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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1979, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat signed a peace treaty arising from their negotiations at Camp
David, bringing an end to the state of war that had existed between the two
nations since Israel had declared its independence thirty-one years earlier. In
so doing, Egypt and Israel created a new international legal order in the
Middle East and a framework for future treaties. The basis for the agreement
was, simply, "land for peace": Israel returned to Egyptian sovereignty the
Sinai Peninsula, which Israel had captured in the 1967 Six-Day War; Egypt
recognized Israel's right to exist and established diplomatic and trade relations
with the Jewish state. 2 The two nations have maintained a peaceful
relationship, if not a friendship, for a quarter-century since.
3
Following the Camp David model, the fitful efforts over the last decade
to forge a negotiated peace between Israel and the Palestinians have also been
based on the land-for-peace concept. With the signing of a series of
agreements arising out of the Oslo negotiations between 1993 and 1995 (the
Oslo Accords), Israel ceded administrative control over parts of the West
Bank (captured from Jordan during the Six-Day War) and the entire Gaza
Strip (captured from Egypt in the same conflict) to the newly recognized
Palestinian Authority (PA) in return for the PA's renunciation of terrorism and
1. Two agreements creating a framework for peace were signed by the Israeli and Egyptian
leaders on September 17, 1978. The peace treaty was signed on March 26, 1979. See SAADIA TOUVAL,
THE PEACE BROKERS 300-03 (1982).
2. Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David, Sept. 17, 1978, Egypt-
Isr., 1138 U.N.T.S. 40, available at http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/-
campdavid/accords.phtml (last visited Dec. 12, 2004); see also Jill Allison Weiner, Israel, Palestine,
and the Oslo Accords, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 230 (1999).
3. See generally Steven L. Spiegel, That Sinking Feeling: At 25, the Israel-Egypt Treaty
Survives But Is Badly Frayed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at MI (calling the countries' relationship a
"cold peace").
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recognition of Israel's right to exist. 4 The commitment of the two sides to
"final status" negotiations by 1998 implied mutual promises of more land5 for
a lasting peace. The failed Camp David II summit of July 2000 and
subsequent negotiations in the final months of Bill Clinton's presidency
focused on proposals according to which Israel would cede more territory and
permit the establishment of a Palestinian state as part of a final resolution of
the conflict between the two nations.6
In September 2000, the second Palestinian intifada (uprising) erupted,
and Israel and Palestine have essentially been at war ever since.7 Despite the
failure of earlier peace attempts, both official and unofficial efforts at
achieving a peaceful resolution of the conflict during this time have continued
to assume a land-for-peace framework. The U.S.-backed "Road Map" for
peace, introduced in April 2003 and endorsed by United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1515, called for an immediate end to Palestinian terrorist
attacks; a stop to Jewish settlement expansion in the West Bank and Gaza
(collectively, the Territories); and the establishment of a Palestinian state, on
specific terms to be negotiated by the parties, by 2005.8 The unofficial Geneva
Accord of December 2003, negotiated by former Israeli cabinet member Yossi
Beilin and former Palestinian Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo (but rejected by
the leadership of both sides), 9 envisioned a final peace agreement between the
4. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993,
Isr.-PLO, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) [hereinafter the Oslo Accords]; Agreement on the Gaza
Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-PLO, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Cairo
Agreement]. Described generally, the Oslo Accords recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and created the Palestinian
National Authority (PA) to govern specified areas within the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO, in turn,
recognized the state of Israel and foreswore the use of violence to achieve its goals. Oslo was
noteworthy more for what it did not say than for what it did. It did not specify which territories the PA
was to control: the Cairo Agreement wound up giving it the Gaza Strip and the area around the city of
Jericho. It also did not outline what the "final status" agreement between the parties would look like,
putting aside contentious issues of borders, Jerusalem, security, and the Palestinian refugees and their
descendants for future talks. Oslo, in short, created a negotiating process, but did not set forth a final
dispensation. In our view, this was a serious error, and this Article proposes inter alia a specific
American plan in place of Oslo's process-oriented approach.
5. Although the Palestinian side viewed the endpoint of the Oslo process as Palestinian
statehood, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin envisioned something short of that. See, e.g., COLIN
KNox & PADRAIC QUIRK, PEACE BUILDING IN NORTHERN IRELAND, ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA:
TRANSITION, TRANSFORMATION, AND RECONCILIATION 100 (2000) (quoting Rabin as opposing the
establishment of a Palestinian state and claiming that the Oslo Agreement does not promise one).
6. See, e.g., BERNARD WASSERSTEIN, ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS: WHY Do THEY FIGHT?
CAN THEY STOP?, 141-45 (2003).
7. By one count, as of June 2004, 3437 Palestinians had been killed and 33,776 wounded,
and 864 Israelis were dead and 6399 wounded. David Rieff, The Maimed, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, §
6 (Magazine), at 30.
8. The Road Map, drafted by the so-called Quartet (consisting of the United States, the
European Union, Russia, and the United Nations), calls for a series of concessions by both sides
eventually leading to the establishment of two states. Under the Road Map formula, first, Israel must
cease settlement-building activities and the Palestinians must cease terrorist activities; second, the
parties will agree to terms establishing a Palestinian state; and third, the parties will agree to terms
concerning the status of Jerusalem. Milton Viorst, The Road Map to Nowhere, WASH. Q., Summer 2003,
at 177.
9. As soon as the Geneva Accord was announced, the Israeli government immediately
condemned it. See, e.g., Gershom Gorenberg, Prefer Peace to the Temple Mount, JERUSALEM REP., Nov.
17, 2003, at 90 ("Prime Minister Sharon labeled the unofficial accord, product of long negotiations by
Israeli doves and Palestinian moderates, as 'an attempt . . . to topple the government by illegitimate
means'-as if Yossi Beilin, the central Israeli negotiator, had circled the Knesset with tanks.").
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two sides on the basis of the establishment of a Palestinian state equivalent in
size to the Territories; the division of Jerusalem between Israel and Palestine,
with Israel retaining sovereignty over the Old City and Palestine obtaining
sovereignty over the Temple Mount; 10 and compensation of Palestinian
refugees who fled Israel during the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War in exchange
for Israeli control over how many refugees may return to Israel."
While, as always, the devil is in the details, both the Road Map and the
Geneva Accord underscore the continued appeal of the land-for-peace
framework as the basis for a negotiated agreement that would end this long-
standing conflict and establish a legal structure to govern the Israeli-
Palestinian relationship. Ridding the lands in which they live of Israeli
occupation, the Palestinians would realize their right to self-determination and
self-government and, for the first time in history, would have the opportunity
and agency to pursue their own vision of the good society. 2 Israelis, in turn,
would free themselves from the physical, psychological, and economic burden
of fighting an ongoing, low-level war against a tenacious enemy, which is
unlikely ever to result in total victory.
The stubborn tenacity of the land-for-peace concept and the equally
stubborn perpetuation of this state of war raise two obvious questions: why has
Although the Palestinian negotiators of the Geneva Accord insisted that PA Chairman Yasser Arafat
endorsed it, Arafat publicly rejected it. See Amon Regular et al., Arafat Rejects Geneva, But Lets
Officials Attend Launch, HA'ARETZ, Dec. 1, 2004, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/-
ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml ("Both supporters and opponents of the draft said they believe Arafat... in
fact believes that the authors are 'trading in national assets and are collaborators with the American
Zionist project.'").
10. The Temple Mount, known as Haram al Sharif("noble sanctuary") to Muslims, is the site
of the Dome of the Rock, from which Muslims believe Mohammed ascended to heaven, and the al Aqsa
Mosque, and is believed by Jews to be the site of the first and second temples. See, e.g., Ken
Ellingwood, Israelis, Muslims Clash at Holy Site, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A3.
11. See The Geneva Accord (Draft Permanent Status Agreement) (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/obj ects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=351461 (last visited Dec. 12,
2004). The People's Voice draft agreement, proposed last September by former Israeli Shin Bet security
chief Ami Ayalon and Palestinian Sari Nusseibeh, prescribes a settlement quite similar to that of the
Geneva Accord, calling for two states based on pre-1967 borders adjusted by equal territorial swaps,
dismantlement of all Jewish settlements not covered by the land swap, an "open" Jerusalem with Israeli
control over Jewish sectors of the city and religious sites and Palestinian control over Arab sectors and
religious sites, and compensation but no right of retum to Israel for Palestinian refugees from ihe 1948
War and their descendants. See People's Voice (July 27, 2002), available at
http://www.mifkad.org.il/en/principles.asp.
12. Palestinians have never had their own, internationally recognized state. The area known as
Palestine was occupied by the Ottoman Empire in 1516 after its defeat of the Mongols. The Ottomans
lost Palestine to Britain as a result of World War I (in 1917-1918), and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-
1949 left the Hashemite rulers of Jordan in control of the West Bank. See generally Weiner, supra note
2, at 234; Tanya Kramer, The Controversy ofa Palestinian "'Right ofReturn " to Israel, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 979, 980-86 (2001). For excellent histories of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the
creation of the British Mandate, see EFRA IM & INARI KARSH, EMPIRES OF THE SAND: THE STRUGGLE FOR
MASTERY OF THE MIDDLE EAST, 1789-1923 (2000); DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE: THE
FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST (1990). An important
although highly controversial description of Jordan's conquest of the West Bank in 1948-1949 is Avi
SHLAIM, COLLUSION ACROSS THE JORDAN: KING ABDULLAH, THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, AND THE
PARTITION OF PALESTINE (1988). Shlaim's work receives a thorough, trenchant, and respectful critique
in ITAMAR RABINOVICH, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: EARLY ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS (1991), which
also provides important background on Jordanian actions. It receives a thorough, trenchant, and not-
very-respectful critique in EFRAIM KARSH, FABRICATING ISRAELI HISTORY: THE "NEW HISTORIANS" 69-
193 (1997). Another excellent history of the 1948 war is YOAV GELBER, PALESTINE 1948: WAR, ESCAPE
AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM (2001).
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resolution of the Middle East conflict proven so elusive, and how can an
interested third party such as the United States help break the deadlock? These
questions are especially timely following the November 2004 death of
Palestinian leader and icon Yasser Arafat. His passing, along with the end of
the U.S. presidential election cycle, has created new enthusiasm for Middle
East peace efforts.
There is, of course, no shortage of observers with opinions about why
the Israelis and Palestinians are at war and what needs to be done to end it.
Prescriptions abound on U.S. newspaper op-ed pages every day, and the
Middle East conflict is a constant topic of discussion in news magazines and
on television talk shows. Most of the participants in these debates are
partisans of one side, more eager to denigrate the enemy and list conditions
for what "they" need to do than to analyze why the parties have jointly failed
to negotiate an agreement for a quarter-century. The scholarly literature is
only slightly more dispassionate, and it also generally fails to put the collapse
of negotiations in a useful theoretical framework.13
In this Article, we attempt to analyze the impasse in Israeli-Palestinian
peace negotiations-asking why it has arisen and how a third party can help
the two sides get beyond it-from a unique conceptual perspective. Rather
than dwell on particular historical events and antagonisms, our approach will
be to use the analytical tools of interdisciplinary negotiation theory to
categorize the range of roadblocks to a land-for-peace agreement and, from
that analysis, to deduce the features of a U.S.-sponsored peace initiative that
would have the best possible chance of overcoming the impasse. Our goal,
then, is not to offer new facts about the events and antagonisms of the Middle
East. Rather, we aim to provide a new analytical framework for organizing
and making sense of the consequences of those antagonisms and deriving
public policy recommendations from them.
Our approach to examining the Israeli-Palestinian impasse leads us to
the following conclusions. The failure of the parties to reach an agreement
based on the land-for-peace framework can be attributed to some combination
of three common roadblocks to negotiation success: (a) the absence of a
bargaining zone, such that no single set of agreement terms would be
preferable to continued impasse for both parties; (b) internal division within
one or both principal parties, such that an agent or a minority faction with the
ability to block an agreement undermines a result that would benefit the party
as a whole; and (c) mutual "hard bargaining," such that both sides refuse to
13. See, e.g., THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS: OSLO AND THE LESSONS OF FAILURE
(Robert L. Rothstein et al. eds., 2002) (various essays describing the failures of the Oslo peace process);
Reflections on the Peace Process and a Durable Settlement: A Roundup of Views, J. OF PALESTINE
STUDIES, Autumn 1996, at 5 (featuring commentary by Abdel Monem Said Aly, Rashid I. Khalid,
Camille Mansour, Moshe Ma'oz, Sir Anthony Parsons, William B. Quandt, Eric Rouleau, Ghassan
Salame, and Khalil Shikaki); Yuval Elizur, Israel Banks on a Fence, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2003, at
106; Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 9,
2001, at 59; Deborah Sontag, Quest for Middle East Peace: How and Why it Failed, N.Y. TIMES, July
26, 2001, at Al. Two recent scholarly works putting the blame squarely on the Palestinians, and on
Arafat in particular, are EFRAIM KARSH, ARAFAT'S WAR: THE MAN AND HIS BATTLE FOR ISRAELI
CONQUEST (2003), and BARRY RUBIN & JUDITH COLP RUBrN, YASIR ARAFAT: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
(2003).
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accept an agreement that would be preferable to impasse and instead hold out
for an even more desirable agreement.
Because the parties' rhetoric can be consistent with any of these
explanations, only an omniscient observer could know for sure which of these
three roadblocks (or combination thereof) is actually the but-for cause of the
ongoing impasse. Consequently, any U.S.-sponsored peace initiative would be
most likely to succeed in bringing peace to the Middle East if it were to
include a conscious plan to overcome each of these roadblocks. We propose
that such a plan should include three crucial features. First, the United States
should present a non-negotiable set of terms to the two disputing parties that
they can either take or leave but not bargain over. Second, because carrots and
sticks linked to the terms of the deal may maximize the chances of success,
the United States should offer side payments to the parties if they accept the
proposed deal and simultaneously threaten to withhold political and economic
support if the plan is rejected. Finally, Washington should work with the
disputants and with U.S. allies to limit the ability of Palestinians and Israelis
who are opposed to an agreement to stand in its way.
Our analysis proceeds in five parts. In Part II, we define and describe
those concepts from negotiation theory that are useful for organizing the
analysis of any bargaining situation, and then situate the ongoing (if that word
is not too optimistic) Israeli-Palestinian peace process within that conceptual
structure. In Parts III, IV, and V, we specifically consider each of the three
common roadblocks to a negotiated agreement as they relate to the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute, and discuss what strategies might be appropriate to
overcome those roadblocks and whether they are feasible in this particular
context. In Part VI, we draw on the conclusions reached in the prior four Parts
to propose and discuss the particular elements that should comprise a U.S.-
sponsored peace initiative designed to maximize the chances of success.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL APPARATUS
A. Reservation Points and the Bargaining Zone
In any bargaining setting, negotiations can have only one of two
outcomes: agreement or impasse. 14 Agreement, of course, requires the assent
of each party. The minimum set of terms necessary for a party to prefer
agreement to impasse is called that party's "reservation point."' 5 If a set of
terms causes a party to favor agreement over impasse, the potential deal
"exceeds" the party's reservation point. The content of a party's reservation
point depends on the consequence of impasse. The set of terms constituting a
party's reservation point will be less favorable to that party, or "lower," if
impasse is extremely undesirable than if impasse is only moderately
undesirable. A negotiator's reservation point, then, is dependent on how that
party perceives the quality of the outside options, or Best Alternative to a
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).16 A person shopping for a new car will
14. See RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 14 (2002).
15. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 45 (1982).
16. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 104 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
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have a lower reservation point if the car she currently owns is inoperable than
if it is in good working order.
In a two-party negotiation in which the interests of the parties (other
than their mutual interest in reaching an agreement) are generally opposed to
one another (for example, an agreement term that benefits one party is costly
to the other), we can plot possible sets of agreement terms (deals) on a simple
one-dimensional graph (Figure 1 below). Deals more desirable to one party
fall on the left side, and deals more desirable to the other party go on the right.
If a car buyer negotiates with a car dealer, an agreement that includes a low
price, an extensive warranty, and extra options would be located on the left
side of the graph, indicating that such a deal would be relatively more
favorable to the buyer. An agreement calling for a stripped-down model, a
high price, and no warranty would be positioned on the right side, indicating
that it would be relatively more favorable to the seller. Deals for a high price
and an extensive warranty on the one hand, and for a low price and no
warranty on the other, would be located in the middle of the graph, between
the two extremes.
The buyer's and the seller's reservation points can also be plotted on the
graph, dividing the deals that each would prefer to impasse from those deals
they would not. If the buyer's reservation point is located to the right of the
seller's reservation point, this indicates the existence of deals that both parties
would prefer to impasse. This conceptual space is called the "bargaining
zone." 17 The existence of a bargaining zone, which might contain only one
deal or many different deals, is a necessary condition of an agreement because
without a bargaining zone any set of deal terms will be unacceptable to at least
one party. A bargaining zone is not a sufficient condition for agreement,
however, because, for reasons explored below, one or both parties might




17. See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1792-
94 (2000).
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B. Situating the Middle East Conflict
The Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations can be mapped on a similar
graph (Figure 2 below). On the left-hand side is the best possible resolution of
the conflict from the Palestinian perspective. This outcome might include a
complete withdrawal of Jews from the region and the establishment of a
Palestinian state in what is now Israel and the Territories. We can label this
agreement "Israeli surrender." Closer to the middle of the chart, although only
slightly, might be the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Territories and
East Jerusalem and the establishment of a Palestinian state therein; Israeli
recognition of the right of return to Israel of Palestinian refugees who left their
homes during the 1948 War; and no official recognition of Israel by the
Palestinians. At the other end of the graph would be the best possible
agreement from the Israeli perspective, which we can label "Palestinian
surrender." Perhaps this outcome would include the Palestinians departing the
Territories for other Arab lands, which would leave the entire territory
currently controlled by Israel to the Jewish state. Slightly toward the center
from that point would be Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel
(including East Jerusalem); an end to all violence against Israelis; a
renunciation of the right of return; maintenance of Israeli settlements in the
Territories; and limited Palestinian autonomy in portions of the Territories.
FIGURE 2
Such extreme outcomes clearly lie outside of any bargaining zone that
may exist. Somewhere toward the center of the chart are various conceptions
of what we have described as land for peace, which are alternatively referred
to as the "two-state solution." '1 8 All the proposals within this rubric envision a
18. A comprehensive discussion of the idea and history of the two-state solutioni, and the
antipathy that hard-line Israelis and Palestinians feel toward it, can be found in the introduction and
articles contained in s the Two-State Solution in Danger?, HA'ARETZ, at
www.haaretz.com/hasenlpages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=383879 (last visited Dee. 12, 2004). See also When
the Two State Solution is No Longer Viahle, bitterlemons.org, at
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final-status agreement between the parties resulting in a state of Palestine
living at peace with Israel. Beyond that fundamental starting point, however,
the general land-for-peace concept is consistent with a variety of different
specific agreements concerning difficult issues such as territorial boundaries,
Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements in the Territories, and control over
Jerusalem and the holy sites. Depending on its specific terms, a land-for-peace
agreement could be relatively more desirable for the Palestinians or for Israel.
Versions of a land-for-peace agreement that lie to the left of Israel's
reservation point or to the right of the Palestinians' reservation point, such as
L/P1 and L/P5 in Figure 2, by definition cannot be achieved because one side
or the other would prefer continued warfare to acquiescing to an agreement on
such terms. In contrast, versions of an agreement that lie between the parties'
reservation points (such as L/P 2 through L/P 4 in Figure 2), if they exist, are
potentially attainable.
The following Parts of this Article rely on this conceptual structure as a
framework for categorizing and analyzing why the Israelis and Palestinians
have failed to reach a peace agreement to date, and for considering what U.S.
policy initiatives might increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement. Two
simplifying assumptions are employed. First, we assume Israel and Palestine
to be unitary actors. This does not mean that we assume all Israelis or all
Palestinians assess the situation in the Middle East identically or have the
same preferences. We realize that diversity of preferences on one or both sides
to the conflict can create barriers to agreement, and we explicitly consider this
problem in Part IV. When we discuss the preferences of Israel or the
reservation point of Palestine, however, we assume the existence of collective
preferences of members of the two nations, be those preferences unanimous or
merely a reflection of majority interests.
Second, we assume a "thin" version of rational behavior' 9 on the part of
Israel and Palestine. Thus, we assume rational behavior in the sense that each
party has preferences for various deal terms and outcomes of peace
negotiations, and that each acts in a way intended to maximize the satisfaction
20of those preferences given expected uncertainties. In other words, we
assume that neither side makes decisions or takes actions randomly,
haphazardly, or without the desire to have those decisions or actions further
identifiable goals. For example, the hypothesis that a party chooses an action
obviously contrary to its interests and desires solely due to "God's will" falls
outside of our model. If the long-standing impasse in the Middle East actually
http://www.bitteriemons.org/previousb160603ed23.html (June 16, 2003); cf S.C. Res. 1397, U.N.
SCOR, 4489th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 397 (2002). Strictly speaking, the Resolution does not say "two
states for two peoples," but rather merely envisions two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side.
Theoretically then, one could argue that "Israel" in this case would mean a predominantly Arab state.
Linguistically, it is hard to imagine any Arab state calling itself "Israel"; more practically, it is hard to
imagine that the United States would be willing to see the destruction of its principal ally in the Middle
East.
19. See generally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 17-19 (1994).
20. Id.; see also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1062-64 (2002)
(describing the expected utility version of rational choice theory).
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results from this type of thinking on the part of one or both parties, our
analysis will shed little light on the conflict.
Our "thin" rationality assumption, however, does not mean that we
assume that either party to the conflict maintains a particular ordering of
preferences or set of beliefs about the world, or that its preference function
reflects only material goals. Our framework allows that either side might have
preferences or beliefs-based on emotions, culture, or history-that many
outsiders might find difficult to understand, and that the extent to which the
disputants are willing to trade material goods (such as money or territory)
versus more intangible items (such as a sense of historical justice) might also
perplex some outside observers. Finally, our framework allows for the
possibility of miscalculation: that is, one or both parties might take actions on
the mistaken belief that those actions will have a particular consequence,
when in fact another consequence results.
C. Roadblocks to Conflict Resolution
Our conceptual apparatus permits us to describe plausible explanations
of why Israel and Palestine have failed to reach a negotiated agreement as
falling into one of three distinct categories. First, it is possible that Israel,
Palestine, or both have such high reservation points that no bargaining zone
exists; that is, for all the talk of land for peace, there simply is no specific
version of a land-for-peace agreement that both Israel and the Palestinians
would prefer to continued warfare. Second, it is possible that there is a
bargaining zone that encompasses one or more specific versions of a land-for-
peace agreement, such that both parties would find that agreement dominates
continued impasse, but that a minority of actors within Israel, Palestine, or
both who hold contrary preferences can block agreement by preventing the
majority from entering into or implementing the deal. Third, it is possible that
there is a bargaining zone and that the parties have the ability to reach a
mutually beneficial agreement, but that an agreement proves elusive
nonetheless because both parties continue to press for a better deal rather than
settle for a merely acceptable one.
The conceptual lens through which we view the Middle East conflict is
useful not only for identifying and describing the causes of negotiation failure,
but also for prescribing policy interventions geared toward breaking the
impasse. Each of the three categories of roadblocks to a peace agreement that
we describe logically suggests the need for different policies on the part of the
disputants themselves or interested outsiders.
Whether a hypothetical agreement exceeds a negotiator's reservation
point depends on the relationship between two variables, as perceived by the
negotiator: the relative quality of the agreement's terms and the relative
quality of the negotiator's BATNA. This suggests that if no bargaining zone
currently exists, one might develop if the terms of the deal are-altered to make
agreement more desirable to one or both parties or if actions are taken to make
the BATNA of one or both parties less appealing.
In contrast, if a bargaining zone exists but minorities block the
agreement, the implications are dramatically different. Steps must be taken to
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eliminate or co-opt the capacity of the rejectionist forces to exercise blocking
power.
Finally, if a bargaining zone exists but impasse persists because one or
both parties hold out for a more advantageous agreement rather than settling
for one that is merely acceptable, the actions to be taken will differ once more.
Either conditions must be changed to make one or both parties more impatient
to reach agreement, or both parties have to be convinced that they can do no
better than a particular set of terms that lies, among others, within the
bargaining zone.
III. ABSENCE OF A BARGAINING ZONE
At first glance, peaceful coexistence would seem to dominate ongoing
warfare, with its accompanying death, physical destruction, and (at least for
the Palestinians) economic hardship. In fact, however, there might be no
specific set of land-for-peace terms such that agreement actually is preferable
to conflict for both sides. This Part considers how the absence of a bargaining
zone might be precluding a peace agreement. Conceptually, this could be the
case if Israel has such a high reservation point that no version of a land-for-
peace agreement is preferable to impasse from its perspective; if Palestine has
such a high reservation point that no version of a land-for-peace agreement is
preferable to impasse from its perspective; or if both parties have moderately
high reservation points, such that some versions of a land-for-peace agreement
would be desirable for each but no single possible agreement would be more
desirable than impasse for both. We divide our discussion, however, into
sections that consider why each party might have a reservation point
sufficiently high that, given the other's reservation point, no agreement is
possible, and a section that explores potential interventions to overcome this
roadblock.
A. Potential Sources of a High Palestinian Reservation Point
Pictures of Palestinians waiting for hours on end at Israeli military
checkpoints, of Palestinian children caught in the crossfire as the Israeli army
attacks militants, and of squalid living conditions in Palestinian refugee camps
are fixtures on U.S. television news. Unemployment in the Territories exceeds
fifty percent, and the Palestinian population, once wealthy by Arab standards,
must rely on international aid to survive. 21 A negotiated agreement with Israel
that results in the founding of an autonomous Palestinian state would
immediately improve some of these features of Palestinian life and allow the
Palestinians an opportunity to improve others. Surely, such a deal would be
preferable to Palestine than pursuing its BATNA of armed insurgency against
the best-financed and best-armed military force in the Middle East. This
21. See Ghassan Khatib, Where Are We Now?, bitterlemons.org, at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bll290903ed37.html (Sept. 29, 2003) ("In three years of
confrontation, Israel managed to reduce by half the struggling Palestinian economy .... [and was]
responsible for an unemployment rate that skyrocketed from 37 to 50 percent. The number of
Palestinians living below the poverty line rose in turn to 60 percent.").
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conclusion is not obviously correct, however, because it overlooks two
important features of life in the region: emotion and demography.
1. The Right of Return
In 1947, the United Nations approved a partition between Arabs and
Jews of British Mandate Palestine, stretching from the Mediterranean to the
Jordan River. Most Arab leaders rejected the terms of the partition. When the
British withdrew from the area in 1948, Jewish leaders proclaimed an
independent state of Israel, and war broke out between the fledgling nation
and the armies of the surrounding Arab countries.2 2 During the Arab-Israeli
war of 1948-1949, between 500,000 and one million Palestinians who resided
within the borders of what became Israel left their homes and moved to Arab-
controlled lands.2 3 The cause of this large displacement, known to Palestinians
as al-Nakba (the "disaster" or "catastrophe") 4 is a bitterly contested historical
fact: Palestinians claim that they were forced out by the Jewish military
forces, while Israelis claim that Palestinians chose to relocate temporarily in
the hopes that invading Arab armies would conquer the territory.2 5 Today,
these Palestinian refugees and their descendents, roughly four million people
in all, 26 live in the Territories and in surrounding Arab nations, many of them
in refugee camps.27 Whatever the historical causes of this situation, the fate of
the refugees has been a significant impediment to Israeli-Palestinian peace
efforts for decades. Palestinian leaders have consistently demanded the right
of return of the refugees and their descendants to their former homes inside
Israel's pre-1967 borders as a prerequisite for a final peace agreement.
28
It is widely believed that no peace agreement that were to include the
right of large numbers of Palestinians to move to Israel proper would exceed
Israel's reservation point.29 Today, approximately twenty percent of Israel's
22. E.g., AVRAM S. BORNSTEIN, CROSSING THE GREEN LINE BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND
ISRAEL 39-40 (2002).
23. E.g., BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949, at
297-98 (1987). Israelis and Palestinians disagree on the exact numbers, with Israelis favoring lower
estimates and Palestinians higher estimates. See Kramer, supra note 12, at 990.
24. Bornstein, supra note 22, at 40.
25. Compare EDWARD W. SAID, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE 101 (2d ed. 1992), with Marie
Syrkin, The Palestinian Refugees: Resettlement, Repatriation, or Restoration?, in ISRAEL, THE ARABS
AND THE MIDDLE EAST 157, 159-66 (Irving Howe & Carl Gershman eds., 1972). A good summary of the
various competing claims is provided in ROGER FISHER ET AL., COPING WITH INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT:
A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 33-36 (1997). The truth
almost certainly resides somewhere in between the two extreme views. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 12,
at 996-98; John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 171, 182
(1998); Wadie Said, The Palestinians in Lebanon: The Rights of the Victims of the Palestinian-Israeli
Peace Process, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 315, 345 (1999); Justus R. Weiner, The Palestinian
Refugees' "Right to Return" and the Peace Process, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1997).
26. See United Nations Relief and Works Agency, Total Registered Refugees per Country and
Area (June 30, 2003), at http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/statis-01 .html.
27. Contrary to the implication of the term "camps," these settlements are made of permanent,
if often squalid, housing developments.
28. Kramer, supra note 12, at 995; Weiner, supra note 25, at l.
29. Avishai Ehrlich, Israel's Religious Right and the Failure of the Peace Process, MONTHLY
REV., Oct. 2001, at 16, 16-17; Weiner, supra note 25, at 1.
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6.5 million citizens are Arab. 30 The mass immigration of the Palestinian
refugees and their descendants to Israel would cause a huge shift in the
demographic balance and, given the disparity between the birthrates of Israeli
Arabs and Israeli Jews, would raise the likely prospect that in the very near
future Israel would cease to be a majority-Jewish nation.3' It is probable that
Israel would prefer protracted warfare with a hostile neighbor to preserve its
existence over a peace agreement that would sow the seeds for the non-violent
destruction of the Jewish state.
But if any agreement that includes the right of return would fall below
the reservation point of Israel, it is also possible that any agreement that
sacrifices the right of return would fall below the reservation point of
Palestine. 32 This point is difficult for many Westerners to understand because
it seems to turn a blind eye to the current realities of life in the Middle East.
Today, Palestinian refugees have no ability to return to their ancestral homes
within pre-1967 Israel, and there is no realistic possibility of winning the right
of return by force of arms. Thus, Palestinians would not be tangibly worse off
by renouncing the right of return as part of a land-for-peace agreement, and a
peace agreement would make them far better off in other respects. From this
perspective, it would appear that the land-for-peace agreement strictly
dominates the Palestinians' BATNA of continuing their low-level armed
struggle against Israel.
The logic of this argument is inescapable on one level, but it might be
flawed because it underestimates the emotional content of the issue for the
Palestinian psyche. 33 The Palestinians might believe that the psychological
cost of renouncing the right of return would be greater than the physical and
economic deprivations that they suffer under Israeli occupation.
34
2. Demographic Shifts Favor Palestine in the Long Term
Although land for peace undoubtedly would improve the quality of life
for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in the immediate future,
Palestinians rationally might believe that their nation would be better off in
the long term without such an agreement. Demographic trends suggest that the
passage of time conceivably could aid the stated Palestinian goal of taking
control of pre-1967 Israel, in addition to the Territories, even without the
return of the Palestinian refugees to Israel.
As noted above, Arabs currently comprise approximately twenty percent
of the population of Israel proper. But high Arab and low Jewish birthrates
suggest that this population balance is not stable. According to one study, non-
30. Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, The Population, by Religion and Population Group,
http://wwwl.cbs.gov.il/shnaton55/st02_01 .pdf (2004); see also WASSERSTEIN, supra note 6, at 25-26.
31. Israeli Jewish women have on average 2.5 children. Israeli Arab women have on average
4.7 children. Palestinian women living in the Territories have on average nearly 6 children.
WASSERSTEIN, supra note 6, at 26. For further discussion, see infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
32. For some evidence that this may no longer be true, see infra Part VI.B. 1.b.
33. A Palestinian representative at the 2000 Camp David talks called the attempt to deal with
the refugee issue "the moment of truth" and lamented the Israeli position on refugees as "[t]he greatest
failure of the summit." Akram Hanich, The Camp David Papers, J. PALESTINE STUD., winter 2001, at
75, 82.
34. Kramer, supra note 12, at 994-1001.
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Jews will comprise approximately one-third of the Israeli population within
the pre-1967 borders by 2020. 35 Other studies indicate that Israeli Arabs, who
have the same voting rights as Israeli Jews, could outnumber Jews in Israel
proper by mid-century, especially if Jewish immigration to Israel from
abroad slows, which it almost certainly must. 37 Palestinians willing to
sacrifice present well-being for future goals (i.e., Palestinians with high
discount rates) might think it worth the costs of occupation today to avoid an
agreement that would recognize the ongoing existence of a Jewish state and
provide an incentive for Arabs to leave Israel to settle in an independent
Palestinian state. Although it is fanciful to think that Israel will be driven out
of existence by force of arms, it is less fanciful to think that a peaceful
takeover of the Jewish state through the electoral system is possible in time.
Although an enfranchised Arab majority within Israel proper is
somewhat speculative and, at a minimum, remains decades away, an Arab
majority in the combined areas of Israel and the Territories is virtually certain
to become a reality in the very near future. Today, Jews slightly outnumber
Arabs in the area from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, but higher
Arab birthrates suggest Arabs should become the majority as early as 2007.38
Although West Bank and Gaza Palestinians lack the right to vote in Israeli
elections, when Arabs become the region's majority they could change their
political goal from a separate Palestinian state to full citizenship in Israel,
which they could then presumably dominate through the democratic process.
It is unlikely Israel would grant such rights, but Palestine might believe that
the moral force of its position in the eyes of the world would provide it with
greater leverage in negotiating a land-for-peace deal than it enjoys now. Some
researchers contend, in fact, that the high birthrate is viewed by some
35. Amon Soffer, Wash. Inst. for Near East Pol'y, Demographics in the Israeli-Palestinian
Dispute, PEACEWATCH No. 370, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/-
peacewatch2002/370.htm (Mar. 22, 2002).
36. See Erik Schechter, Doomsday Demographer Gets a Hearing at the Prime Minister's
Office, JERUSALEM REP., Nov. 5, 2001, at 5 (citing Hebrew University demographer Sergio della Pergola
for the projection that in fifty years the Jewish "majority would be severely eroded by the Israeli Arab
natural growth rate of over 3 percent." Israel's annual Jewish growth rate, including immigration, says
della Pergola, is 2.5 percent.).
37. There simply are not many Jews left living in non-Western countries. For example, many
Jews emigrated from former Eastern-block countries following the collapse of communism. Fewer than
500,000 Jews now live in the former Soviet Union. WASSERSTEIN, supra note 6, at 26. In 2003,. fewer
than 25,000 people immigrated to Israel. James Bennet, Sharon's Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, § 6
(Magazine), at 31.
38. Reliable statistics on this issue are notoriously difficult to obtain because governments are
not happy to disclose numbers and because of the difficulty of conducting surveys, particularly during a
war. Hasan Abu Libdeh, the director of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, says that equilibrium
will be reached by 2006, and the Palestinian majority will grow each year after that. See Time Is in the
Palestinians' Favor, bitterlemons.org, at http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bll20104ed2.html (Jan.
12, 2004) ("If we talk about the area from the river to the sea, at this moment Jews are a minority vis--
vis non-Jews, because we count about 300,000 foreign workers. Jews are about 48-49 percent, and will
decrease to about 39 percent in another 16 years."); Where the Facts May Lead To, bitterlemons.org, at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bll20104ed2.html (Jan. 12, 2004); see also Ina Friedman, More
Arabs than Jews Already Between the River and the Sea, Top Demographer Suggests, JERUSALEM REP.,
Oct. 20, 2003, at 5, available at http://www.jrep.com/Reporter/Article-19.html (predicting demographic
transition between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea by 2010).
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Palestinians explicitly as a political weapon. 39 With a perceived increase in
bargaining power on the horizon, Palestine might believe that no land-for-
peace agreement---or, alternatively, only versions of an agreement that would
require it to make very few sacrifices-would exceed its reservation point.
B. Potential Sources of a High Israeli Reservation Point
As is true for Palestinians, the benefits of a land-for-peace agreement for
Israelis would be significant. Peace would mean an end to bus bombings,
attacks on Israeli soldiers, negative publicity around the world, and the
economic and psychological costs of occupying the West Bank and Gaza. But
as is true for the Palestinians, it is not obvious from the Israeli perspective that
the benefits of any particular peace agreement would outweigh its costs. Two
plausible explanations exist for why Israel's reservation point might exceed
the terms of any land-for-peace agreement---or at least exceed the terms of
any version of a land-for-peace agreement that would require it to make
significant sacrifices-thus constituting a roadblock to a negotiated settlement
of the conflict.
1. "Greater Israel" and the Settlements
After occupying the West Bank and Gaza during the Six-Day War, and
especially after Prime Minister Begin's conservative Likud government came
to power in 1977, Israel began an intensive government-sponsored program of
constructing Jewish settlements throughout the Territories. 40 Today,
approximately 440,000 Jewish Israelis reside in these settlements, 4 1 the largest
of which houses 25,000 people.42 Just as Palestine has its emotional issue in
the conflict-the right of return-Israel has its emotional issue in the form of
the settlements.
Although the relatively low cost of subsidized housing lured many
Jewish settlers to the West Bank, 43 others moved to establish a Jewish
presence on the land consisting of the biblical territories of Judeah and
Samaria, which the Old Testament says God promised to the Jews. 44 To these
settlers and their supporters in Israel, maintenance of Jewish control of the
region is a religious imperative and anything, including living in armed
fortresses indefinitely, is superior to a peace agreement that would ensure
39. See Elia Zureik, Demography and Transfer: Israel's Road to Nowhere, 24 THIRD WORLD
Q. 619, 623 (2003).
40. David Newman, How the Settler Suburbs Grew, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2002, at A21.
41. This number includes settlements in parts of East Jerusalem annexed by Israel in 1980 and
thus technically not considered part of the Territories by Israel. Israeli settlements in the West Bank
house approximately 230,000 people, settlements in East Jerusalem count 200,000 residents, and 8000
settlers live in Gaza. Steven Erlanger, Lawmakers Back Sharon on Plan for Leaving Gaza, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2004, at Al.
42. Gershom Gorenberg, Road Map to Grand Apartheid?, AM. PROSPECT, July-Aug. 2003, at
16, 16.
43. See, e.g., WASSERSTEIN, supra note 6, at 128 (claiming most settlers were motivated to
move to the Territories by their interest in cheap housing within commuting distance of Jerusalem or Tel
Aviv); Newman, supra note 40.
44. Ehrlich, supra note 29, at 16.
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exclusive Arab control of the West Bank.45 These religious ideals have had a
significant effect on Israeli government policy. Yitzhak Shamir, Israeli prime
minister from 1983-1984 and again from 1986-1992, famously admitted after
leaving office that his participation in the "peace process" was designed to
stall and avoid any agreement requiring the return of occupied territory to the
46Palestinians. More recently, riots broke out in June 2003 when Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon ordered a small Jewish settlement (of only 100
residents) dismantled as a gesture urged by President George W. Bush at the
Road Map summit the prior month.47
2. "Land for War" and the Problem of Moral Hazard
No Palestinian government could guarantee that no act of violence
would ever be committed against Israelis following a final agreement between
the parties. But for the promise of "peace" in an agreement based on the land-
for-peace concept to have any currency, Palestine would have to commit to
using all the resources at its disposal to prevent any acts of terror from
emanating from its territory and promise to punish harshly any such acts that
do occur.
A common roadblock to reaching a negotiated agreement in any
situation in which the parties' performance obligations will be non-
simultaneous is the fear of the first-performing party that it will fulfill its
duties in good faith, only to see the second-performing party shirk in the
performance of its duties or act contrary to the interests of the first-performing
party. This problem is commonly known as "moral hazard." 48 One
impediment to insurance agreements, for example, is that once an insurance
company assumes the risk of loss, the insured party loses some of its
motivation to take all possible steps to avoid or minimize losses, and might
behave carelessly. A barrier to the formation of service contract agreements is
that once the customer agrees to a certain fee, the seller lacks an incentive to
use maximum effort while performing the services.
In the context of a business transaction within the boundaries of a
sovereign state with an established rule of law, the moral hazard problem is
somewhat mitigated by the threat of the first-performing party to sue for
breach of contract, at least if the second-performing party's obligations can be
clearly specified ex ante and its failure to satisfy them proven in court ex post.
International agreements lack this backstop of a judicial mechanism backed by
the coercive power necessary to enforce its judgments.
45. See, e.g., Benjamin Beit-Haflahmi, Some Psychosocial and Cultural Factors in the Arab-
Israeli Conflict: A Review of the Literature, 16 J. CONFLICT REs. 269, 276 (1972); Uri Avnery, Sharon
May Have Helped Create a Monster-Israel's Settler Movement, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2004, at B13;
Armon Rubinstein, Why the Israelis are Being Difficult, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 18, 1971, at 32.
46. Robert I. Friedman, Land for Peace-Rabin's Dilemma, NATION, Nov. 9, 1992, at 542,
542 (quoting from Shamir's interview with the Israeli paper Ma'ariv); Bob Hepburn, Israeli PM's
Dreams Turn into Struggle for Survival, TORONTO STAR, June 25, 1993, at A25.
47. Greg Myre, Israel Dismantles a Settlement and Ignites a Family Feud, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 2003, at A10.
48. See generally KOROBKIN, supra note 14, at 138-39.
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Bargaining parties may further reduce the moral hazard risk by building
into an agreement specific sanctions for shirking. In ordinary business
negotiations, when moral hazard is a significant risk, contracting parties often
structure agreements to make payment contingent on the quality of
performance. For example, a homeowner is wise to structure an agreement
with a contractor so that the final payment is withheld until work is complete
to the homeowner's satisfaction.
In a land-for-peace agreement, however, all Israeli performance would
necessarily be finished prior to the completion of Palestinian performance.
That is, even as Israel fully withdrew from Palestinian lands and permitted the
formation of an autonomous Palestinian state, it would continue to rely on the
commitment of Palestine to use the full weight of its authority to prevent and
punish any terrorist acts planned or committed by any enemies of Israel
residing in Palestine.
The fundamental problem is that, in an agreement based on the concept
of land for peace, territory must be provided at a point certain, whereas the
obligation to provide peace continues indefinitely. If Israel's sacrifice of land
were contingent on Palestine's indefinite provision of peace, Palestine would
never receive its benefit of the bargain. But if Palestine's commitment of
peace were contingent on Israel's provision of land, Israel could (and does)
fear that once it acts, Palestine will shirk its continuing obligation to provide
peace by using insufficient energy to identify terrorist networks, insufficient
force to stop them, or insufficient punishment to incapacitate them.49 At the
extreme, the government of Palestine might even collude with terrorists,
turning a blind eye to or supporting violence against Israelis.
Fears of this result could cause Israel to determine that a land-for-peace
agreement would result in significant costs to Israel while failing to bring real
peace. From this perspective, it is conceivable that Israel might believe that
any land-for-peace agreement resulting in the establishment of a Palestinian
state would fall below Israel's reservation point.
The evident futility of the Israeli government's apparent attempts to deal
with this problem indicates how hard it is to solve. Prime Minister Sharon has
often demanded that the PA crack down on terrorism prior to Israeli
concessions or even peace talks, a position he reiterated immediately after
Arafat's death. 50 If the PA can control militant groups, doing so would
demonstrate that it is able to deliver peace when it is motivated to do so, and
thus that militant groups cannot essentially veto a peace agreement. But PA
compliance with this demand of Sharon's would not reduce the risk of post-
49. A typical Israeli view is expressed by current Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff
Moshe Ya'alon, who recently remarked in an interview with the Israeli daily Ma 'ariv that "Arafat saw
Oslo as a Trojan Horse ... he does not recognize Israel's fight to exist as a Jewish state and his game
plan is to bring about Israel's disintegration .... Time and after time, he promises his people that Israeli
society is about to break." Quote Unquote, JERUSALEM REP., Sept. 23, 2002, at 51; see also Benny
Morris, Peace? No Chance, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 21, 2002, at 2 (arguing, among other things, that
Palestinian peace moves are solely part of a strategy of stages designed to allow for more effective
future warmaking).
50. See, e.g., Aluf Berm & Arnon Regular, Sharon: No Gestures to PA After Arafat,
HA'ARETZ, Nov. 11, 2004, http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=500074-
&contrassID=l; Leslie Susser, Conference? What Conference?, JERUSALEM REP., June 17, 2002, at 14.
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agreement shirking. What a person is willing to do in order to obtain what he
wants is often very different from what he will do after he has obtained what
he wants. The Israeli preoccupation with stopping terrorism before a
negotiated agreement is reached belies the difficulty of preventing post-
settlement shirking.
C. Overcoming the Roadblock of the Absence of a Bargaining Zone
When no bargaining zone exists between the reservation points of
negotiating parties, impasse is temporarily unavoidable-but two types of
changes in circumstances can make agreement attainable. Changes to the
status quo or other non-agreement alternatives can make the parties' BATNAs
relatively less attractive, thus shifting the parties' reservation points lower.
Alternatively, changes to the envisioned terms of a plausible agreement can
make agreement relatively more desirable to one or both parties, effectively
expanding the conceptual space between the disputants' reservation points.7
This section explores the prospects for creating a bargaining zone in the
Middle East if, in fact, the absence of a bargaining zone explains the long-
standing impasse between Israel and Palestine.
1. Degrading BA TNAs
In a business negotiation, each party often has a BATNA beyond the
control of the other. For example, if Seller S and Buyer B are attempting to
negotiate a sales contract, S might have a BATNA of selling his goods to A
for a certain package of terms X. To have any hope of reaching a deal with S,
B must convince S that the terms he offers are superior to X; he has no hope
of changing X. Conflicting nations, however, often have the power to affect
their enemy's BATNA by making its pursuit unpleasant. This statement is
certainly true in the Middle East.
One plausible explanation for the last thirty-eight years of violence and
bloodshed in the Holy Land is that each side is engaged in a constant effort to
convince the other that its BATNA is worse-in fact, much worse-than
previously believed. Just in case Israel believed that its BATNA was to
occupy the Territories peacefully, Palestine staged the first and second
intifadas, effectively changing Israel's BATNA to include suffering attacks
against Israeli military targets and suicide bombings aimed at Israeli civilians.
Palestine believes that if Israel suffers enough, it will determine that its
BATNA is so undesirable that it will lower its reservation point and be willing
to agree to peace terms desired by Palestine.
Israel's armed responses to the intifadas in the Territories and terrorist
attacks on Israeli civilians can be understood as an attempt to convince
Palestine that the latter's BATNA is worse that it might otherwise have
believed. If Palestinians understand that their alternative to a peace agreement
is not merely Israeli control of the Territories but military rule, frequent
curfews, endless waiting at checkpoints, border closures, high unemployment,
51. See, e.g, Korobkin, Positive Theory, supra note 17, at 1812-15.
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demolition of Palestinian houses and symbols of nationhood, and attacks on
suspected militants (often accompanied by collateral damage), perhaps
Palestine will lower its reservation point and be willing to accept an
agreement on terms favorable to Israel.
In theory, making a living hell out of an adversary's only alternatives to
a negotiated agreement can reduce that adversary's reservation point and thus
create the necessary conditions for reaching a more favorable agreement.
Nearly four decades of cold hostility interspersed with hot warfare have
probably lowered both Israeli and Palestinian reservation points. Not very
long ago, most Palestinians said that they opposed recognition of Israel's right
to exist on any terms, and most Israelis opposed Palestinian statehood.52
Today, public opinion on these questions has changed among both
populations, with recent polls showing that more than sixty percent of Israelis
support the creation of a Palestinian state and that fifty-two percent of
Palestinians favor living side-by-side with the state of Israel. 53 It is highly
unlikely that this shift is the result of sudden altruistic impulses on either side;
more likely, it reflects fatigue from living with what both sides realize are
very poor BATNAs. International conflict scholars often refer to this type of
situation as a "mutually hurting stalemate."
54
If in fact no Israeli-Palestinian bargaining zone exists today, however,
we doubt that either party acting alone could have a sufficient impact on the
other's reservation point to create a bargaining zone. There are two reasons
for this conclusion.
First, each party's ability to make the other's daily life even more violent
and miserable than it has already is limited. Since George W. Bush became
the U.S. president, the United States has alternated between turning a blind
eye to Israeli retaliation for terrorist attacks and incursions into Palestinian-
controlled portions of the Territories and, when the violence reaches a certain
point, scolding the Israeli government and warning it not to escalate the
52. See Glenn Frankel, PLO Popular on West Bank: Arab Survey Shows Use of Force Backed,
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1986, at 15 (nearly 80% of Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and
Gaza Strip see a Palestinian state as an interim step toward "full control of all of what is now Israel";
more than 80% reject U.N. Resolution 242, which supports Israel's right to exist within secured and
recognized boundaries; a "large majority" of Israelis oppose a Palestinian state). By 1991, things had
changed somewhat on the Israeli side. See Lea Levavi, 90% of Public Favor Use of Nuclear Arms: But
Jaffee Survey Shows Israelis are a Little More Dovish, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 15, 1991, at 2 (noting
"crawling conciliation" among Israelis-and support for Palestinian state up to one-third from one-
quarter in 1986). Not surprisingly, this "crawling conciliation" occurred in the wake of the first intifada,
which began in December 1987.
53. See Palestinian Ctr. for Pol'y & Surv. Res. (PCPSR), Public Opinion Poll #8,
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p8a.html (June 19-22, 2003) (52% of Palestinians support
mutual recognition). The Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian state has been acknowledged even by those
observers not generally sympathetic to the Israeli position. See Ghassan Khatib, At a Crossroads,
bitterlemons.org, at http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl250302ed.ll.html (Mar. 25, 2002) (the
"most promising source of hope comes from inside Israel itself. The last ten years have witnessed
increasing Israeli public understanding and recognition of Palestinian rights and concerns. Beginning in
1991, with the start of the peace process, the Israeli public began to demonstrate an acceptance of the
idea of a Palestinian state, an end to the Israeli occupation in most of the territories and agreement for
sharing the city of Jerusalem.").
54. The coinage of this popular term is usually attributed to William Zartman. See I. William
Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION
AFrER THE COLD WAR 225 (Paul Stem & Daniel Druckman eds., 2000).
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conflict.55 Israel cannot afford to alienate the United States, its best friend and
patron, so the military measures available to Israel have limits-and Palestine
knows it. On the other hand, Palestine knows that when terrorist attacks reach
a certain level, the United States will permit strong Israeli countermeasures
and will use its influence in the Arab world to stem the flow of money and
arms to terrorist organizations operating in the Territories.
56
Second, both adversaries probably have what can be called "malevolent
utility functions";5 7 that is, each side derives positive utility from the other's
failing to achieve its goals or fulfill its desires. Worsening Party A's BATNA
should, in theory, lower Party A's reservation point. But, on the other hand, if
Party A has a malevolent utility function, it will be extremely resistant to
accepting any deal it views as beneficial to Party B. Consequently, Party A's
response to attacks by Party B can be to redouble its commitment not to
reduce its reservation point, or even to raise its reservation point. For every
horror that Party B imposes on Party A, the latter will be motivated to keep
the score even by returning the favor.
58
A malevolent utility function probably motivates Prime Minister
Sharon's occasional insistence that a period without any terrorist attacks
against Israelis precede any peace negotiations. Responding to violence by
negotiating peace will teach the Palestinians, Sharon argues, that terrorism
works. 59 Allowing the Palestinian strategy to succeed is itself considered an
undesirable result. The Palestinians, for their part, have demonstrated an
extreme willingness to live in deprivation and fight a well-armed and trained
enemy rather than give in to Israeli demands. If each party's malevolence is
positively correlated with the amount of violence directed at it, it is possible
that neither side can create conditions so bad that the other will essentially
surrender.
In early 2004, Sharon announced his plan to withdraw unilaterally from
Gaza, abandoning the Jewish settlements there, which house roughly eight
thousand settlers, in the process. 60 The proposal drew opposition from
Palestinian leaders, who fear that a withdrawal could set a precedent for Israel
unilaterally establishing a de facto two-state solution on terms not to
Palestine's liking, such as one that includes Israeli maintenance of West Bank
55. See James Carney, How Bush Got Religion, TIME, June 16, 2003, at 42, 42.
56. See Jonathan Broder, The Right's Red Lines, JERUSALEM REP., June 21, 1999, at 36;
Andrew Stephen, Tony Blair and John Howard, the Australian PM, May Take the Middle East Road
Map Seriously, But Bush Just Wants to Sweep It Hurried Under the Carpet, NEW STATESMAN, May 12,
2003, at 8, 8.
57. See Jack Hirshleifer & Evan Osborne, Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle, in THE DARK
SIDE OF THE FORCE: ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT THEORY 131, 133 (Jack Hirshleifer ed.,
2001).
58. Cf. ROGER FISHER ET AL., COPING WITH INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 119 (1997) (noting that
the principle of reciprocity can lead to a policy of "an eye for an eye").
59. See Yuval Elizur, supra note 13, at 106; Rema Hammami & Jamil Hilal, An Uprising at
the Crossroads, MIDDLE EAST REP., Summer 2001, at 2, 3.
60. See James Bennet, Angering Settlers, Sharon Says Most May Have to Leave Gaza, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, at Al. Sharon's proposal also calls for Israel to withdraw from four small
settlements in the West Bank. See Steven Erlanger, Israel Could Safely Withdraw from Golan, Army
Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.14, 2004, at A2.
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settlements and control over Jerusalem. Sharon's proposal is perhaps best
understood as an attempt to convince Palestine that its BATNA is not as
desirable as it might think. Specifically, Palestine will not find itself in a
stronger bargaining position in time as a result of demographic trends because
Israel will act to reshape the region before those trends can work to Palestine's
advantage.
62
President Bush's support of Sharon's plan, along with his statements that
Israel should be expected to keep at least some West Bank settlements in a
final-status agreement and that Israel should not have to permit any
Palestinian refugees a right of return, 63 provoked criticism from some
commentators who pointed out that the president's pro-Israel slant seemed
inconsistent with an intent to remain an "honest broker" between the
disputants. 64 Rather than being politically clumsy, however, Bush's support of
the Israeli prime minister is best understood as an effort to reinforce Sharon's
message that Palestine's BATNA of delaying agreement is undesirable, and it
should therefore reduce its reservation point.
Whether Sharon's attempt to weaken Palestine's BATNA by unilateral
withdrawal is more likely to succeed than attempts by the disputants to
weaken each other's BATNAs through violence remains to be seen. The
perceived importance of the U.S. president's response to the proposal,
however, illustrates a larger truth in the interdependent world of the twenty-
first century: no nation is an island, and the BATNAs of both Israel and
Palestine also depend on the actions of third parties. As the world's sole
superpower, the United States enjoys substantial influence on both Israel and
Palestine. If it chose to exercise that power to its fullest potential, it likely
could shift one or both party's reservation points in the direction of accepting
a land-for-peace agreement. This observation informs our recommendations
for a new U.S.-sponsored peace initiative, which we develop in detail in Part
VI.
2. Improving the Benefits ofAgreement
If one way to create a bargaining zone is to reduce the quality of one or
both parties' BATNAs, the other way is to improve the value of reaching an
agreement to one or both parties. The trick-especially when the adversaries
view each other as mortal enemies competing for scarce resources in a zero-
sum environment-is to identify ways to improve the value of a deal to one
party without reducing its value to the other party, or at least without reducing
its value so significantly that it falls below that party's reservation point and
out of the bargaining zone.
61. Steven Erlanger, Sharon's "'Gaza Problem ": It May be Israelis, Not Arabs, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2004, at Al.
62. Cf James Bennet, Sharon Advances Toward Removal of Some Settlers, N.Y. TIMES, June
7, 2004, at Al (observing that Sharon "has played down the demographic issue" when advancing his
Gaza proposal but stated in a speech that the withdrawal would be "good for the demography of the
Jewish people in Israel").
63. See James Bennet, Sharon Coup: U.S. Go-Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2004, at Al.
64. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, The Bush and Kerry Tilt, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A23
(criticizing Bush's support for Sharon as unbalanced).
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Conceptually, the easiest way to accomplish this task is for a third party
to offer side payments to the disputing parties as part of the terms of the
agreement. Few bargaining participants are fortunate enough to find third
parties sufficiently interested in the negotiation's outcome to subsidize
agreement, but international disputes with the potential to destabilize non-
parties are frequent exceptions to this rule, with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
being an obvious example. The United States and its allies have offered
monetary incentives to grease the wheels of agreement between Israel and
Palestine in the past,65 and if the primary failure of the parties to reach an
agreement to date is the absence of a bargaining zone, subsidies could play an
important role in any successful peace initiative.
From a conceptual perspective, side payments need not be in cash to be
effective. This insight could be useful in helping mitigate at least two
drawbacks to a land-for-peace agreement that could be responsible for an
absence of a bargaining zone. If the status of the Palestinian refugees renders a
land-for-peace agreement inferior to Palestine's reservation point, interested
third parties may be able to provide non-cash assistance that would increase
the value of agreement. If the risk of post-agreement Palestinian shirking
renders an agreement inferior to Israel's reservation point, a third-party
guarantee of Palestinian performance-similar to the guarantee a co-signer
can provide to reduce the moral hazard risk of a bank loan--could increase
the value of agreement to Israel. Either or both of these types of in-kind side
payments could help to create a bargaining zone. Consequently, we build on
both ideas in constructing our proposal for a U.S.-sponsored peace initiative in
Part VI.
IV. INTERNAL DIVISIONS: COALITION AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS
In Part III, we considered the possibility that Israel and Palestine have
failed to reach a negotiated agreement based on the land-for-peace formula
because no specific set of agreement terms exists that would exceed the
reservation points of both. In conducting that analysis, we made the
simplifying assumption that each nation is a single, unified actor able to (1)
compare different states of the world, such as the status quo and a land-for-
peace agreement; (2) determine a preference between those different states;
and (3) execute an agreement it prefers to the status quo, assuming that the
other nation agreed to do the same. In this Part we relax this set of
assumptions and consider the possible implications of internal divisions
within one or both nations for understanding the failure of the land-for-peace
approach to date.
Israel and Palestine are not monolithic actors, of course. Each is
comprised of various subgroups that differ in their worldviews and
preferences for peace. Each acts in the international arena through the agency
of political leaders whose interests and worldviews are not necessarily aligned
with those of the majority of their constituents. The result of these internal
65. See, e.g., Hanieh, supra note 33, at 79 (reporting that at the Camp David II summit
President Clinton promised Yasser Arafat "huge financial support from the G-8 for any agreement the
two sides would reach").
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differences could be the failure to achieve an agreement even if there is a deal
that would be desirable for both nations viewed as single, unified entities. This
Part considers two types of roadblocks to a negotiated agreement that fall into
this category: the problem of the "faithless agent" who serves his own
interests rather than those of his principals; and the problem of the "blocking
minority" able to veto-literally or figuratively-an agreement favored by the
majority.
A. A Problem of Leadership
Even assuming that Israel and Palestine would be best-served by a land-
for-peace agreement, a necessary condition of reaching such an agreement is
the willingness of the political leaders on both sides to give their consent. One
possible explanation for the failure to date is a lack of will on the part of the
Palestinian or Israeli leadership that is inconsistent with the preferences of the
Palestinian or Israeli people.
1. Arafat: Self-Image or Self-Protection
At the end of 2000, President Clinton proposed a land-for-peace
agreement that would have set the stage for the establishment of a Palestinian
state comprised of the vast majority of the West Bank and Gaza (including the
Arab portions of East Jerusalem, where non-Arabs are a small minority),
assured Palestinian control over the Muslim holy sites on Jerusalem's Temple
Mount, and provided substantial financial compensation to Palestinian
refugees. 6Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who staked his political career
on making peace with the Palestinians, was prepared to agree. 67Yasser Arafat,
leader of the Palestinian nationalist movement since the 1960s and president
of the PA since its establishment as a result of the Oslo Accords, rejected the
offer. This decision was not an accident or even a temporary miscalculation:
Arafat had earlier declined a similar proposal at the July 2000 Cam David II
summit, and on neither occasion did he present a counter-proposal. 8 Arafat's
decision to walk away from these offers, effectively ending the Oslo peace
process and inflaming the burgeoning second intifada that continues today,
stunned the U.S. and Israeli leaders. 69 Later accounts suggest that Arafat's
66. For a detailed description of Clinton's post-Camp David ideas, see DENNIS Ross, THE
MISSING PEACE 712-58 (2004); see also Abmad Samih Khalidi & David Makovsky, Debate: Israel and
Palestine: What's Gone Wrong?, PROSPECT, Nov. 23, 2000, at 16, LEXIS, News Library, Prospect File.
67. Khalidi & Makovsky, supra note 66 ("Ehud Barak put his political future and life on the
line by going to Camp David to resolve all outstanding issues."); Matt Rees, Barak's Cagey
Resignation: Israeli Political Shocker, TIME, Dec. 18, 2000, at 60, 60 (discussing Barak's resignation
and the special election, during which he claimed that a vote for Sharon meant a vote against his
prospects for a peace deal).
68. Thomas L. Friedman, Yasir Arafat's Moment, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2000, at A21 (Arafat
made no counterproposal and left the meeting); John Lister, "Middle" Politics: Looking Again at the
Peace Process, MIDDLE EAST POL'Y, Sept. 2002, at 22, 23 (Arafat rejected Camp David and refused to
make a serious counteroffer).
69. Benny Morris & Ehud Barak, Camp David and After-Continued, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June
27, 2002, at 47.
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actions also stunned and confused a range of Arab leaders who had
historically championed the Palestinian cause.
One explanation of Arafat's behavior is that the Clinton proposal was
inferior to Palestine's reservation point. That is, for the reasons considered in
Part III, the nation of Palestine, as a hypothetical single entity, was better off
living with the status quo than agreeing to the concessions implicit in a land-
for-peace agreement, and the actions of Palestine's leader reflected this
calculation. The deep disappointment in Arafat's actions expressed by some
of Palestine's long-standing supporters in the Arab world undermine this
explanation to some extent, although they do not refute it.
Alternatively, it is possible that Arafat believed the Clinton proposal was
desirable but strategically rejected the offer in the hope of obtaining even
better terms in the future. Such strategic behavior as a possible explanation for
the failure of diplomacy to date is discussed more generally in Part V. But if
Arafat's behavior was motivated entirely by a desire to wrest marginal
concessions from Barak, observers wondered, why would he fail to make a
counter-offer to the proposals advanced by Barak and Clinton or otherwise
state his demands?
72
A third possibility is that Arafat walked away from a deal that would
have benefited his people because making peace with Israel would not serve
his personal interests. In other words, perhaps Arafat was a faithless agent.
Various commentators have relied on several related psychological
theories to support the claim that Arafat was personally incapable of making
peace with Israel, whatever the benefits to Palestine of doing so. One version
of this conjecture is that, as the leader of a revolutionary movement for
decades, Arafat's self-image depended on a state of war with Israel and could
not coexist with a land-for-peace agreement. 7 This is, essentially, the
conclusion reached by Dennis Ross, President Clinton's chief Middle East
negotiator, whose recent memoirs place the blame for the failure of final-
status negotiations in 2000 on Arafat's personal inability to enter into an
irrevocable agreement.74 A slightly different version is that Arafat believed
that his image as a hero to Palestinians could not survive the transition from
70. Elsa Walsh, The Prince: How the Saudi Ambassador Became Washington 's Indispensable
Operator, NEW YORKER, Mar. 24, 2003, at 48 (discussing the Saudi Ambassador's surprise and
unhappiness with Arafat's course of action at Camp David); Dennis B. Ross, Yasir Arafat, FOREIGN
POL'v, July-Aug. 2002, at 18, 20 (Arab leaders don't trust Arafat, but are also unwilling to oppose him).
71. Jane Perlez, A Fork In Arafat's Road, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2000, at Al (moderate Arab
leaders supported the Camp David proposal); Jane Perlez, Three Arab Leaders React Favorably to
Mideast Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 28, 2000, at Al (Arab leaders liked Camp David because it dealt with
the Temple Mount issue); Walsh, supra note 70, at 48.
72. Cf Friedman, supra note 68, at A21; Hanieh, supra note 33, at 75, 88 (recalling that
Arafat refused to even consider the proposals advanced by Clinton a "basis for negotiations"); Lister,
supra note 68, at 22 (discussing various viewpoints on why Arafat did not pursue the peace talks
further); Ross, supra note 70, at 19 ("Arafat missed a historic opportunity when he turned down the
Clinton proposal.").
73. Stephen Blank, The Middle East-The Conventional Wisdom is Wrong, 17 WORLD AND I,
at 286, 292 (2002) (Martin Indyk and Dennis Ross agree that Arafat is psychologically incapable of
making peace); Khalidi & Makovsky, supra note 66 (noting that Arafat's approval rating rose to 64% as
a result of the beginning of the second intifada).
74. Ross, supra note 66, at 13 ("[A] comprehensive deal was not possible with Arafat. Too
much redefinition was required. He was not up to it. He could live with a process, but not with a
conclusion."); see also id. at 757-58.
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leader of a revolutionary movement to administrator responsible for bringing
ordinary Palestinians a better life. Or, as some have said, Arafat had no
interest in "collecting the garbage," 75 and would rather "play the victim than
the statesman."
76
Somewhat different hypotheses for why Arafat might not have been
willing to accept the land-for-peace proposals concern his political and
personal safety. These hypotheses are consistent with the observation that, in
high-intensity conflicts, intransigence is often seen as a measure of loyalty to
one's cause, and willingness to compromise can make one appear weak.77
Any land-for-peace agreement requires sacrifices by both sides and, as Part III
discussed, any agreement acceptable to Israel almost certainly would require
Palestine to relinquish the refugees' claim to the right of return. Making peace
on such terms, even if beneficial to the Palestinian nation as a whole, would
undoubtedly have angered some constituencies, who would then have labeled
Arafat a traitor to the movement he once led. 78 By signing a peace agreement,
Arafat might have believed he would be signing his death warrant.79
2. Sharon: Can the Hawk Become a Dove?
Military leader, champion of the settlements, and right-wing politician,
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has opposed the creation of an
independent Palestinian state for as long as Yasser Arafat sought to establish
one. As a Likud member of the Knesset for decades and occasional
government minister, Sharon never supported the land-for-peace concept.
80
Catapulted to power in February 2001 as a result of an Israeli backlash against
75. See, e.g., Douglas Davis, Terrorism Most Intense When Peace Is In The Air, JERUSALEM
POST, Jan. 7, 2003, at 3:
The mere prospect of peace would retarding [sic] all this at a stroke, for without the
conflict, how much international attention could they seriously expect to command[?]
Not for Yasser Arafat and his cronies the mundane business of nation-building, of
organizing drainage for Jenin, garbage collection for Ramallah, street lighting for
Kalkilya, and sewage facilities for Gaza. Not when the glittering state occasions beckon
in European capitals.
76. Thomas L. Friedman, Arafat's War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2000, at A33; Fouad Ajami, The
Sentry's Solitude, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 2, 12 (Arafat did not want to agree to a peace for
which he had not prepared his people); Lister, supra note 68, at 22 (Arafat never successfully made
himself a legitimate statesman, but relied on his role as a revolutionary; he also relies on his mythical
comparison to Saladin to determine his policy).
77. See Herbert C. Kelman, Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict, in
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 191, 216 (William Zartman & J. Lewis Rassmussen eds.,
1997).
78. Isabel Kershner, The Arafat Enigma, JERUSALEM REP., Nov. 20, 2000, at 34, 34 ("If
[Arafat] were to publicly come out and call for the end of all forms of resistance now ... he would only
lose popular credibility-and might even be exposed as impotent in the face of popular anger.").
79. When explaining to Clinton why he was rejecting an agreement proposal at Camp David,
Arafat reportedly asked the American President, "Do you want to attend my funeral?" Hanieh, supra
note 33, at 75, 95. He reportedly asked American Secretary of State Madeline Albright a similar
question. Ross, supra note 66, at 693.
80. Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, Three Men in a Boat, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2003,
at 32; James Kitfield, Peace May Lie Only Beyond Sharon and Arafat, 34 NAT'L J. 1074 (2002), LEXIS,
News Library, National Journal File ("In Sharon, the White House must deal with an Israeli leader who
has long opposed the essential principle of 'land for peace' that has been at the core of Israel's
peacemaking efforts for decades, and which is the foundation of present proposals for a permanent
peace.").
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Arafat's rejection of the Clinton proposal and the beginning of the second
intifada,8 1 Sharon embodied the hard-line portion of the Israeli psyche. Nearly
four years later, Sharon remains prime minister. Ever since the failure of the
Camp David II talks discredited Barak, no strong leader of the more
conciliatory Labor Party has emerged to mount a serious challenge for the
nation's leadership. 82 Barak expressed willingness to enter a land-for-peace
agreement in 2000, but Sharon's leadership could be a current roadblock to
agreement. That is, even if the terms of specific versions of a deal based on
the concept of land for peace would be superior to Israel's reservation point,
Sharon's opposition could prevent the parties from reaching agreement at the
present time.
In an apparent reversal of his life-long position, in 2003 Sharon
expressed a willingness to agree to Palestinian statehood under the right
conditions 83-a willingness that has caused some upheaval within the ranks of
his hawkish Likud Party and Likud's partners in Sharon's coalition
government.84 Whether Sharon has ever shifted from his belief in an Israeli-
dominated West Bank is open to serious question, however.85 The change in
Sharon's stated position could be the result of a determination that Palestinian
terrorism is unlikely to be defeated completely and decisively, and that the
costs of retaining control over the Territories outweigh the benefits of
continued occupation. On the other hand, there is evidence that Sharon
envisions a future Palestinian state so small-perhaps only fifty percent of the
Territoriesr-that an agreement based on such boundaries could likely never
exceed Palestine's reservation point.
Also troubling is that, other than making statements cautiously
supportive of land for peace, Sharon has taken no actions that demonstrate his
willingness to enter into a negotiated agreement on that basis. At the 2003
summit in Aqaba, Egypt, Sharon pledged to disband settlements unauthorized
by the Israeli government, but for every outpost removed by the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF), settlers have constructed others without government
opposition.87 Despite considerable pressure from President Bush to comply
81. See generally Kitfield, supra note 80. See also Aluf Benn, The Last of the Patriarchs,
FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2002, at 64, 64 (stating that Sharon became the first Likud leader ever to agree
publicly to the creation of a Palestinian state).
82. Leslie Susser, From Rabin to Ruin, JERUSALEM REP., Feb. 24, 2003, at 20 ("Prof. Ephraim
Ya'ar, head of Tel Aviv University's Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, argues that this is part of a
long-term trend. Israeli democracy, he says, has entered a new era in which the right is totally
dominant.").
83. Leslie Susser, Divided in Victory, JERUSALEM REP., Feb. 24, 2003, at 18 (stating that
Sharon and his party disagree about the possibility of Palestinian statehood, with Sharon supporting a
state, albeit a "truncated" and "demilitarized" state).
84. Benn, supra note 81, at 69 ("Many on Israel's right, led by Netanyahu, have dismissed
Sharon's inactivity as weakness and have started calling for the reoccupation of the Palestinian
territories, the expulsion of Arafat, and increased reprisals against the PA.").
85. Leslie Susser, Knesset Lists Show Labor, Likud, Heading to the Right, JEWISH BULL. OF N.
CAL., Dec. 13, 2002, at http://www.jewishsf.com/bk02l213/i20.shtml ("Haim Ramon, chairman of the
Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, said Sharon has no intention of negotiating
Palestinian statehood or evacuating settlements.").
86. Cf Zureik, supra note 39, at 628 (claiming Sharon's plan is "to grant the Palestinians a
Bantustan-like state in non-contiguous areas of the West Bank and Gaza").
87. See, e.g., Gideon Alon, Defense Ministry Doesn 't Know the Exact Number of Outposts,
HA'ARETZ, July 24, 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml (stating
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with the Road Map's demand that Israel freeze all settlement growth by May
2003, Sharon continues to authorize new housing units in West Bank
settlements that clearly contradict the Road Map's spirit. Freezing settlement
activity is a relatively (although of course not entirely) painless concession for
Israel to make because a freeze does not foreclose new construction in the
future if no peace agreement is reached. Sharon's failure to implement a
freeze casts some doubt on whether he is really prepared to trade land for
peace.
In other words, the signals from Sharon are unclear. The prime
minister's proposal to withdraw unilaterally all Jewish settlements from Gaza
along with a few small West Bank settlements might suggest he would be
amenable to a final-status agreement based on land for peace. On the other
hand, his stated intention to retain most of the West Bank settlements hints
that he might still be unwilling to part with a sufficiently large amount of
territory to exceed Palestine's likely reservation point. An October 2004
statement to the Israeli media by a close Sharon advisor that the Gaza
withdrawal is meant to "freeze" the peace process and "prevent the
establishment of a Palestinian state," although disavowed by the prime
minister's office, 89 is also not encouraging.
B. Coalition Members with Veto Power
Internal divisions within nations can present impediments to
international conflict resolution that are as significant as the primary dispute at
issue. 9° Even if the Israeli and Palestinian nations believe that they would
benefit from a land-for-peace agreement, and the leadership of each side is
willing to represent those aspirations at the bargaining table, a minority group
on either side with the power to veto a peace agreement could perpetuate the
impasse. The preferences and worldviews of both nations are far from
monolithic; even if a land-for-peace agreement is in the best interests of most
citizens on both sides, significant minorities would prefer the status quo. Yet
the respective tools that the Israeli and Palestinian holdouts could employ are
quite different.
that of ninety-one illegal settlements, only eleven have been dismantled); Uzi Benziman, Corridors of
Power: Bibi Meets His Match, HA'ARETZ, July 18, 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/-
arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml ("The U.S. has determined that, on balance, only one outpost has been
removed, given the number of new outposts that sprang up in the wake of evacuation efforts.").
88. Steven Erlanger, Israel Adds to Plans for More Housing Units in Settlements, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2004, at A3 (announcing plans for 533 more housing units); Steven Erlanger, Sharon Issues
Bids for New Housing Units for Settlers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2004, at A3 (announcing plans to build
1001 new apartments for settlers); cf Steven R. Weisman, Mideast Peace Plan's Sponsors Dismayed at
Lack of Progress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A3 (reporting that U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
joined with European, Russian, and United Nations representatives in "expressing dismay over Israel's
failure to freeze settlements").
89. See Greg Myre, Israeli Aide Hints that Gaza Exit Would Freeze Peace Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2004, at A10.
90. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 77, at 191, 200.
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1. Palestinian Rejectionists
The international community recognizes the PA as the legitimate voice
of the Palestinian nation; its leaders therefore have the ability to affix their
signature to any negotiated agreement with Israel. Whether the PA has the
ability to make peace in any sense beyond the ceremonial is a more contested
question.
In Part III, we considered the possibility that a land-for-peace agreement
might not exceed Israel's reservation point if Israel fears the Palestinians
would lose the incentive to vigorously oppose terrorism after gaining the
benefits of statehood. 9t Here, we consider a possible roadblock to agreement
that is related but distinct: the question is not the Palestinian government's
incentive to control terrorism after an agreement, but its current and future
capacity to do so. If the PA cannot control militant, rejectionist elements
within its borders and prevent future attacks against Israeli targets, those
elements effectively possess the ability to block an agreement by preventing
the PA from delivering peace. In this case, their power could take one of two
forms: either Israel could refuse to enter into an agreement because it believes
the PA could not implement it, or a signed agreement could not be
implemented as a result of the activities of Palestinian rejectionists.
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aksa Martyrs' Brigade
have demonstrated that they have the weaponry and the personnel to deny
peace to Israel, of late through suicide bombings of civilian targets inside
Israel proper.92 These groups have not renounced the Palestinian Liberation
Organization's historic mission to destroy Israel and establish in its place a
Palestinian state. 93 What remains unclear is whether-if offered an Israeli
withdrawal from most or all of the Territories, Palestinian statehood, and
outside assistance in building and training a security force-the PA could
prevent the violent operations of these groups. A negative answer to this
question would prevent the parties from entering into a true exchange of land
for peace, and could explain the lack of a negotiated settlement to date.
91. See supra Part III.B.2.
92. Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Name of God: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, 17 WORLD AND
I, at 38, 40 (2002) ("From September 2000 to March 2002, Hamas took responsibility for approximately
40 suicide bombing incidents, taking the lives of over 400 Israeli citizens."); Dan Ephron, A Mideast
Mandela, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2003, at 24, 24; Laurence Grafstein, Age Limit, NEW REPUBLIC, June 10,
2002, at 42, 42 (discussing the Hamas policy that suicide bombings must continue until Israel is
destroyed).
93. Alexander, supra note 92, at 42 (explaining that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
share the goal of destroying Israel, and that the latter criticizes the PLO for participating in the peace
process); Greg Myre, Fencing Off.- In the Middle East, Even Words Go to War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
2003, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3 ("Hamas, the Palestinian group responsible for the largest number of
suicide bombings, typically claims responsibility by announcing 'a heroic martyrdom operation against
the Zionist entity.' Hamas avoids mentioning 'Israel,' which it does not recognize, and does not use the
term 'suicide bombing."'). The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades' overall political goal is not clear. The
Brigades claim allegiance to Arafat and the PA, and at times they say that they are only fighting the
Israeli occupation, but their insistence on the right of return undermines this argument.
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2. Israeli Politics
The Israeli body politic also contains radical, rejectionist elements that
might try to use force to prevent the Israeli government from turning over the
occupied territories to a Palestinian state. The assassination of Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 by an Israeli anti-peace extremist 94 demonstrated that
people on both sides of the "Green Line"-the pre-1967 eastern Israeli
border 95 -are willing to use violence to prevent an Israeli-Palestinian
agreement. More recently, some Israeli settlers have vowed to ignore any
government orders to leave their homes in the Territories.
96
Unlike militant Palestinian groups, however, Israeli radicals clearly lack
the ability to block a land-for-peace agreement through the use of force-any
resistance would prove no match for the Israeli security forces. In contrast, it
is conceivable that an Israeli minority opposed to land for peace could block
such an agreement politically. In Israel, no party commands a majority of the
Knesset: governing requires forming and maintaining a coalition. In the
current Knesset, Likud controls only 40 seats out of 120. 97 Should Sharon
indicate his willingness to sign a particular land-for-peace agreement, his hold
on power could weaken, and he might be forced to hold new elections.
In early 2005, in the wake of defections from the coalition of right-of-
center parties opposed to Sharon's Gaza withdrawal plan, the Israeli prime
94. Serge Schmemann, Police Say Rabin Killer Led Sect That Laid Plans to Attack Arabs,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at Al.
95. The "Green Line" is actually the 1949 armistice line between Israel and Jordan. Between
1949 and 1967, Jordan occupied and administered the West Bank. BORNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 1.
96. Dousing the Candle, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2003, at 12, 12 ("Although the 15 settlement
outposts that [Sharon] has ordered dismantled are mostly uninhabited, the settler movement has
responded angrily, threatening to create two new outposts for each one taken down."); Words, Guns and
Anguish, MACLEAN'S, July 21, 2003, at 20, 20 ("Alex Bligh ... bristles at the concept of 'land for
peace.' For him, these are not settlements. 'This is our homeland,' he says. 'Being the only state
established for Jews, by Jews, we have an obligation to exist. We can, and we will, defend ourselves."');
Greg Myre, Israelis Protest Sharon's Plan to Oust Jews From Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2004, at A3
("Some right-wing settler activists have warned that government efforts to remove the 8,000 settlers
from Gaza ... could lead to open conflict among Israelis."). Whether these individual sentiments reflect
widespread settler sentiment is not clear. A poll conducted by the anti-settlement group Peace Now
found that 74% of Jewish settlers would leave their homes if offered compensation by the government.
See Sharmila Devi, Poll Says Jewish Settlers Will Leave if Paid, FIN. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at 10,
available at http://globalsecurity.com/road-map/poll-says/poll-says.htm. On the other hand, polls
reported by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research were much more pessimistic. In
1995, only 30% of settlers said that they would return for compensation, with 58% refusing to do so; by
1997, this number had shrunk to only 23% agreeing to return for compensation, with 67% refusing.
Palestinian Ctr. for Pol'y & Surv. Res., CPRS Polls-Survey Research Unit: Settlers Poll (2): The
Future of Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/97/setpoll2.html
(last visited Dec. 12, 2004). Several factors suggest such wide discrepancies. The CPRS polls were
taken before the second intifada broke out in September 2000, making the settlers' physical security far
more precarious. On the other hand, caution should be used in relying on a poll conducted by an anti-
settlement group.
97. For a complete party-by-party breakdown of the results in the 2003 Knesset elections, see
Special Report, Israel Elections 2003, HA'ARETZ, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/IsraelElections.-
jhtml?contrasslD=28 (last visited Dec. 12, 2004). As of this writing, Likud holds 40 Knesset seats,
Labor 19 seats, Shinui 15 seats, Shas 11 seats, Arab parties 9 seats, National Union 7 seats, Yahad and
the Democratic Choice 6 seats, United Torah Judaism 5 seats, National Religious Party 5 seats, and Am
Ehad 4 seats. Among these parties, Likud, Shas, National Union, United Torah Judaism, and National
Religious Party, composing 67 of the 120 seats, are considered right-wing and religious; Labor, Shinui,
the Arab parties, Yahad and the Democratic Choice, and Am Ehad, composing 53 of the 120 Knesset
seats, are considered left-center parties). See http://www.knesset.gov.il/-history/eng/enghistl 6_s.htm.
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minister received Knesset approval to bring the opposition Labor Party and a
small ultra-orthodox party into his government-a coalition that "should
allow him to remain in office to carry out his plans to dismantle all Israeli
settlements in Gaza and four in the West Bank., 98 Presumably, Labor would
support any land-for-peace agreement that the more hawkish Sharon would be
willing to sign. But it is unclear whether Sharon could marshal the support of
his own Likud Party for an agreement that would permit Palestinian
statehood-and without Likud, it would be impossible to put together a
parliamentary majority for the agreement. In fact, some members of Likud's
policymaking body voted in 2003 to oppose an independent Palestinian state
on any terms. In 2004, Likud's membership voted in a non-binding
referendum to reject Sharon's Gaza withdrawal lan, 100 despite its
approximately seventy percent support among Israelis. tol Sharon also faced
opposition to the plan from many of his own Likud cabinet members, and he
was able to prevail in an early cabinet vote on the proposal only after he fired
two ministers from an allied right-wing party, which then left the governing
coalition.I°2 Though Sharon's plan won a comfortable (but not overwhelming)
majority of votes in the Knesset in October 2004, approximately half of the
parliament's Likud members voted against their own prime minister's
proposal despite considerable pressure to support their leader.
103
Sharon's difficulty in garnering the support of his own party for his
Gaza withdrawal plan bodes particularly ill for the future of a land-for-peace
agreement because Gaza is home to very few Israeli settlers (approximately
8000) and, unlike the West Bank, has virtually no historical significance to
religious Jews. 104 These events suggest that as long as right-of-center
parties-that is, Likud and the smaller, farther-right parties 0 5 -control the
majority of Knesset seats, an Israeli government might be unable to gain
approval of a land-for-peace agreement, even assuming a specific set of terms
that a majority of the public favors and the prime minister is willing to sign.
t°6
98. See Steven Erlanger, New Coalition Led By Sharon is Approved in Parliament, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005, at Al.
99. Leslie Susser, Sooner or Later, Sharon Will be Voted Down Over the Road Map, Says
Likud Minister Uzi Landau, JERUSALEM REP., July 14, 2003, at 6 ("In a late-May cabinet vote on the
road map, only 12 (seven Likud and five Shinui) of the 23 ministers supported it. The other II either
voted against (two National Union, two National Religious Party, and three Likud) or abstained (four
Likud).").
100. See Andres Martinez, One State of Two, Israelis and Palestinians Share the Same
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at A20.
101. See Greg Myre, Netanyahu Joins Call for Referendum on Pullout of Gaza Settlers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2004, at A5 (citing Israeli opinion polls); Greg Myre, Sharon to Face Cabinet Hard-
Liners on Gaza Pullout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2004, at A6 (same).
102. See, e.g., Greg Myre, Sharon Loses His Majority When 2 Ministers Resign, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2004, at A10.
103. John Ward Anderson, Sharon Wins Vote for Gaza Pullout: Israeli Parliament is Bitterly
Divided: Likud Ministers Demand Referendum, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2004, at Al; Steven Erlanger,
Lawmakers Back Sharon on Plan for Leaving Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2004, at Al.
104. See Joseph Berger, For Orthodox Israelis, Views Differ on Yielding Gaza, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2004, at Al1.
105. See supra note 97 (giving the composition of the current Knesset and identifying those
parties identified with the right and the left, respectively).
106. Any major peace treaty would have to be approved by the Cabinet, which could take this
action unless there is a specific enactment forbidding it. See Basic Law: The Government § 1 (Isr.)
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C. Overcoming the Roadblock of Internal Division
If internal divisions within one party to a negotiation are in fact
preventing Israel and Palestine from agreeing to or implementing the terms of
a negotiated settlement that lies within the bargaining zone, the theoretical
approaches to overcoming this roadblock are relatively clear. How to
implement these approaches in practice, however, is less evident.
I. Discredit or Replace Unwilling Leaders
If a negotiating party's agent stands in the way of achieving a mutually
desirable negotiated agreement, the obvious implication is that the opposing
negotiator, or interested third parties, should attempt to discredit or replace
that faithless agent. The Sharon government followed this precise course of
action following Arafat's rejection of the Clinton land-for-peace proposal in
December 2000 and the elections that brought Sharon to power two months
later. The Israeli leader attempted, quite methodically, to isolate Arafat
physically and politically, dismantle his security apparatus, destroy his
symbols of power, and he refused to negotiate with the PA as long as Arafat
remained in control. 1
07
How disputing parties can effectively discredit or replace opposing
leaders unwilling to make peace is, it turns out, quite a difficult problem. In
early 2002, Israel threatened to exile Arafat from the Territories 108 but
declined to follow through, mainly because Arafat could potentially have been
a more dangerous adversary in exile, flying around the world and putting
himself front and center on the international stage. 109 Israeli attempts to isolate
Arafat politically might have actually strengthened him in the eyes of
Palestinians.11
0
("The Government is the executive authority of the State."); see also id. § 32 ("The Government is
authorized to perform in the name of the State and subject to any law, all actions which are not legally
incumbent on another authority."). The Cabinet, however, could face a vote of no-confidence were it to
approve a treaty vehemently opposed by a majority of the Knesset. See id. § 28. One could argue that a
Cabinet confident of a treaty's popularity would be willing to risk a fall of the government because it
could then hold an election on that issue. That may be asking for too much courage. In any event,
government members might find themselves endorsing a relatively popular treaty, but unable to run for
Knesset because they would not be chosen for the candidate list by the relevant party. All major Israeli
political parties have primaries in which only party members vote.
107. David C. Unger, Maps of War, Maps of Peace: Finding a Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Question, WORLD POL. J., Summer 2002, at 1, 1 ("Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and
now President Bush, refuses to deal with Yasir Arafat, a man Israelis no longer trust and whom they
blame, with considerable justice, for the breakdown of the 1993 Oslo Accords.").
108. Leslie Susser, Anyone but Arafat, JERUSALEM REP., Feb. 25, 2002, at 12.
109. This essentially is the reason why the United States has pressured Israel not to do so,
which has been a principal reason for Israeli forbearance. See Chris McGreal, Israelis Threaten To Exile
Arafat, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 12, 2003, at 2 ("Richard Boucher, a spokesman for the Bush
administration, which has previously warned Israel against exiling Mr. Arafat, said: 'We think that it
would not be helpful to expel him because it would just give him another stage to play on."').
110. We say "might" because in fact the evidence on this is murky. The PCPSR survey of
Palestinian public opinion reported a temporary increase in Arafat's popularity. Interestingly, it found
that the vast majority of Palestinians believed that Arafat's popularity increased due to Sharon's
pressure, a belief that might have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The survey found:
The results of this poll point to a degree of contradictions in Palestinian public attitudes
toward domestic political issues as well as issues of peace and security. The results show
a large increase in Arafat's popularity not seen during the last five years. They also show
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In theory, if the leader of a disputing party poses a serious roadblock to
peace, a third party with leverage is more likely than the adversary to promote
a change in leadership effectively. In practice, though, the Bush
administration's policy of backing Sharon's effort to seek a change in
Palestine's leadership-effectively the core of its Middle East policy
throughout Bush's first term in office-failed to bear fruit for four years.
Death, not Israeli or U.S. pressure, ultimately succeeded in eliminating
Arafat's influence in Palestinian affairs. His demise, and the recent election of
the moderate Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen) as PA president,
might turn out to be fortuitous for the cause of peace. But while waiting for a
leader's death is certainly one way to overcome a faithless agent roadblock,
such a strategy is unpredictable, and the wait could be indefinite.
2. Eliminating or Co-opting Minority Groups
When minority factions within one principal party oppose a negotiated
agreement and have the ability to block its acceptance or implementation,
proponents of agreement on both sides of the bargaining table and interested
observers can pursue either or both of two strategies for overcoming the
roadblock. They can eliminate the minority faction's power to block
agreement, or they can restructure the terms of the deal to gamer the faction's
support without sacrificing the assent of the majorities on both sides of the
negotiating table.
a. Co-opting with Side Payments
Just as incorporating monetary or in-kind side payments to one principal
party into the terms of a proposed agreement can lift the agreement option
above that principal's reservation point, side payments to a disaffected faction
within a principal party may buy its cooperation, if not its active support.
Side payments are a powerful tactic because they need not garner the
support of every member of the minority faction to have the desired effect;
they need only sway the loyalties of a sufficiently large portion to take away
the faction's blocking ability. Thus, for example, while it would never be
possible to convince every supporter of Hamas to favor a peace agreement
recognizing Israel's right to exist, even within its pre-1967 borders,
proponents of an agreement need only persuade enough Hamas supporters so
that the group loses the ability to pose a significant threat to peace.
Conversely, although Israelis who believe Jewish occupation of the West
Bank is a religious imperative will always oppose land for peace, pro-peace
forces need only convert enough would-be rejectionists so that those who
remain lack the political power to derail an agreement.
widespread support for his decision to declare a state of emergency and to appoint
Ahmad Qurai' as a prime minister. In addition, 60% support placing all Palestinian
security services under the control of a national security council headed by Arafat.
Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians believe the increase in support
for Arafat is due to Sharon's recent threats against him.
Palestinian Ctr. for Policy and Survey Research, PSR-Survey Research Unit: Public Opinion Poll #9,
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p9a.html (Oct. 7-14, 2003).
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Side payments may vary in source or type. The source of side payments
can be the minority faction's own government, the opposing party, or third
parties with an interest in successful negotiations. Moreover, as noted above,
side payments can be in cash or in kind. Such offers as substantial
resettlement payments to Palestinian refugees, specific settlement rights
within the new Palestinian state, or settlement rights in third countries might
increase Palestinian support for a land-for-peace agreement and reduce
support for the rejectionist groups. Similar promises to displaced settlers
might reduce Israeli opposition to such an agreement. Moreover, when side
payments to minority factions come from the faction's own government, the
payment need not directly remedy the burdens suffered as a result of a land-
for-peace agreement. For example, Israel might garner land-for-peace support
from some religious opponents by offering concessions to positions held by
ultra-Orthodox religious groups on other domestic issues.
b. Degrading the Capacity to Block Agreement
If the ability of rejectionist Palestinian groups, such as Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to negate a Palestinian promise of peace creates a
significant roadblock to a land-for-peace agreement, the most direct approach
to the problem would be to destroy these groups' capacity to launch terrorist
attacks. The Sharon government's Palestinian policy, it might be said, has
been based principally on this reasoning, with the IDF responding to virtually
every suicide bombing with attempts to capture or assassinate rejectionist
leaders in the occupied territories, or otherwise disrupt the terrorist
infrastructure in (or sometimes outside of)' the Territories.112 President Bush
has largely endorsed this approach, stressing that the destruction of militant
Palestinian groups is a prerequisite for a Palestinian state.'
1 3
While logically defensible, this approach has failed to achieve its desired
end. If anything, repeated Israeli military assaults may have strengthened
support for Hamas and other Palestinian rejectionist groups. 114 To further
111. In October, the Israeli Air Force raided a training camp for Palestinian terrorist groups
inside Syria. Washington ensured that Israel would not receive U.N. sanctions for the raid and blocked a
Security Council Resolution condemning it. See Amos Harel et al., IAF Strikes Camp Deep in Syria,
HA'ARETZ, Oct. 7, 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/hasan/pagesarch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtm. For a
good overview, see Yossi Alpher, Add Him to the List, bitterlemons.org, at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/b1031103ed40.html (Nov. 3, 2003).
112. Benn, supra note 81, at 64; Michael Elliot, Sharon's Game, TIME, June 23, 2003, at 35
(discussing Sharon's response to suicide bombers, including such actions as launching missiles at
Hamas leaders, and quoting him telling his Cabinet ministers, "Jewish blood can't come cheap. We
aren't going to be put on the altar of the road map." The article primarily discusses Sharon's response to
suicide bombers, including such actions as launching missiles at Hamas leaders.); Abraham D. Sofaer,
The U.S. and Israel: The Road Ahead, COMMENT., May 2003, at 21, 23 ("Until recently... the State
Department has joined in castigating Israel for capturing or killing leaders and members of [Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinel.").
113. James Bennet, Accord Reported on Israeli Pullout from Gaza Areas, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2003, at AI ("Mr. Bush has also called a cease-fire insufficient, saying Hamas must be 'dismantled."').
114. Cf Rosemary Hollis, The Israeli-Palestinian Road Block: Can Europeans Make a
Difference?, 80 INT'L AFF. 191, 200 (2004) (claiming that senior IDF officers believe that Israel's
attempts to suppress the current intifada have created increased support for Palestinian extremists).
There is no simple one-to-one relationship between Israeli military attacks and Palestinian radicalism. In
July 2000, for example, 63% of Palestinians said that Palestinians should emulate the tactics and
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complicate matters, Israeli military operations aimed at degrading the
Palestinians' ability to attack Israelis have severely degraded the PA's security
apparatus,1 5 which the Israelis at times have considered complicit in such
attacks. "6 But without a well-armed and organized security force, the PA can
never establish control over rejectionist groups. With recent history suggesting
that direct military force is unlikely to resolve the blocking minority problem
on the Palestinian side, we suggest in Part VI that a U.S.-sponsored peace
initiative emphasize alternative methods of degrading the military capacity of
Palestinian rejectionists.
Eliminating Israeli rejectionists' capacity to block a land-for-peace
agreement that would serve the interests of both Israel and Palestine as a
whole presents a political rather than a military challenge. The specific
challenge is to ensure that the minority that opposes the creation of a
Palestinian state on any terms does not exercise political power substantially
disproportionate to the number of Israelis that it represents. In Part VI, we also
explore approaches that might accompany a U.S.-sponsored peace initiative
designed to achieve this result.
V. HARD BARGAINING: FAILURE TO AGREE TO SPECIFIC DEAL TERMS
An irony of the negotiation process is that, although a bargaining zone is
a necessary condition of reaching agreement, the existence of a relatively
large bargaining zone often makes an agreement more elusive rather than
bringing it closer within reach. Reaching an agreement requires the parties to
coalesce around a specific set of terms. A large bargaining zone makes many
different sets of deal terms available and can thereby exacerbate disagreement
over which terms to choose. t1 7 If a buyer's reservation price for a seller's
wares is $20, and the seller's reservation price is also $20, the bargaining zone
strategy of Hizbullah. See Palestinian Ctr. for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll #1,
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2000/pla.html (July 27-29, 2000). One could interpret this finding as
showing that even before the current war, Palestinians supported terrorist activity. That said, it is also
undeniable that support for Arafat and his Fatah Party, relative to more radical Palestinian groups, has
taken a strong hit since the outbreak of the war. As Khalil Shikaki has noted, "the domestic legitimacy
of the PA has been severely damaged. Its ability to provide services has been crippled, and the standing
of Yasir Arafat and Fatah has dropped dramatically." Khalil Shikaki & David Makovsky, Wash. Inst. for
Near East Pol'y, Special Policy Forum Report: Assessing Palestinian-Israeli Violence: Two Years On,
PEACEWATCH No. 398, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/index.htm (Oct. 3, 2002). In other
words, a complicated process emerges whereby Israeli attacks undermine the PA and its ability to
provide services, leaving a gap to be filled by Hamas. It is not clear that this trend will continue
inexorably; instead, Hamas has achieved important political gains from the intifada and has been able to
become the dominant force in Palestinian politics. It may have hit its maximum. See David Makovsky,
Wash. Inst. for Near East Pol'y, Israel and the Palestinians: An End of Year Assessment (Part I),
PEACEWATCH No. 438, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/index.htm (Dec. 23, 2003).
115. Martin Indyk, A Trusteeship for Palestine?, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2003, at 52-53
(discussing how a Palestinian government would require its own security mechanism for fighting
terrorism so it would not have to rely on Israel and the United States, as it currently does).
116. Reuel Marc Gerecht, Hardly Intelligent: How the CIA Unintentionally Aids Terrorism in
the Middle East, WKLY. STANDARD, June 10, 2002, at 24, 24 ("Arafat's political-paramilitary
organization, Fatah, the principal force within the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian
Authority, is on display as the proud mother of the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigade, one of the primary groups
sponsoring suicide-bombing operations."); Sofaer, supra note 112, at 23 ("The PA has advocated,
planned, financed, and rewarded terrorism against Israel and Jews.").
117. See, e.g., KOROBKIN, supra note 14, at 150.
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consists of precisely one agreement, and a deal will be struck at the price of
$20 or not at all. In contrast, if the buyer's reservation price is $30 and the
seller's reservation price is $10, a deal price of anywhere from $10 to $30 is
possible. If the buyer insists on $10 (or $11, or $12), while the seller insists on
$30 (or $29, or $28), impasse is a very probable outcome. Similarly, if a land-
for-peace agreement is significantly-rather than only marginally-superior
to the reservation points of Israel and Palestine, the benefits to be gained by
reaching agreement could themselves create a roadblock to peace, as each side
angles for the largest possible share of the gains-in-trade that a deal will
create.
Fundamentally, there are two ways for bargaining parties to agree on a
single set of deal terms when more than one set lies within the bargaining
zone. First, one or both parties can attempt to exercise bargaining power to
convince its adversary that it will not yield, and that reaching agreement
therefore requires the adversary to agree to the terms held by the resolute
party. Second, the parties can agree to accept a particular set of deal terms
based on the implicit understanding that those terms are objectively fair or
reasonable, according to some neutral criteria. This Part considers the
possibility that the impasse over land for peace stems from the failure of the
parties to use one of these approaches (or a combination of the two) to identify
a specific set of deal terms.
A. Strategic Behavior
1. Misrepresenting Reservation Points
Because each negotiator's reservation point is based on unobservable
private information-such as the negotiator's relative preference for
agreement versus its BATNA, and the negotiator's subjective assessment of
the risks associated with agreement and impasse-a bargaining party can
never know its adversary's reservation point with certainty. '18 So each
negotiator has an incentive to try to convince its opponent that its reservation
point is higher than it actually is and that, therefore, the opponent must make
concessions in order to avoid an impasse. For example, if a buyer believes that
a seller might be willing to part with his wares for $10, the buyer might
employ "strategic bargaining" and claim that he is willing to pay no more than
$10 for those wares, even if his reservation point is really $30.
The flip side of the incentive for strategically misrepresenting one's own
reservation point is the mutual disincentive to make an offer that is not
extremely favorable to the offering side. A specific proposal signals that the
terms are superior to the offeror's reservation point, which can result in the
offeree inferring that the offeror is willing to yield further. Thus, if a buyer
offers to pay $20, the seller may infer that the buyer's reservation point is at
least $20 and is highly likely to be somewhat greater than $20. This inference
can lead the offeree to believe that a price above $20 is achievable and hence
to reject the offer of $20.
118. Cf Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1797-99 (discussing how negotiators estimate their
opponents' reservation points).
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To summarize, a strategic bargainer tries to convince his adversary that
his reservation point approaches what he estimates the adversary's reservation
point to be, while refusing to propose any agreement that might suggest his
reservation point is lower-an approach sometimes labeled "hard bargaining."
If both negotiators adopt this posture, their positions will seem far apart (even
if a bargaining zone does actually exist), and neither side will make an offer
that the other will accept. Unless one party, or both, softens its approach,
impasse will result. And if the parties have malevolent utility functions,
1 19
impasse is particularly likely-not only do both parties wish to obtain the
most advantageous agreement possible, they also wish to prevent the other
from obtaining a favorable deal.
Many different specific sets of deal terms are consistent with the land-
for-peace framework. In terms of land, Israel could agree to any of the
following options (or some combination thereof): the establishment of a
Palestinian state in all the territory beyond Israel's pre-1967 boundaries,
Israel's retaining portions of the West Bank located close to the Green Line,
or Israel's retaining some territory beyond the Green Line in exchange for
some territory within Israel proper. The state of Palestine could consist of only
portions or the entirety of the West Bank and Gaza, which are not contiguous,
or it could include some territory linking the two Palestinian areas. Israel
could keep possession of part or all of East Jerusalem, or all of East Jerusalem
could be turned over to Palestine. Control over the religious sites on the
historic Temple Mount could go to Israel or Palestine individually, together
with joint authority, or could be divided between them. Finally, territory could
be transferred from Israeli to Palestinian control all at once, or in steps over
time. Similarly, in terms of peace, Palestine could guarantee Israel that it
would follow a wide range of possible policies for stopping and punishing
renegade acts of terror launched by Palestinian militants.
Many other significant issues that are too numerous and complex to
canvass here could also potentially be resolved in a variety of ways. For
example, the state of Palestine could be completely demilitarized, it could be
permitted some limited defense capability, or there could be no limitations.
Palestinian refugees could be entitled to financial compensation of various
amounts, or to none at all. Palestine could disclaim the right of return, Israel
could grant some number of refugees the right to immigrate to Israel, or the
refugees could receive a symbolic right of return that could not be exercised in
practice. Israel could guarantee Palestinians specific rights to work and travel
in Israel, or there could be no guarantees. 120 Any treaty establishing a
Palestinian state would have to deal with a range of additional economic
issues, one of the most important being the division of water rights. 21 With so
119. See Hirshleifer & Osborne, supra note 57, at 131, 133.
120. Indyk, A Trusteeship for Palestine?, supra note 115, at 62-65 (describing the various
suggestions for resolving the conflict); Daniel Pipes, Does Israel Need a Plan?, COMMENT., Feb. 2003,
at 19, 19 (same); Unger, supra note 107, at I (same).
121. ARNON SOFFER, RIVERS OF FIRE: THE CONFLICT OVER WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 189-
95 (1999); Daniel J. Epstein, Making the Desert Bloom: Competing for Scarce Water Resources in the
Jordan River Basin, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 395, 415 (1996); Raed Mounir Fathallah, Water
Disputes in the Middle East: An International Law Analysis of the Israel-Jordan Peace Accord, 12 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 119, 122 (1996).
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many issues and so many possible resolutions of each, the permutations of any
possible final-status agreement are nearly limitless.
Each party can threaten to reject any agreement containing particular
terms, essentially claiming that such a deal would be inferior to its reservation
point, regardless of how desirable the other terms in the package may be. The
veracity of such a claim is unverifiable. It can be made by a party for whom
the term at issue is so critical that it would make any agreement inferior to that
party's reservation point, or it can be made by a party trying to squeeze further
concessions out of its bargaining opponent. For example, at various times,
Israeli leaders have claimed they would never agree to the division of
Jerusalem.122 Both sides have demanded control over the Temple Mount.'
23
Palestinian leaders have claimed they would never concede their claim to the
right of return. 124 When President Bush released the Road Map in the spring
of 2003, Prime Minister Sharon accepted the document as a starting point for
discussions but immediately announced fourteen specific exceptions to its
content. 125
A negotiator's claims that certain terms are non-negotiable can quickly
become self-fulfilling prophecies, because a subsequent reversal of position
can be viewed as losing face. 126 This outcome is especially likely when the
negotiator relies on an image of strength and resolve to maintain his office, as
do Israeli and Palestinian political leaders. What begins as an impediment to
agreement caused by strategic behavior can evolve into an impediment caused
by a conflict of interest between principals and their agent.
A somewhat different point, rooted in unconscious psychological
processes rather than calculated strategic behavior, is that negotiators often
react negatively to agreement terms that in theory are acceptable once those
terms appear achievable, especially when an adversary proposes the terms.
This "grass is always greener on the other side of the fence" or "you always
want what you cannot have" phenomenon is sometimes called "reactive
devaluation."
127
A recent study suggests how this phenomenon could apply to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict specifically, causing the disputants to represent higher
reservation points than a more objective comparison of potential deal terms to
their BATNAs would rationally support. Jewish and Arab Israeli students
were presented with a proposed term for a hypothetical interim agreement,
122. Sofaer, supra note 112, at 25; Unger, supra note 107, at 4-6.
123. David B. Green, Battle over the Bulge, JERUSALEM REP., Oct. 21, 2002, at 36; Yossi
Shain, Jewish Kinship at a Crossroads: Lessons for Homelands and Diasporas, POL. Sci. Q., Summer
2002, at 279, 305 (describing how many conservative, religious Israeli Jews believe Temple Mount
belongs to all Jews, and its surrender is not under negotiation); Leslie Susser, Which Way Forward
Now?, JERUSALEM REP., Nov. 6, 2000, at 17 (during the Camp David negotiations, both sides demanded
sovereignty over the Temple Mount).
124. Cf Kramer, supra note 12, at 994 (quoting refugees who claim that no Palestinian leader
can sign an agreement that gives away their land).
125. Peter Beinart, Empty Cabinet, NEW REPUBLIC, June 16, 2003, at 6, 6 ("Only seven of the
14 ministers from Sharon's own Likud voted yes and only because Sharon attached 14 revisions to the
plan."); Bruce Stokes, Peace on Paper, 35 NAT'L J. 1000, 1002 (2003) (reporting that Sharon's
government leaked 100 proposed amendments to Ha'aretz).
126. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1809.
127. See generally Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
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and asked to rate how good the proposal was for Israel and how good for the
Palestinians. 28 Some participants were told that it was proposed by Israel, and
others that it was suggested by the Palestinians. 129Jewish students who
believed the proposal was advanced by Israel rated it significantly more
desirable for Israel than did Jewish students who believed it was advanced by
the Palestinians.130 Arab students rated the proposal as less desirable for the
Palestinians when they were told that Israel, rather than the Palestinians,
advanced the proposal.' 3 1 These results suggest that, in the course of bilateral
bargaining, agreement proposals that fall within the bargaining zone might be
devalued and subsequently rejected, fueling a cycle of hard bargaining and
making even a mutually desirable agreement elusive.
2. Demonstrating Patience
Standard game theory models of negotiating behavior assume that when
two parties attempt to demand agreements that are significantly superior to
their reservation points, the party that can be the most patient in conducting
the bargaining should prevail in the hard bargaining contest and enjoy the
more favorable deal terms. 132 Assume, for example, that Buyer, with a
reservation price of $30, refuses to offer more than $10 for Seller's wares,
while Seller, whose reservation price is $10, demands $30. Assume also that
Seller is in no hurry to convert the goods to dollars, but Buyer, for financial
reasons or merely as a result of personal preference, is extremely anxious to
complete the purchase immediately. Buyer's greater desire to complete the
transaction should lead him to increase his offer before Seller will decrease
her demand. In fact, if Buyer knows that he is less patient than seller, he
should increase his offer immediately because there is no point in postponing
the inevitable when delay is costly.
This model will fail to predict bargaining outcomes, however, if both
negotiators believe they are the more patient side. In such a situation, as a
primary negotiation tactic, each party will continue to demand the most
beneficial agreement possible consistent with its estimate of the adversary's
reservation point. As a secondary negotiation tactic, each party will attempt to
demonstrate its relative reservoir of patience in order to convince the
adversary to make concessions. If both sides remain tenaciously patient and
believe they can outlast the other, the impasse can continue indefinitely.
This dynamic could be an important roadblock to peace in the Middle
East. In Part III, we suggested that the cycle of violence between Israel and
Palestine could be characterized as both parties attempting to convince the
other that "your BATNA is worse than you think." This message would aim to
128. Ifat Maoz et al., Reactive Devaluation of an "Israeli" vs. "Palestinian" Peace Proposal,
46 J. CONFLICT RES. 515, 528-29 (2002).
129. Id. The term was actually offered by the Palestinian delegation in 1993 as part of the
negotiations that eventually led to the Oslo Agreement. Id. at 528.
130. Id. at 530 tbl.2.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ETAL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 218-24 (1994); Russell
Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 6 (2002).
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make the other side prefer an imperfect peace agreement to the status quo:
133
acknowledgment that it will continue to suffer until an agreement is reached
ought to make it impatient and willing to make concessions to achieve a deal.
Palestinian suicide bombers can thus be seen as a tactic for making Israel
impatient for a deal, because the attackers are effectively saying, "until we get
what we want, you will suffer." Israeli military reprisals, planned and
collateral damage to the lives and property of Palestinians, border closures,
checkpoint lines, and curfews can be seen as tactics designed to make
Palestinians impatient for peace, as they reply to the suicide bombers, "you
will suffer more than we will." As long as both sides remain patient, the cycle
can continue.
B. A "Fair Deal"
Not all negotiators, of course, are hard bargainers who misrepresent their
reservation points and attempt to outwait adversaries until fatigue forces
concessions. Rather, most negotiators reach agreement through mutual
concessions-they realize they might have held out for a slightly more
advantageous deal, but they also know that agreeing to terms that are
reasonable and fair to both sides avoids undue unpleasantness, a protracted
power struggle, sore feelings in the future, and the real possibility of ongoing
impasse. In the context of the Middle East, history makes achieving a
consensus as to what constitutes a fair compromise seem remote.
Reaching what both parties would consider a fair deal requires the
negotiators to agree on a reference transaction from which to evaluate various
sets of deal terms. 134 Often, this means the parties must agree on what
preferred norms of justice are most relevant to the negotiation. 135 For
example, Buyer and Seller might agree to a deal at the market price of Seller's
wares, even if in the particular situation Buyer's reservation point is higher
than the market price and Seller's reservation point is lower. If Seller has
particularly high costs, he might argue that a more appropriate norm'is that the
price reflect Seller's costs plus a standard profit margin. If Buyer and Seller
are regular trading partners, Buyer might argue that it has a reasonable
expectation of paying the price it paid in the last transaction.
In commercial transactions, bargaining parties often disagree as to which
justice norms should underlie the terms of a particular deal. The
disagreements are likely to be more extreme in international disputes,
however, for two reasons. First, in many cases, there is no substantially
similar transaction that can serve as a reference point or model for an
agreement. Second, cultural differences and the emotional content of the
dispute often make the parties' particular claims more deeply felt and
entrenched. In these situations, it will be difficult to reach common ground
concerning the appropriate justice norms for resolving a disagreement.
In the Israeli-Palestinian context, most justice claims can be met with
plausible competing claims from the other side. The assertion that justice
133. See supra Part III.A.
134. See Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1825-29.
135. Id. at 1828-29.
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requires that Palestinian refugees be able to return to their homes, for
example, can be met with a claim that justice requires the preservation of a
Jewish state. The argument for drawing territorial boundaries based on current
demographics, and thus leaving Israeli settlements in place, can be countered
with the claim that Israel should not be permitted to gain an advantage by
virtue of having established such settlements in the first place. The claim that
all Palestinians deserve self-determination can be met with the claim that
Israelis, surrounded by hostile neighbors, are entitled to secure borders. The
list could go on indefinitely.
C. Overcoming the Roadblock of Hard Bargaining
When more than one agreement lies within the bargaining zone but two
negotiating parties cannot agree on a substantively just resolution to their
dispute and neither will make concessions, an alternative course of action is
for the parties to attempt to agree on a process from which a specific set of
terms can unfold. Agreeing on a process for determining the terms of an
agreement is different from the scripted confidence-building approaches often
called "peace processes" that are intended to push parties toward eventual
settlement. The Road Map's call for Palestine to halt terrorist attacks and for
Israel to stop settlement construction as a prelude to a final resolution of the
conflict,' 36 for example, viewed in its best light, seeks to pave the way for the
parties to discuss substantive peace terms. But this approach will not help to
resolve the difficult substantive issues such as borders, refugees, and the status
of Jerusalem that the parties must confront in order to achieve peace. This
Article speaks of negotiating a process to mean the parties determining a
procedure, or a set of rules, that will in turn define a substantive set of peace
terms that the parties will agree to abide by ex ante.
1. Negotiating a Process
One process-based approach to reaching an agreement is to formulate
rules that encourage each party to reveal its preferences, and then to use those
revealed preferences to create a set of substantive terms that maximize the
parties' joint gain created by settling their dispute. A simple example, known
to every child, is called "divide and choose.'3 One child cuts a cake into two
pieces, and the other child chooses his piece. The first child has an incentive
to cut the cake as evenly as possible; the second child has an incentive to
reveal honestly which piece he finds more attractive.
A more sophisticated procedure with a similar goal calls for parties to
agree on a range of plausible terms for an agreement and then bid for those
terms with a fixed number of points allocated to each side.138 Each negotiator
then wins terms relatively more important to it, while losing some terms
136. Sofaer, supra note 112, at 21; Press Statement, Office of the Spokesman, Department of
State, A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062pf.htm.
137. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION 8-9 (1996).
138. See id. at 68-75 (describing the adjusted winner procedure); KOROBKIN, supra note 14, at
214-18.
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relatively less important. A recent article proposes a resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute based on precisely this approach, while trying to predict
what the specific settlement terms might look like by relying on results of
public opinion polls to rank the importance of the various central issues to
each side.1
39
While negotiating a procedure is easier than negotiating the substantive
terms of an agreement in many contexts, hard bargaining can undermine even
this approach. With as much as is at stake in the Middle East, both parties
would no doubt look ahead to predict the substantive consequences of a
particular negotiating procedure and strategically bargain for that procedure in
much the same way that they bargain over substantive issues directly. In other
words, it is hard to imagine that both parties would not try to "game" any
negotiations over process in a way that effectively replicates the strategic
behavior that they exhibit in negotiations over substance. Thus, it seems
unlikely that substituting negotiations over a process for reaching a
substantive agreement for negotiations over the substance itself would make
the dispute significantly more tractable.
2. Delegating Authority to a Third Party
Rather than agree on procedural rules for determining substantive deal
terms, an alternative procedural approach for resolving conflict is for
negotiators to agree to delegate authority for determining the substantive
terms to a third party. Submitting domestic disputes to a judge or jury is a
form of this approach. In the international commercial setting, parties often
resolve disputes by submitting them to a neutral arbitrator, agreeing in
advance to regard the arbitrator's decision as binding. 140 In general, the
impartiality of the adjudication model gives it legitimacy to the parties, thus
making it appear fair ex ante.1 41 In theory, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute could
be resolved using a version of this model.
A decision to delegate deal-making authority to a third party would
create two challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian context, however. First, the
parties would have to decide on the rules that would govern the arbitrator. No
nation would risk its entire future on the general wisdom of a third party, so
parameters would be necessary. At a minimum, each nation would require that
the range of terms open to the arbitrator be limited such that any resulting
agreement would be preferable to the status quo.
Second, both parties would have to agree on the arbitrator, which is to
say that both sides would have to believe the arbitrator would faithfully apply
rules and make any unconstrained judgments neutrally. Disputants are
unlikely to voluntarily trust arbitral powers-that is, the authority to dictate
the terms of an agreement-to any third party whose allegiance or sympathies
139. Tansa George Massoud, Fair Division, Adjusted Winner Procedure (A49, and the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, 44 J. CONFLICT RES. 333 (2000).
140. Michael F. Hoellering, Managing International Commercial Arbitration: The Institution 's
Role, Disp. RESOL. J., June 1994, at 12.
141. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR COPING WITH CONFLICT 77
(1994).
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might lie with the adversary, which makes the possibility of resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute through an arbitral procedure appear quite small. It
is unlikely that Israel would trust any nation or international body with this
power, other than perhaps the United States. It is equally unlikely that
Palestine would trust the United States in this role, especially given the
perception in the Middle East that U.S. policy has tilted decidedly toward
Israel and away from Palestine since Arafat rejected the final Clinton peace
proposal in 2000 (and Clinton blamed Arafat for the failure), and especially
since the events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing U.S. war on terrorism.
Importantly, although perceived neutrality and evenhandedness are
critical qualities for an arbitrator in international conflicts, a mediator need not
be seen as perfectly neutral in order to succeed in helping the parties reach an
agreement. In fact, disputants have much to gain from the assistance of a
mediator perceived to be allied with their adversary because the mediator can
often put pressure on its ally to adopt a more moderate posture. 142 Our
recommendations in Part VI for a more assertive U.S. mediative role in
addressing the conflict implicitly build on this observation.
VI. DEVISING A U. S. POLICY TO OVERCOME ROADBLOCKS
In Part II, we presented a framework for understanding the continuing
impasse in Israeli-Palestinian attempts to negotiate a lasting peace, and in
Parts III-V we described each category of possible explanations for that
impasse. In this Part, we use the analysis presented in Parts II-V as the basis
for proposing an integrated U.S. foreign policy initiative that we believe
would maximize the chance of successfully brokering a stable land-for-peace
agreement between Israel and Palestine.
Designing a model peace initiative would be a far simpler task, at least
analytically speaking, if it were clear which of the potential roadblocks to
peace have actually caused the ongoing impasse in the Middle East.
Unfortunately, while the issues that divide the parties are well known, the
precise cause of their failure to bridge those differences in light of the obvious
benefits of peace to both sides remains unknown, even to the most
knowledgeable observers. Numerous potential factors could explain why
Israel and Palestine remain at war fifty-seven years after the founding of Israel
and thirty-eight years after the Six-Day War: perhaps no bargaining zone
exists that encompasses a specific set of deal terms; internal divisions in the
guise of faithless agents or blocking minorities may have prevented the parties
from concluding a peace agreement on mutually beneficial terms; or the
parties' desires to negotiate a perfect agreement may have prevented the
conclusion of a merely acceptable one.
This observation suggests that a prudent U.S. peace effort would attempt
to address all three of the potential categories of roadblocks simultaneously,
142. See TOUVAL, supra note 1, at 325-26; cf Ross, supra note 66, at 768 (contending that
"Arafat saw [the United States] as his equalizer with the Israelis"); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Lessons for
Practice, in POWER AND NEGOTIATION 255, 259 (I. William Zartman & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 2000)
(observing that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat succeeded in negotiating with Israel by enlisting the
United States in the process and thus getting help in winning concessions from Israel).
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and as many of the specific potential causes of impasse within each category
as possible. The alternative to such a comprehensive approach is to forge a
policy that is based essentially on guesses as to which of the plausible
negotiation roadblocks actually have frustrated Middle East peace for two
generations and continue to do so. Such an approach would run the obvious
risk of failing to resolve the impasse, and it could even exacerbate the conflict
by allowing current problems to fester. With this logic in mind, this Part
attempts to outline the fundamental elements of a comprehensive U.S. policy
initiative.
Before we begin, two qualifications are in order. First, our proposals
assume that the United States wishes to use its influence to try to mediate
143
peace in the Middle East, but we make no attempt here to defend this desire
either as a descriptive or a normative matter. Second, our proposals are
directed at the goal of maximizing the likelihood that, if implemented, Israel
and Palestine would reach a peace agreement. That is, our proposals are
normative. The extent to which the potential efficacy of our proposals might
conflict with competing domestic political concerns, thus creating challenges
to their adoption, is beyond the scope of this analysis. We do believe,
however, that although they would be politically difficult to implement, our
proposals are politically plausible-that is, the second Bush administration
potentially could choose to implement them-thus making the normative
analysis more than merely an intellectual exercise.
A. Eliminating Strategic Hard Bargaining Over the Cooperative Surplus
Compared to the other potential roadblocks to peace explored in this
Article, the problem of hard bargaining over the cooperative surplus that a
mutually beneficial transaction would create receives relatively little attention.
But because the insistence of even one disputant on achieving better deal
terms can prevent the parties from reaching any mutually beneficial
agreement, any sensible U.S. initiative should take steps to preclude such
destructive hard bargaining. Overcoming the roadblock of hard bargaining is
only one of three prongs of our policy proposal, but it is the linchpin on which
the efficacy of the other prongs rests. Accordingly, we begin our analysis with
consideration of this roadblock, first explaining why we believe it is a
significant impediment to peace unlikely to be overcome without a third
party's assistance, and then suggesting an approach to confronting it.
1. The State of the Roadblock: The Problem of Mutual Patience
Even assuming that Israel and Palestine both determine that the value of
a land-for-peace agreement exceeds their reservation points and that no agents
or minority constituencies can block agreement, no agreement will be reached
143. For a good discussion of various conceptions of what constitutes mediation in the
international dispute resolution context, see Jacob Bercovitch, Mediation in International Conflict: An
Overview of Theory, a Review of Practice, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, supra note
77, at 125, 126-30. Which of the various definitions of mediation one adopts is not critical to our
analysis.
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if both sides believe they can garner even better terms by waiting for
additional concessions from the other party. The passage of time is unlikely to
resolve such a stalemate between the parties, each seeking relative advantage,
for the following reasons.
First, the existential nature of the conflict makes the specific terms of a
land-for-peace deal extremely important to the citizens of both nations, which
means that both parties are likely to be inclined to hold out indefinitely for the
best deal possible rather than compromise. 144 As a result, both parties have
extremely high aspirations concerning the terms of any peace agreement, and
they are likely to perceive any concessions they might make as losses relative
to what they consider possible, rather than perceiving concessions as the
normal cost of reaching any agreement between parties with opposing
preferences. 145
Second, neither party is likely to determine that the adversary has the
capacity to be more patient, and thus that having to make concessions is
inevitable. Willingness to suffer now for future benefit is a major component
of both nations' self-conception; or, as economists would say, Israel and
Palestine both have low discount rates. Israel's national self-image is built on
images of the history of the persecution of Jews worldwide and the ability of
the fledgling nation to win its independence by single-handedly defeating the
combined armies of the Arab world in the 1948 war. 146 Israel's history of
fighting the entire Arab world for survival against long odds leads to a
willingness to suffer high costs rather than make concessions, as does a
history of more than two thousand years of suffering anti-Semitic persecution
and slaughter. Palestinians also view their history as one of suffering,
especially since 1948.147 Their long struggle, first against the existence of the
Jewish state and later against Israeli control of the occupied territories, makes
stoic acceptance of suffering part of their self-image as well, and makes
concessions just to avoid further suffering unlikely.
Unfortunately, frameworks adopted to structure Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations in the past have exacerbated rather than mitigated the problem of
mutual strategic behavior. Under the terms of the Oslo Accords, each side was
to make less difficult concessions first, while the more difficult issues-such
as whether there would a Palestinian state and the final status of Jerusalem-
were postponed until the end of the process. 148 The Oslo process stressed
144. Cf Daniel Druckman, Negotiating In the International Context, in PEACEMAKING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, supra note 77, at 81, 100 (nations that perceive a security risk are less likely
to cooperate in the negotiation setting); Kelman, supra note 77, at 191, 196 (nations' "sense that their
identity, security, and existence as a national group are at stake" makes them "afraid to make the
necessary concessions or accommodations for the negotiations to move forward").
145. See KOROBKIN, supra note 14, at 33-36.
146. Cf C.D. SMITH, PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. 157 (1996) (defining "Ben
Gurionism" as Israel's perceived need to demonstrate military superiority until others sue for peace);
Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, supra note 45, at 269-80; Marc H. Ellis, The Future of Israel/Palestine:
Embracing the Broken Middle, J. OF PALESTINE STUD., Spring 1997, at 56, 57 (observing an aura of
victimization in Israel); KNOX & QunRK, supra note 5, at 89 (noting that Israeli politics are characterized
by a "siege mentality").
147. See ROSS. supra note 66, at 42 (observing that "[v]ictimization has deep roots in the
Palestinian mind").
148. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Selective Justice: The Case of Israel and the Occupied
Territories, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 934, 956 (2003); Unger, supra note 107, at 8.
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confidence-building measures designed to establish trust between Israel and
Palestine, with the expectation that trust would magically lead to agreement
concerning specific terms. By leaving the issues of greatest importance for
last, this framework virtually guaranteed that as time passed bargaining would
become harder and more strategic.
The current Road Map repeats this process flaw. The Road Map calls for
the parties to make some initial concessions-such as freezing settlements and
ending violence-but it provides no hint as to the specific substance of a final
agreement.14 9 The Road Map also calls for the establishment of a Palestinian
state by 2005, but on no specific terms. 15 President Bush has defended the
lack of specificity by saying that the terms are for the parties themselves to
determine. 151 However, this approach implicitly assumes that the critical
barrier to peace is the parties' unwillingness to deal with each other, rather
than the parties' mutual refusal to make a concession as long as there is a
possibility that the other party will make a concession. If this assumption is
incorrect as a factual matter, any negotiation framework that promotes hard
bargaining will deepen the impasse between the parties rather than help to
overcome it. It follows that a U.S.-sponsored peace initiative should not
merely seek to make the parties amenable to the idea of an agreement; it
should guide them to a set of substantive agreement terms.
2. Policy Initiative: A Detailed, Non-Negotiable U.S. Proposal
In the terms of negotiation theory, in attempting to mediate the Middle
East conflict, President Bush, like President Clinton (with one exception,
described below) before him, has played essentially a "facilitative" role,
disclaiming an intention or desire to impose a particular substantive resolution
of the conflict.152 The United States should abandon this approach. Instead of
149. Joshua Muravchik, The Road Map to Nowhere: Do We Really Need Another Doomed
Mideast Peace Process?, WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 31, 2003 at 28, 28. (claiming that the ultimate
settlement is unclear from the roadmap); Press Statement, Office of the Spokesman, Department of
State, supra note 136.
150. Muravehik, supra note 149, at 28.
151. This is traditional U.S. policy. See, e.g., Indyk, supra note 115, at 53-54 ("For decades the
United States has rightly preferred that the onus for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain on
the parties themselves. The appropriate role of the United States and other external parties, officials
believed, was to facilitate agreements arrived at through direct negotiations."); Eran Lerman, How Will
the 2004 Elections Influence the U.S. Role?, bitterlemons.org, at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl0l1203ed43.html (Dec. 1, 2003) ("American policy in general.
. . rejects the prospect of externally imposed solutions, which will always be, by definition, unpopular
and brittle.").
152. See generally Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 7 (1996). Many different terms are used
to distinguish third-party participation in disputes to merely facilitate negotiation and third-party
attempts to use influence or leverage to push the parties toward agreement. See, e.g., Chester A. Crocker
et al., Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle, in HERDING CATS: MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN A
COMPLEX WORLD at 19, 20-24 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 1999) (distinguishing between the
"structuralist" mediation paradigm in which the third party uses "persuasion, incentives, and
disincentives" to encourage settlement and "social-psychological approaches" to third-party intervention
based on the goal of facilitating "processes of communication and exchange"); Loraleigh Keashly &
Ronald J. Fisher, Towards a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict: A
Cyprus Illustration, 45 INT'L J. 425, 434 (1990) (distinguishing between the third-party approach of
"consultation," premised on the belief that an improved relationship between disputants will lead to a
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presenting the parties with a broad framework, as the Road Map does, the
United States should assume a more directive position and present the parties
with a detailed set of agreement terms that it considers fair and reasonable to
both sides. The U.S. president should then make it clear that the terms are not
the starting point for negotiations, but the ending point; the United States
should not dicker over the terms.
Facing a set of non-negotiable terms, both parties will have the choice
between agreeing to those terms and impasse. The option of holding out for
better terms in the future-a recipe for stalemate if adopted by both sides-
disappears, not only because the United States will not countenance
arguments for altering the terms, but because it would be difficult under such
circumstances for either party to accept anything less that what is contained in
the proposal. It is doubtful that the Israelis would accept any settlement that
the United States believed was unreasonably biased in favor of Palestine. The
same is true for Palestine, and especially so if the U.S. position had Arab
support.
In order for this approach to succeed, of course, the U.S. resolve not to
dicker over terms must be firm, and the commitment of the United States not
to relent must be credible in the eyes of both disputing parties. Both Israel and
Palestine would be likely to respond to a substantive U.S. peace proposal by
contending that they could not accept the terms as presented and that
extensive alterations favoring their side must be made. Agreeing even to
consider any such alterations, however, would only encourage both parties to
resume their tradition of hard bargaining in search of advantage rather than
agreement.1
53
The support of the international community for the U.S. proposal,
perhaps in the form of a U.N. Security Council resolution, would have
important benefits as well. Not only would international backing undermine
likely claims that the United States is biased in favor of Israel 154 and
undermine the oft-stated although highly contested Palestinian claim that an
unlimited right of return for refugees is required by international law,
155
good substantive outcome, and "mediation" premised on the belief that a good substantive settlement
will lead to a better relationship); I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International Mediation:
Conflict Resolution and Power Politics, J. Soc. ISSUES, Spring 1985, at 27, 38-39 (distinguishing
between mediators that play the role of a "communicator" or "formulator" from those that play the role
of a "manipulator").
153. The Camp David II negotiations provide an example of how this dynamic has worked in
the past. On the third day of the summit, the U.S. delegation prepared a draft framework agreement
designed to serve as the basis for continued negotiations. The Israeli delegation objected strongly to a
number of the items, causing the Americans to make revisions. Sensing that the Israelis were gaining the
upper hand in the bargaining, the Palestinians responded by voicing their unwillingness to negotiate
based on those terms. See Ross, supra note 66, at 658-62.
154. Any perception that U.S. sympathies tilt toward Israel and away from the Palestinians
cannot help the United States mediate an agreement between the parties, but there is little reason to
believe that a lack of perfect neutrality will be fatal to such efforts. It is sufficient for the parties to
believe that the mediator wants to achieve and can help the parties to achieve an agreement that is
acceptable to both sides. See Zartman & Touval, supra note 152, at 37.
155. Palestinian commentators often argue that U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 grants
the right of return and represents international legal acceptance of this principle. See, e.g., HENRY
CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 213-23 (2d ed. 1976); Sari Hanafi, Without the Right of
Return There Can Be No Solution, bitterlemons.org, at http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/-
b1270904ed.html#isl (Sept. 27, 2004); W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Right of Return,
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Security Council backing would help to strengthen the credibility in the eyes
of both parties of the claim that the terms are truly non-negotiable, rather than
merely the opening gambit in a new round of bargaining. International
solidarity would make it less likely that Israel's leaders would believe the
United States would support Israeli rejection of the proposed terms 156 and that
Palestinian leaders would believe that the international community would
support its rejection of those terms. 157 A Security Council resolution would
also transform the proposal from a U.S. to an international initiative,
providing political cover to the Arab states and allowing them to support the
proposal without appearing to have succumbed to U.S. pressure. The
international status of the proposal would also appeal to European states.
Our proposal that the U.S. government advance a non-negotiable set of
peace terms raises an obvious question: What would be the substantive
content of the proposal? From the perspective of our theoretical approach, the
substance of the terms proposed is irrelevant. What matters is only that the set
J. PALESTINE STUD., Spring 1980, at 125, 128-30. It is hard to give this assertion much purchase. The
Resolution states that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their
neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be
paid for the property of those choosing not to return." G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR 3d Sess., P 11, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/194 (1948). Thus, by its specific terms it does not refer to the descendants of refugees,
rejecting current Palestinian claims. Moreover, its permissive language ("should be permitted") suggests
that this does not create a legal right but rather a general political desire, especially in light of the
provision that the return date is that which is "practicable" and that refugees must desire "to live in
peace with their neighbors." A persuasive analysis of the text of Resolution 194 is found in Ruth
Lapidoth, The Right of Return in International Law, with Special Reference to the Palestinian Refugees,
16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 103 (1986).
As a General Assembly resolution, Resolution 194 does not have binding legal effect. Most
importantly for our purposes, however, Resolution 194 would most likely be preempted by Security
Council Resolution 242, which the PLO accepted as part of the Oslo Accords, and which simply refers
to a "just settlement of the refugee problem." S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., P2, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/22/Rev. 2 (1967) In general, then, we are confident that international law provides no basis for a
general right of return. A compelling demonstration of this point most generally is found in Eyal
Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian
Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 321-29 (1995).
156. Sharon has staked much of his domestic credibility on maintaining American support. It
would obviously be much more difficult to maintain this strategy if his government were to violate an
American-sponsored Security Council resolution-assuming, of course, that the U.S. administration
were then to follow through on it.
157. Moreover, Arafat and many other Palestinian rejectionists have consistently argued that
appeals to the international community will eventually lead to the triumph of their strategy. See, e.g.,
Leslie Susser, Hesitating, As the Tension Rises, JERUSALEM REP., May 20, 2002, at 20 ("From the very
start of the violence in September 2000, Yasser Arafat's main strategic goal has been to
'internationalize' the conflict ...."). This has been admitted by their leadership. See Hanna Amireh,
Ushering in Year Four: A Reassessment, bitterlemons.org, at http://www.bitterlemons.org/-
previous/b1290903ed37.html (Sept. 29, 2003) ("The gamble made by the Palestinian leadership--and
one initially fully justified relied on the assumption that escalating Israeli military measures and
aggression reap Arab and international solidarity."). Amireh is a member of the PLO's Executive
Committee. He writes that "it is possible to employ efforts that will alter international positions still
more dramatically in favor of the Palestinian people, their president and their leadership. This external
support is an instrument of pressure that no Israeli government can ignore." Id. This attitude would be
more difficult to maintain in the face of a Security Council resolution rejecting the PLO's terms.
158. Since the first Arab-Israeli war, U.N. Security Council resolutions have, at least on some
occasions, provided political cover for Arab actions that might otherwise have been viewed as
concessions. See, e.g., TOUVAL, supra note 1, 37 (claiming that a "strong Security Council resolution
enabled the Arab governments" to agree to an eventual 1949 armistice with Israel, ending the war
"without losing face").
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of terms falls inside the bargaining zone (i.e., inside the area between the
parties' reservation points), so that both parties will prefer agreement on the
terms included in the initiative to the impossibility of reaching any
agreement.1 59 Because the primary risk of advancing a non-negotiable set of
terms is that the proposing party will miscalculate and unintentionally design
an agreement that is inferior to one side's reservation point, prudence (in
addition to commonsense notions of fairness) suggests that the United States
attempt to design the substance of the initiative so that its attractiveness
relative to each party's reservation point is approximately equal.
Determining what specific terms would satisfy this criterion would
require a considerably more detailed analysis than is possible in this Article.
With this said, however, it seems likely that the terms of a non-negotiable
U.S. peace plan would probably resemble in content the Geneva Accord and
the similar but less well-known People's Voice initiative, 160 although in
considerably greater detail. These two recent plans are both final-status
documents negotiated by prominent Israelis and Palestinians (although not by
elected leaders), and both have received substantial public support in each
nation. 16 1 These facts suggest that a more detailed plan that follows the outline
159. Cf. Zartman & Touval, supra note 152, at 33 (noting that mediators in international
disputes often have substantive preferences as to terms, but that their interests "usually allow for a wider
range of acceptable outcomes than the immediate interests of the parties").
160. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the People's Voice initiative and
the Geneva Accord do differ in some critical respects, most importantly in regard to Palestinian
refugees. The People's Voice initiative quite clearly states that refugees shall have the right to return to
the Palestinian state, but not to Israel. People's Voice, supra note 11. The Geneva Accord is more
complex. Article VII specifically states that Israel will have complete "sovereign discretion" as to how
many refugees it will accept, and further states that it will only have to accept the number that it submits
to the International Commission overseeing the process. Geneva Accord, supra note 11, art. 7, §
4(e)(iii). At the same time, however, the Accord creates a number of Technical Committees to "oversee
and manage" the refugee issue, id. § 1 l(a)(iii)(1), which "shall have full and exclusive responsibility for
implementing all aspects of this Agreement pertaining to refugees," id. § 1 l(a)(i), and "shall establish
mechanisms for resolution of disputes arising from the interpretation or implementation of the
provisions of this Agreement relating to refugees." Id. § I l(c)(iv). Skeptics argue that providing for such
committees presents a procedural opportunity to inflame the refugee issue and could allow a
Commission so disposed to interpret the agreement to force Israel to take in hundreds of thousands of
refugees. They argue that the Commission would be so disposed because of its members, only the
United States would be sympathetic to Israel (other prominent members could include Arab states, the
European Union, and Norway).
The foregoing describes the ambiguities contained in the Accord's English text. For these
reasons, some sophisticated observers who believe in a two-state solution have expressed qualms about
the Accord. See Asher Susser, A Shaky Foundation, HA'ARETZ, Dec. 15, 2003,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml. Cf. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Laudable
in Rekindling Hope, bitterlemons-intemational.org, at http://www.bitterlemons-
international.org/previous.php?opt=l&id=17 (Nov. 13, 2003) (noting that the Geneva Accord "fudges
the issue"). There is little doubt in our minds that the best reading of Article VII protects Israel's interest
on the issue, and that "sovereign discretion" actually means sovereign discretion. Thus, we feel
confident, despite the differences, in aligning the Geneva Accord with the People's Voice initiative.
Still, we acknowledge that the creation of the International Commission does introduce a potentially
dangerous procedural wrinkle. Cf. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.
312 (1983) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("I'll let you write the substance ... and you let me write the
procedure, and I'll screw you every time."); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 9 (1960)
("[W]hat substantive law says should be means nothing except in terms of what procedure says that you
can make real.").
161. See Poll: Most Israelis, Palestinians Support Geneva Accord, HA'ARETZ, Nov. 24, 2003,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml (citing a poll finding that Israelis
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of these documents would be likely to fall between the parties' reservation
points. Moreover, both accords have attracted substantial international
support, 162 so basing an U.S. proposal on them would sharply increase the
likelihood of desirable Security Council approval.
One possible objection to our proposal is that such directive behavior by
the United States would require Israel and Palestine to relinquish some
sovereignty, and it would be morally objectionable or politically impossible
for either side to do this. Put in the terms we have used, if one or both parties
were to view a non-negotiable set of terms as inappropriately coercive, this
might have the dynamic effect of raising one or both reservation points. The
result could be that the proposal would fall outside of the bargaining zone,
even if the substance of the proposal (if it could be separated from the element
of coercion) would rest comfortably inside it. Moreover, a coerced agreement,
even if grudgingly accepted by the parties, would lack legitimacy and fail to
endure over time.
This objection misunderstands the exact message communicated by
providing a "non-negotiable" set of deal terms. By providing such terms, the
United States would not be attempting to force either party to accept them, as
it did, for example, when it insisted that Iraq permit access to UN weapons
inspectors on threat of military force. Rather, by providing a specific set of
terms, the United States would create a focal point for the parties' attention,
making it extremely hard for either party to accept less. 63 This approach
would actually empower Israel and Palestine to accept the proposed terms
because the other party would be unlikely to accept less than what the U.S.
president described as fair. A clear focal point can be an excuse for the parties
support the Accord 53% to 44% opposed, and Palestinians support it 56% to 39% opposed). Israeli
support for the Accord declined toward the end of 2003; one commentator suggests that support
"dropped as the public became aware of the full extent of its implications," "its identification with Yossi
Beilin, who is viewed as Israel's leading dove," and "because of the Accord's European support."
Makovsky, supra note 114. Still, Makovsky concedes that opposition to the Accord only reached 50%,
hardly a stinging rebuke. Id. Makovsky also reports that 58% of Palestinians opposed the Geneva
Accord, mostly due to its provisions on refugees and its limitations on Palestinian sovereignty. Id. These
poll results also suggest that political space exists to gain Palestinian approval. In addition, Makovsky
states that only 37% of the Israeli public opposed the People's Voice initiative, and that the initiative had
gained 100,000 Israeli and 60,000 Palestinian signatures through the end of October 2003. UN's Annan
Boosts Nusseibeh-Ayalon, Geneva Peace Plans, HA'ARETZ, Oct. 29, 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/-
hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml. A resolution along the lines of the Geneva Accord and
People's Voice would also be unlikely to attract a French veto, as Paris has already endorsed the
Accord. See France, Belgium Draw Israeli Ire Over Geneva Accord, EurActiv.com,
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-116516&type=News (Oct. 28, 2003). French and
Belgian support for the proposal is so strong that Israeli officials believe that Paris and Brussels are
bankrolling it. See Gideon Alon & Aluf Benn, Shalom: France, Belgium Offering $7 Million To
Promote Geneva Accord, HA'ARETZ, Oct. 23, 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/-
ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml. Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami has called for a Security
Council resolution embodying the Clinton Plan of December 2000, which is referenced in the Geneva
Accord and is essentially restated by People's Voice. See Shlomo Ben-Ami, The Security Council May
Hold the Key, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 13, 2003, at 6.
162. See To Israelis and Palestinians: A Statement of Support, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Jan. 15,
2004, at 46. As we argue below, international actors play a crucial role in maintaining both the Israeli
and the Palestinian positions. Thus, strong international support of the American proposal would also
significantly assist in creating the bargaining zone because this could change the adversaries' BATNAs.
See Part VI.B.2 infra.
163. Cf KOROBKIN, supra note 14, at 352-53 (describing how third parties can create focal
points to encourage settlement between disputants).
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to stop fighting for marginal leverage that makes a peace agreement
impossible, even if a bargaining zone exists, because the existence of this
focal point sharply reduces the expected value of such strategic efforts. 164
Moreover, because its adversary would not be able to negotiate for any
"improvements" in the terms of the deal, each party could interpret the
outcome of the "negotiations" as successful for it.'
65
Similarly, a U.S.-proposed set of non-negotiable terms also can be
understood as a method that helps the parties to solve the prisoner's dilemma
that they find themselves facing. 166 Assuming that the U.S.-proposed terms
were to fall within the bargaining zone, mutual acceptance of those terms (i.e.,
"cooperation") would by definition render both parties better off than if both
reject those terms (i.e., "defection"). Both parties fear, however, that
indicating a willingness to cooperate would make them vulnerable to
exploitation by their adversary and leave them worse off than they would be
in a world of mutual defection (i.e., result in receiving the "sucker's payoff').
By making its proposed terms non-negotiable, the United States would create
conditions under which a disputant's acceptance of the terms would not put it
at risk of exploitation because the United States would have already
committed to not allow the other party to seek more advantageous terms.
A second possible objection to our proposal is that U.S. insistence on
specific terms might preclude the parties from identifying and taking
advantage of mutually profitable trades-to use negotiation jargon, from
taking advantage of "integrative bargaining" opportunities. 167 For example,
more than eighty percent of Jewish settlers in the Territories live in
settlements around Jerusalem or on the far-western edge of the West Bank.
1 68
Consequently, it is likely both parties could benefit by drawing the border
between Israel and Palestine such that most of these settlements become part
of Israel and some lands on the Israeli side of the Green Line are in return
awarded to Palestine.169 A U.S.-specified land swap could and should attempt
to take advantage of such mutually beneficial trades; nevertheless, the attempt
might fail to capitalize on all such opportunities.
164. Cf. Howard M. Sachar, Great Powers Hold Key to Mideast Peace, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2004, at B13 (contending that pressure from the "Great Powers" would give Arafat and Sharon political
cover to accept a compromise).
165. Cf. I. William Zartman & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiations, in
POWER AND NEGOTIATION, supra note 142, at 271, 286 (concluding that agreement "often depends on
the ability of each side to claim that it did well in the negotiations").
166. Cf. KOROBKIN, supra note 14, at 224-25 (describing the requirements of a "prisoner's
dilemma" game).
167. See, e.g., id. at 111-15; ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING, How LAWYERS
HELP CLIENTS CREATE VALUE IN NEGOTIATIONS (2000); HOWARD RAIFFA, TmE ART AND SCIENCE OF
NEGOTIATION 33 (1982).
168. See WASSERSTEIN, supra note 6, at 132.
169. It is largely assumed that a final settlement between Israel and Palestine would allow
Israel to keep a small portion of the West Bank-from 2% to 5/o--that is adjacent to Israel and has the
most dense settler concentrations in return for transferring some land to Palestine. According to one
account of the Camp David II and subsequent negotiations, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators agreed in
principle to a land exchange for up to 3% of the West Bank. See Miguel Angel Moratinos, EU Non-
Paper Summarizing Discussions at Taba, at http://disarm.igc.org/morotinosdoctmentl.htm (Jan. 2001).
The recent, although unofficial, Geneva Accord and People's Voice draft agreement both anticipate
some type of a land swap as part of a final settlement. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Insisting on a non-negotiable set of terms, however, would not preclude
the parties from taking advantage of available mutually profitable trades in the
future. It would only establish the non-negotiable set of terms as the baseline
for future negotiations. Once both sides accepted the non-negotiable terms,
nothing would prevent them from sitting down to renegotiate."' Should
renegotiations fail, however, the parties' fallback position would be the U.S.-
directed land-for-peace terms rather than ongoing conflict. Contracts scholars
will recognize the non-negotiable terms as "default terms," which the parties
may contract around but which would govern the parties if they were not able
mutually to agree otherwise. '
7
Granted, as is the case for any set of default contract terms, 172 it would
be difficult for the parties to renegotiate their legal relationship after the U.S.-
proposed terms have been accepted because the behavioral tendency to be
loss-averse causes negotiators to view sacrifices from a reference point as
more costly than gains from that reference point; 73 further, the legal status
quo is the most natural reference point from which parties to the Israel-
Palestine dispute view possible changes as gains or losses.'74 But this status
quo bias might also be preventing the parties from offering concessions in the
current environment, in which the status quo is ongoing warfare. The
imposition of U.S.-directed terms would not make successful renegotiation
any more unlikely than successful negotiation is at present, 175 and those terms
would provide a baseline regime that is better for both disputants than the
present status quo.
In December 2000, in a last-ditch attempt to help the disputants reach a
peace agreement, President Clinton submitted a set of proposed agreement
terms to Israel and Palestine, breaking a long U. S. tradition of avoiding such
directive behavior. 176 Barak accepted the terms; Arafat rejected them.
Although the Clinton proposal was less detailed than the proposal we urge-
in fact, it was presented to the parties only orally-it did attempt to resolve the
170. See generally Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 9 (1985).
171. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L. J. 729 (1992).
172. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608 (1998) (finding that experimental subjects placed a higher value on specific contract terms if
they were identified as the legal default terms than if they were identified as different from the legal
defaults).
173. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model, 106 Q. J. EcoN. 1039, 1056 (1991); see also Russell Korobkin, The Endowment
Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1227, 1250-55 (2003) (discussing various motivational
explanations for loss aversion).
174. See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, The Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
175. In fact, although the status quo bias would provide an obstacle in both cases, a future
renegotiation would be more likely than a successful negotiation at present if an agreement on the basis
of U.S.-proposed terms resulted in reduced hostilities between the disputants. Cf Keashly & Fisher,
supra note 152, at 438 (recommending arbitration in order to produce "at least a temporary settlement
and control the escalating hostility and aggression," as part of a strategy to encourage agreement in
international disputes).
176. Ross, supra note 66, at 4 (calling the Clinton proposal the "first" and "last" time "the
United States put a comprehensive set of proposals on the table designed to put an end to the conflict").
2005]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
most contentious issues and was presented as non-negotiable, 77 so it bears a
strong relationship to what we envision.
Two observations about this event are important. First, Clinton's
proposal came at the urging of the parties' negotiators, who believed a third-
party proposal was necessary because neither party would accept terms
proposed by the other. 178 In other words, the assumption that neither side
would ever propose terms that were not somewhat better than its reservation
point meant, in practice, that the recipient of any offer would always believe
that a slightly more advantageous deal was possible and would respond by
rejecting the offer and demanding more. This suggests that, rather than
perceiving a non-negotiable proposal to be coercive and threatening to their
sovereignty, the parties could understand such a proposal as an attempt to
empower them to overcome a prisoner's dilemma.
Second, the failure of the Clinton proposal to produce an agreement does
not suggest that a non-negotiable proposal cannot be successful in forging
agreement between the parties. The timing of Clinton's proposal ensured that
it could not be presented (or understood by the parties) as the only set of terms
the United States would support. Clinton told the parties that his proposal
would be withdrawn when he left the White House the following month.
79
Even without this explicit disclaimer, the imminent end of the Clinton
presidency and the succession of a Republican president made it obvious that
the United States might take a different position on negotiations after January
20, 2001. In other words, Clinton's proposal might have been non-negotiable,
but only for a month. Thus, although the Palestinians might have been wise to
believe that Bush would not extend the efforts to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian
peace that Clinton did, they need not have believed that the terms proposed by
Clinton were the best that they could hope to achieve.
In addition, Arafat's rejection of the proposal could have been-indeed,
we believe was--due not to the non-negotiability of Clinton's terms, but to
one or more of the other roadblocks to peace that we have discussed. This
underscores the importance of any U.S. initiative incorporating not only a
non-negotiable proposal to eliminate the roadblock of hard bargaining but also
efforts to insure that a bargaining zone exists and that internal divisions do not
block the parties from reaching agreement. We now turn to these roadblocks.
B. Creating a Bargaining Zone
Skeptics might contend that our initial focus on countering the roadblock
of mutual hard bargaining might be overly optimistic in the sense that hard
bargaining can be the but-for cause of a negotiation impasse only if a
bargaining zone exists. A straightforward implication of the historical failure
of the parties to reach an agreement might be that there is simply no
bargaining zone for the reasons we discussed in Part III.A.
177. Id. at 751. For a transcript of Clinton's proposal, see id. at 801-05.
178. See id. at 719 (Barak believed the United States "would have to present a proposal if there
was to be an agreement."); id. at 724 (Palestinian negotiators also believed an American proposal was
critical.).
179. Id. at 4.
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As we will explain, there are good reasons to believe that there is a
reasonable, non-negligible probability that a bargaining zone does in fact
exist. Because only an omniscient observer could know for sure whether this
is the case, however, any U.S. peace initiative should err on the side of caution
and assume that a bargaining zone does not exist presently. A non-negotiable
peace proposal advanced by the United States should be accompanied by the
deliberate creation of a bargaining zone in order to ensure that the proposal is
superior to continued impasse for both principal parties, and thus that the
proposal is potentially acceptable.
If a bargaining zone does in fact already exist, such efforts will not be
wasted. They will have the effect of expanding the bargaining zone, thus
increasing the likelihood that the non-negotiable proposal will fall within the
zone rather than (by miscalculation) outside of it and below one of the parties'
reservation points. As noted above, 180 a large bargaining zone can encourage
hard bargaining because more variations of agreement terms are possible,
which means in turn that there is more cooperative surplus at stake in the
selection of a specific set of terms. For this reason, in order to ensure that
third-party attempts to increase the size of the bargaining zone make
agreement more rather than less likely, it is important to pair this strategy with
the introduction of a non-negotiable set of terms designed to prevent hard
bargaining, as described in the previous Section.
1. The State of the Roadblock: Reasons for Cautious Optimism
There is some reason to believe that, whether or not the historical failure
of Israel and Palestine to reach a negotiated peace agreement can be attributed
to the absence of a bargaining zone, social and political changes in the Middle
East over the last decade have enabled a bargaining zone to emerge. This
Section describes the reasons for such optimism.
a. Israel and the Occupation: Diminishing Benefits, Rising
Costs
At its thinnest point, pre-1967 Israel is only nine miles wide, making the
heart of the country extremely vulnerable to a first-strike military attack by
hostile Arab forces without the West Bank serving as a buffer. Former Israeli
Foreign Minister Abba Eban, a dove by Israeli standards, once provocatively
described the pre-1967 territorial lines as "Auschwitz boundaries."'' 1 In light
of this geographical fact, Israel might have believed in the past that its
BATNA of occupying the territories and endlessly battling Palestinian
nationalism was a more desirable option than trading land-especially the
West Bank-for peace. In fact, many Israeli military and political figures
contended that retaining control of most or all of the West Bank was an
absolute requirement of Israeli security.
180. See supra Part V.
181. Interview with Daniel Pipes, CNN Newsnight (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 26, 2002),
available at http://www.danielpipes.org/article/144.
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This view seems untenable today. Israel enjoys a better-equipped and
better-trained army, navy, and air force than all Arab states combined. 82 The
Jewish state is at peace with Egypt and Jordan. Israeli-Syrian relations remain
cold, but the recent demolition of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq destroyed
the last serious Arab military threat to Israel's existence. With this
development, Israeli control of the West Bank can no longer be considered
strategically critical, and security concerns that impeded Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations as recently as the 1990s are far less critical today. Although
Islamic militant groups operating beyond the Territories present a very real
threat to Israeli security, the threat of a conventional army attack across
Israel's eastern border is extremely small-even smaller than it was just two183
years ago.
In contrast, the economic and psychological costs to Israel of occupying
and governing a territory that is home to 3.5 million hostile Palestinians are
large.18 4 Added to this is the fact that Palestinian militants have demonstrated
their ability to keep Israeli citizens in near-constant fear of terrorism, creating
further crippling economic as well as psychological effects. 185 These primary
results of the ongoing intifada on Israeli society are compounded by the
secondary effect of mounting emmigration of Israeli Jews-often the better
educated-which increases the risk of worsening both Israel's long-term
economic growth prospects and its precarious demographic balance. 186
Overall, it seems that the possibility of trading land for peace would dominate
Israel's alternatives. Polls of Israelis bear this out.'
8 7
182. For specific figures, see CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK: ISRAEL, at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html (last updated Nov. 2, 2004) [hereinafter
WORLD FACTBOOK: ISRAEL].
183. See, e.g., David Makovsky, How to Build a Fence, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 50,
62:
[M]any Israelis of both parties have long considered the Jordan Valley essential to their
security .... [But] as former IDF Strategic Division Head General Shlomo Brom and
others note, there has not been an interstate war against Israel since 1973, and Israel has
since signed peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Syria's military prowess has been
greatly weakened by the loss of its Soviet patron and the end of the Cold War, and the
U.S. toppling of Saddam Hussein has removed the Iraqi threat. The Jordan Valley is
therefore no longer a likely gateway for an invading Arab army.
184. A 2002 Israeli National Security Council report concluded that continued occupation of
the Territories endangers both the Jewish and the democratic character of Israel. See Aluf Berm,
Background: Mapping out Israel's Future, HA'ARETZ, Aug. 23, 2002,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml.
185. See, e.g., Erik Schechter, Back to Square One?, JERUSALEM POST, July 11, 2003, at lB
(observing that Palestinian terrorist groups caused "a tremendous amount of psychological, economic
and military pain to Israel," and "terrorism within the Green Line costs Israel . . . 14 to 19 billion
[shekels] a year in lost revenue and the country's GDP per capita is plummeting at a rate of 3% per
year").
186. See WASSERSTEIN, supra note 6, at 27.
187. Recent polls have found, for example, that 78% of Israelis support withdrawal from most
of the settlements in the Territories, and even a (slim) majority of conservative Likud voters were
willing to accept a Palestinian state. See James Bennet, Israel Coalition Nears Collapse in Budget Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at Al.
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b. Palestine: A New Realism?
As is true for Israel, the likelihood that Palestine perceives a land-for-
peace agreement as superior to its BATNA of continued political and military
struggle against Israel seems to have increased in recent years. While many
Palestinians still dream of conquering the Jewish state, there is no serious
prospect of this taking place. If there were any hope of Arab armies
"liberating" Jerusalem after the Soviet Union collapsed and its military
sponsorship of Arab states disappeared, the destruction of Saddam Hussein's
regime in Iraq extinguished it. With Saddam's armed forces disbanded, no
Arab nation to Israel's east possesses conventional military forces that could
plausibly be considered a threat to the Jewish state.
Following Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, many
Palestinian leaders, and particularly Arafat, believed that Israel was a "spider
web": 188 outwardly impressive but ready to collapse in the face of a
Palestinian military challenge. Four-and-a-half years of the second intifada
and the continued disintegration of Palestinian civil society with no signs of
Israeli capitulation, however, have undermined this theory severely.
Palestinian disillusionment is exemplified by one Palestinian commentator
writing recently in an Arabic newspaper:
Today I feel great bitterness ....
This bitterness emanates from my realization that, in the final analysis, the Palestinian
intellectuals do not really care about the suffering of their people. Most of them live in
fancy houses in the U.S. or Europe, [drive] luxury cars, and [send] their children to attend
prestigious schools. And every time a solution to the Palestinian problem is proposed
they say "No" [and choose] steadfastness, sacrifice, and Shahada [martyrdom]. And who
is the shahid [martyr]? Not any of their sons. Not at all. Rather, one of the children of the
unfortunate [Palestinians].
For 50 years we have seen the pictures of the weeping, mourning mothers, and of their
demolished homes, and no one thinks of ending this suffering. The stone has become
more important than the man. Instead of the land serving man-man has become the
servant of the land. The history of Palestine is an entire century of acts of idiocy by its
intellectuals, of egotism, of arrogance, and of national foolishness, which tore their land
to shreds and brought catastrophes upon their people.
18 9
Recent polls show that this Palestinian writer's feelings are widespread.
While a majority of Palestinians polled often express support for armed
confrontation with Israel, majorities also favor peace based on the concept of
Jewish and Palestinian states existing side by side. 190 A July 2003 poll
188. The phrase is actually that of Hizbullah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Farid Mustafa, In
Hizbullah's Footsteps?, JERUSALEM POST, June 2, 2000, at 3B. See also KARSH, supra note 12, at 181-
82 (showing the influence of Lebanon withdrawal on Palestinian strategic thinking).
189. Khaled Al-Qishtini, First Palestine, Second Iraq, AI-Sharq Al-Awsat, July 23, 2003,
trans. Middle East Media Res. Inst., Special Dispatch Series No. 545 (July 31, 2003),
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=reform&ID=SP54503.
190. See WASSERSTEIN, supra note 6, at 173; Glenn E. Robinson, Being Yasir Arafat: A
Portrait of Palestine's President, 82 FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2003, at 136, 138 ("Polls consistently
show that about 70 percent of Palestinians [in the Territories] want a two-state solution and believe in
reconciliation with Israel after the Palestinian state is created."); Palestinian Ctr. for Pol'y and Surv.
Res., Poll No. 5, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p5epressrelease.html (Aug. 26, 2002) (finding
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conducted by respected Palestinian political scientist Khalil Shikaki found that
more than ninety percent of Palestinian refugees do not actually want to return
to pre-1967 Israel. 191 A large majority said they would accept resettlement in
the Palestinian state or elsewhere and compensation in lieu of the right of
return to Israel. 192 The percentage rose when pollsters told respondents their
original pre-1948 villages no longer existed. 193 These numbers suggest that
giving up the right of return as part of a land-for-peace agreement might no
longer be the third rail of Palestinian politics.
2. Policy Initiative.: Sweeten the Agreement, Worsen the BA TNA
To help create a bargaining zone if none currently exists-or,
alternatively, to increase the breadth of the existing zone-a U.S. peace
initiative should maximize the benefits of agreement to each party while
simultaneously maximizing the costs of impasse by reducing the desirability
of each party's BATNA of maintaining the status quo. 194 To satisfy the first
goal of maximizing the benefits of agreement, the U.S. proposal should
include the promise of side payments when the proposed agreement is
implemented, both in the form of cash assistance and in-kind aid. 195 These
side payments should be designed to mitigate the most serious objections that
the parties are likely to have to a land-for-peace agreement. To satisfy the
second goal of maximizing the costs of impasse, the proposal should also be
accompanied by the threat of serious adverse consequences should the parties
reject the proposal.'96 The ability of the United States, based on its economic,
military, and political power, to employ both "reward power" and "coercive
power"' 97 gives it the unique ability among possible mediators of the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute to implement this proposal. 198
73% of surveyed Palestinians residing in the Territories support reconciliation between the Israeli and
Palestinian people on the basis of Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state).
191. The best description of the poll's findings and guide to interpreting it is found on the
website of the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. Khalil Shikaki, Palestinian Refugees:




194. This approach is called "mediat[ion] with muscle." See TOUVAL, supra note 1; Keashly &
Fisher, supra note 152, at 438.
195. Cf Daniel Ehrenfeld et al., Aid Conditionality and the Peace Process: An Analysis of Its
Implementation, INT'L J. WORLD PEACE 59 (2003).
196. Cf. Chester A. Crocker et al., Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle, in HERDING
CATS: MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN A COMPLEX WORLD, supra note 152, at 19, 31 (noting that "offers of
side-payments or coercive threats" will sometimes have to be used by third parties to change the "cost-
benefit calculus of warring parties away from violence to a consideration of various political
alternatives"); Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Conclusion: International Mediation in Context, in MEDIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 249 (Jacob Bercovitch & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1992) (discussing "reward
power" and "coercive power" employed by mediators).
197. For a typology of power that includes the use of these terms, see id. at 249, 255.
198. The Arab-Israeli conflict demonstrates the importance to would-be peace-makers of the
ability to use positive and negative leverage to affect the choices of disputants. In a careful study of
mediative interventions in the region, Saadia Touval juxtaposes a description of a failed mediation
attempt in which a U.N. envoy "possessed no resources that could enable him to provide incentives or to
threaten punishment" with the effort of an American envoy (acting on behalf of the United Nations) the
following year who succeeded in brokering an Arab-Israeli armistice, in part due to his potential ability
to "affect U.S. attitudes and relationships with the govemmentls] in question," all of whom wanted
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a. Carrots
The most obvious way that a U.S.-sponsored peace initiative could
increase the relative benefits to both Israel and Palestine of reaching a peace
agreement is by offering increased cash assistance to both parties if they sign
on to the U.S. plan. While the idea of sweetening an agreement with aid is, of
course, hardly original-President Carter pledged $2 billion to Egypt and $3
billion to Israel as part of the Camp David Accords, 199 while President Clinton
reportedly offered the Israelis and Palestinians a combined $35 billion at
Camp David in 20002o0- it should be a core ingredient in any peace proposal.
Presumably, any set of land-for-peace agreement terms proposed by the
United States would include a commitment by Palestine to use the full force
of its security apparatus to guarantee peace to Israel by preventing violence
against Israelis emanating from its soil. As discussed in Part III, Israel's fear
of post-agreement shirking by Palestine could render an agreement inferior to
Israel's reservation point and therefore lead Israel to reject a U.S.-sponsored
non-negotiable agreement proposal.
There are, in theory, ways to mitigate this moral hazard concern within
the substantive provisions of the proposed peace agreement itself. For
example, the agreement terms could establish specific objective standards to
evaluate Palestine's compliance with this commitment, name a neutral
tribunal to adjudicate factual disputes concerning whether the standards had
been met, and include a Palestinian warranty of compliance giving Israel the
right to take military action within Palestinian territory or reclaim territory
ceded as part of the agreement if the PA breaches its obligations. In other
words, the agreement's terms could be structured to partially address the
strategic problem caused by the fact that a land-for-peace agreement, by its
very nature, anticipates non-simultaneous performance by the parties. Under
this approach, although Israel still would perform first, its self-help remedy in
the case of Palestinian shirking would make the permanence of Israel's
performance contingent on Palestinian performance.
Attempting to mitigate the moral hazard problem in this way, however,
would raise a raft of practical problems. The type of effort that the agreement
would demand of Palestine would be difficult to observe, let alone clearly
verify. Guaranteeing the neutrality of a tribunal would be difficult. Israel
would be justifiably hesitant to condition its right to take military action
against terrorists on the findings of a tribunal. Finally, Palestine would be
justifiably hesitant to agree to any treaty under which it would be obligated to
allow incursions into its territory by a foreign army or surrender territory
based on the findings of an external tribunal.20'
diplomatic or economic assistance from Washington. TOUVAL, supra note 1, at 51-52, 72-73. Touval
also, in explaining how U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger succeeded in forging a series of Arab-
Israeli agreements in the early 1970s, calls the "weight of American pressure and the lure of U.S.
incentives... the decisive impact." Id. at 281.
199. Id. at 317.
200. See, e.g., Scott Lasensky, Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American
Foreign Aid, 58 MIDDLE EAST J. 210, 227 (2004).
201. U.S. foreign policy has a history of unsuccessfully attempting to solve highly charged and
often violent political struggles through mediation by "neutral" and "objective" adjudicators. See
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In light of these implementation concerns, rather than drafting the
agreement terms to provide Israel with a self-help remedy in the event that
Palestine fails to provide peace, the United States should attempt to increase
the attractiveness to Israel of a negotiated agreement by making a side• • •202
commitment to serve as a guarantor of Palestinian performance. The United
States has made commitments to facilitate past Arab-Israeli agreements, such
as providing aerial surveillance and civilian presence in the buffer zone
between the Israeli and Egyptian militaries in 1975203 and promising to supply
oil if Israel could not procure supplies from elsewhere after it withdrew from
the oil fields of the Sinai Peninsula as part of the Camp David Accords.2° In
the current conflict, the United States could serve as a guarantor of Palestinian
performance in any number of ways. One specific approach would be for the
United States to pledge to station U.S. soldiers as peacekeeping forces in
Israeli locations most likely to be the targets of terrorist attacks. 2 5 While
peacekeeping forces alone are unlikely to prevent terror attacks, stationing
U.S. troops in harm's way provides a powerful incentive for Palestine to use
the full extent of its resources to prevent such attacks. Any terrorist act could
result in the death of U.S. soldiers, and such deaths would jeopardize
Palestine's relationship with the United States.206
The United States could conceivably increase the value of the proposed
agreement to Israel more dramatically by offering a U.S.-Israeli mutual
defense treaty or membership in NATO 207 as incentives, such that a failure of
Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the New
Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 239 (2003); Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign
Policy: The Twenty Years' Crisis, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 583 (2004). Thus, while recognizing the theoretical
promise of neutral panels to arbitrate disputes over adherence to treaty obligations, we are hesitant to
recommend here that the United States make this a centerpiece of a peace initiative.
202. See, e.g., TOUVAL, supra note 1, at 200 (observing that an important contribution that
peace mediators can make is "the provision of insurance in order to help the parties to manage the risks
which the agreement entails").
We recommend that the United States guarantee as a supplement to Israel's inherent right of self-
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
203. See TOUVAL, supra note 1, at 266.
204. See id. at 308.
205. A related recommendation-that NATO could provide a peacekeeping force in the
region-has gained adherents recently. See, e.g., Steven Everts, The Ultimate Test Case: Can Europe
and America Forge a Joint Strategy for the Wider Middle East?, 80 INT'L AFF. 665, 671 (2004)
("Dismissed earlier as ludicrously ambitious, the idea of a NATO-led force in Gaza and the West Bank
is slowly gathering support."); Hollis, supra note 114 (proposing that NATO offer Israel security
guarantees in return for Israel abandoning claims to the West Bank and Gaza).
206. A similar sort of arrangement was proposed for American troops on the Golan Heights in
early 2000, when it appeared as if Israeli-Syrian negotiations would bear fruit. See Brent Scowcroft, A
U.S. Role on the Golan Heights?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 2000, at A25; cf THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS
AND INFLUENCE 47 (1966) (describing the role of American and Allied troops in Berlin as a "trip wire").
207. Some signs indicate that such a possibility might be on the horizon. See AlufBenn, NATO
Invites Israel to Joint Military, Anti-Terror Exercises, HA'ARETZ, Nov. 18, 2004,
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Palestine to live up to its commitment to maintain peace for Israel could result
in direct U.S. military intervention. Israel might balk at such an arrangement
as compromising its right to use military force in self-defense in any way that
it sees fit, without approval from other nations.20 8 But even in the absence of a
formal security reiationship, Israel depends heavily upon U.S. goodwill and is
constrained in its actions by its desire not to risk alienating its most important
supporter. Throughout 2001, the Israeli military refrained from entering
Palestinian-controlled areas or otherwise retaliating against terror attacks. The
United States clearly demanded the policy, and it relented only after the wave
of suicide bombings continued and Arafat refused to make any effort to stop
209or punish them.
Any specific land-for-peace arrangement would almost surely require
Palestine to compromise its demand for the right of return to Israel of all
refugees from the 1948 war and their descendants, a step that Arafat
consistently refused to take. 210 For some Palestinians who reject the concept
of land for peace, the refugee issue has little to do with the status of the
refugees themselves and much to do with seeking the destruction of the
211Jewish state through demography. But for other Palestinians, the demand of
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml. It would be bad enough for
Palestine to face retribution from Israel and the United States in the event of terrorist activities; Palestine
would be even worse off were it also to face military and economic pressure from NATO. To be sure,
there is no assurance that NATO members, which might be generally hostile to Israel, would respond
and support their new member. The possibility of NATO involvement, however, would create great
uncertainty for a new Palestinian state seeking to establish itself in the international community.
208. Although the United States has supplied military technology and hardware to Israel since
the early 1960s, it has never sent soldiers to fight on Israel's behalf. See Douglas Little, The Making of a
Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-1968, 25 INT'L. J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 563
(1993); see also WILLIAM B. QUANDT, DECADE OF DECISIONS: AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1967-1976 (1977). Israel, for its part, has jealously guarded the autonomy of its
military. See, e.g., WARREN BASS, SUPPORT ANY FRIEND: KENNEDY'S MIDDLE EAST AND THE MAKING
OF THE U.S.-ISRAEL ALLIANCE 186-238, 251-53 (2003) (explaining that Israel pursued a nuclear
weapons program despite opposition from and possible angering of the United States).
209. See Eric Silver, Bush Withholds PA Funding, Reassesses Attitudd to Arafat, JERUSALEM
REP., Feb. 11, 2002, at 5; see also Ehud Ya'ari, Neighborhood Watch: Three Cheers for the Spooks,
JERUSALEM REP., May 20, 2002, at 30 (noting that Israeli intelligence services uncovered evidence of
Arafat's support of terrorism, which the United States and some European states found persuasive).
210. The claims of some commentators, notably Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, that Arafat
was simply looking for a proper rhetorical formula to do so, both at Camp David and upon receiving the
Clinton Plan, see Malley & Agha, supra note 13, simply do not bear scrutiny. Arafat consistently
refused even to negotiate on the issue, and refused to issue a counterproposal. If he was truly looking for
a suitable formula, he could have suggested one himself. His only statements on the matter suggest that
he insisted on adherence to General Assembly Resolution 194, which is a non-starter from the Israeli or
the American standpoint, since it has arguably been superseded by Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338. Even more recently, Arafat pointedly refused to endorse the Geneva Accord. See Amon
Regular et al., supra note 9. It is difficult to argue, then, that Arafat was actually trying to reach an
agreement on the issue.
211. See, e.g., Fouad Ajami, Arafat's War, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2002, at A12:
[Arafat] was offered statehood some 18 months ago. He walked away from it and
unleashed a phantom of incalculable power: the Right of Return, a claim not on the West
Bank and Gaza, but on Jaffa and Haifa and Galilee, a way, insinuating and understood by
his people and by Arabs beyond, of contesting Israel's very existence and statehood.
An old hard-liner of Mr. Arafat's entourage, Farouk Kaddoumi, a man who in the
nature of such titles and honorifics, passes himself off as the foreign minister of Mr.
Arafat, cut to the heart of the matter in recent days: "The Right of Return of the refugees
to Haifa and Jaffa," he said on the eve of the Arab summit,as he met with the leader of
Hezbollah (the Party of God) in Lebanon, "is more important than statehood." With this,
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the right of return is rooted in a concern for the property or dignitary rights of
212the refugees, 2 which could be addressed by means other than repatriation.
By offering side payments to the refugees as part of a peace proposal, the
United States, hopefully with the help of other nations, could significantly
increase the value of a peace agreement for Palestine by finding a way to
honor these dignitary rights without actual settlement in Israel.
The United States could significantly increase the value of a land-for-
peace agreement to Palestine by offering permanent residency to all
Palestinians who fled the region during the 1948 conflict and remain refugees
to this day. Such a gesture would not create a significant burden for the United
States because most of these Palestinians are in fact not refugees at all under
international law: they either live in the West Bank and Gaza (thus making
them internally displaced persons, not refugees), have accepted citizenship in
other countries (most notably Jordan), or are the descendants of those who
fled Israel.2" As a symbolic matter, however, such an offer would be quite
significant because it would essentially privilege the Palestinian refugee
question above other international humanitarian efforts, giving special
recognition to the plight of Palestinian refugees. If Canada and the European
Union (EU) were to join the United States and agree to accept other segments
of the Palestinian population, land for peace would become even more
desirable to Palestine. Quite literally, such an offer is one that hundreds of
millions of people around the world would give quite a lot to obtain: in its
wake, no one would be able to say that the world had ignored or dismissed the
predicament of the Palestinians.
b. Sticks
There are, of course, two ways that the United States can maximize the
likelihood that its peace proposal would fall within a bargaining zone lying
between the parties' reservation points. In addition to maximizing the value to
each party of its specific land-for-peace proposal, a U.S. initiative should
include an attempt to reduce the value to Israel and Palestine of pursuing their
BATNAs of continued warfare. Specifically, the United States should threaten
to undermine the political and economic bases of Israel and Palestine if they
refuse to agree to the U.S.-backed peace initiative.
2 14
For the United States, this task is far easier in regard to Israel. The
Jewish state receives more U.S. foreign aid than any other country: $2.8
the logic of things is laid bare: Whatever the summiteers wish and say, a foul wind blows
through Arab lands, a conviction has taken root in the popular Arab imagination that
Israel is on the run, that perhaps the verdict of the war of 1948 (not the verdict of the Six-
Day War of 1967) could be undone.
212. This is the argument advanced in George E. Bisharat, The Power of Apology, HA'ARETZ,
Jan. 2, 2004, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/ArehSearchEngArt'jhtm.
213. See Erik Schechter, Redefining the Refugees, JERUSLAEM REP., Jan. 28, 2002, at 22-27
(parsing the differing definitions of refugees and explaining the difference between internally displaced
persons and refugees).
214. As one scholar of international conflict has written, "it is the whip of external pressure and
the pain of unacceptable alternatives that drives [international antagonists] to the bargaining table."
Rubin, supra note 196, at 252.
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billion in 2002.215 This aid subsidizes the Israeli economy and military. If
Israel perceived its BATNA to be existence without any U.S. support, it is
likely that its reservation point in peace negotiations would drop
precipitously. 216 If it is serious about maximizing the likelihood of success of
a peace initiative, the United States should commit to drastically slashing or
even eliminating its aid to Israel unless Israel accepts the U.S.-sponsored plan.
The U.S. president could make such a threat, of course, but its credibility
would be immediately questioned. Congress controls the purse strings, and the
power of the pro-Israeli political lobby would make it difficult, and perhaps
impossible, for the President to follow through if the threat fails to satisfy its
objective. To make the threat credible, the President should seek a
Congressional resolution at the time the peace proposal is unveiled that makes
U.S. aid to Israel contingent on its acceptance of the peace proposal, thus
tying Congress' hands.21 Such a resolution would significantly reduce the
value of Israel's BATNA.
Is the idea that the U.S. government might threaten aid reductions to its
closest and most reliable ally in the Middle East at all plausible? Although
extensive U.S. military and economic aid to Israel seems a bedrock principle
of U.S. foreign policy today, U.S. aid has often been made contingent on
Israeli cooperation with U.S. peacemaking efforts in the Middle East.
Substantial U.S. economic support of Israel did not begin until the early
1970s, when the Nixon administration began using the promise of aid to Israel
(as well as Arab states) to encourage Middle East peace agreements. 2 18 In
1973, that administration threatened that it would look less favorably on future
aid requests if Israel did not cooperate with the U.S. attempt to arrange a
ceasefire in that year's Yom Kippur War.2 19 In 1975, the Ford administration
threatened reassessment of its Middle East aid policy-widely viewed as a
thinly veiled threat to Israel's annual aid package-should Arab-Israeli
disengagement negotiations remain stalled.22 ° When the Camp David peace
process appeared threatened, President Carter threatened to withhold U.S. aid
and political support if Israel did not make concessions. 221 In 1991-1992,
President George H.W. Bush made substantial loan guarantees to the Jewish
state contingent on Israel freezing the expansion of West Bank settlements,
and received congressional support for his policy notwithstanding intensive
Israeli lobbying efforts. 222 The loan guarantees were ultimately provided, but
not until the hawkish Yitzhak Shamir was replaced as prime minister by
Yitzhak Rabin and the latter repudiated the aggressive settlement policy of the
215. Clyde R. Mark, Congressional Research Service, Middle East: U.S. Foreign Assistance, at
6 (Mar. 28, 2002), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/orgamzation/9190.pdf; James Kitfield, The Ties That
Bind and Constrain, NAT'L J., Apr. 20, 2002, at 1152, 1152.
216. Cf Ehrenfeld et al., supra note 195, at 73 (arguing that conditioning aid to Israel on
making concessions to the Palestinians could be effective).
217. Cf THoMAs SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 21-25 (1980) (explaining the
benefits of binding one's future action in order to insure that one cannot retreat from a position taken).
218. See Lasensky, supra note 200, at 212.
219. TOuVAL, supra note 1, at 234-35.
220. Lasensky, supra note 200, at 214; Saadia Touval, The Superpowers as Mediators, in
HERDING CATS: MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 196, at 232, 241.
221. TOUVAL, supra note 1, at 315.
222. Lasensky, supra note 200, at 215-18.
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former. 223 President Clinton sought congressional delay of a promised
supplemental aid appropriation to Israel in 1999 as a response to Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Palestinian policy, a request that was
rescinded only after Netanyahu was replaced by Ehud Barak.224 Despite the
close relationship between the United States and Israel, history suggests that
making U.S. aid contingent on Israeli acceptance of a U.S.-proposed peace
initiative is neither politically impossible nor unprecedented.
U.S. influence over the Palestinians poses far greater problems.
Washington should, of course, adopt the same policy concerning Palestine as
it would toward Israel and condition all aid to the PA on its agreement to and
implementation of the U.S.-sponsored peace plan. The PA is heavily
dependent on international assistance,225 and much of that assistance emanates
from the United States. 226 So this commitment would make Palestine's
BATNA appear worse than it appears today. Yet the threat of suspending U.S.
economic support would have far less of a deleterious effect on Palestine's
BATNA than the equivalent threat would have on Israel's BATNA. To begin
with, Palestine's standard of living is quite low. The Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of the occupied territories was $4.6 billion in 2000, compared to
227Israel's GDP of $102.9 billion in 2004. With such a low baseline, Palestine
has less to lose from economic pressure. In addition, greater economic
deprivation would not be likely to generate the same response from the
Palestinian citizenry as it would from the Israeli population. The Palestinian
population tends to view economic devastation as the consequence of




224. Id. at 225.
225. WORLD BANK, FIFTEEN MONTHS-INTIFADA, CLOSURES, AND PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC
CRISIS: AN ASSESSMENT (Mar. 18, 2002), available at http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/-
Attachments/complete/$File/complete.pdf; see also Ehud Ya'ari, First Deal With Anarchy, bitterlemons-
international.org, at http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=I&id=26 (Jan. 29,
2004) ("In many ways the PA has become a pay station whose primary task is to take out loans in order
to pay salaries to tens of thousands of officials, security personnel, teachers, etc., many of whom have
long since ceased showing up at work.").
226. The United States is the second-largest contributor, having provided roughly $500 million
to the PA between 1993 and 1998. Thomas 0. Melia, Book Review, Legislative Politics in the Arab
World. the Resurgence of Democratic Institutions, MIDDLE EAST POL'Y, October 2000, at 187, 187; see
also Lasenksy, supra note 200, at 232 (estimating current U.S. aid at $75-$ 100 million per year).
227. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, GDP by Expenditure in Palestinian Territories
1994-2000, at http://www.pcbs.org/natacco/nat-main.aspx; Central Intelligence Agency, supra note
182. While we do not vouch for the exact accuracy of the numbers, the general point is still clear:
Palestinians have a lot less to lose than Israelis.
228. Cf Shlomo Avineri, Critical and Organic Intellectuals, bitterlemons.org, at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/b1070703ed26.html (July 7, 2003). In this article, Avineri draws
on Antonio Gramsci's distinction between "critical" intellectuals, who "speak truth to power," and
"organic" intellectuals, who merely repeat the master nationalist narrative. "Hardly ever does one hear a
Palestinian intellectual question Palestinian policies, let alone the Palestinian master narrative. If there is
criticism of the Palestinian Authority, it is that it is too accommodating to Israel, or that it is corrupt-
the latter being a merely generalized accusation." Id. Economic collapse brought about by American
actions therefore will not result in popular, self-critical re-examination of Palestinian bargaining
positions. See also FouAD AJAMI, THE DREAM PALACE OF THE ARABS: A GENERATION'S ODYSSEY 253-
312 (1998) (demonstrating how the intellectual opinion-makers in the Arab world resist accommodation
with Israel and are more comfortable with revolutionary resistance.). While it is certainly true that one
cannot infer popular opinion from the positions of intellectuals, it is also true that "in the eyes of the
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Politics are more important than economics to the Palestinians, and in
the economic sphere, other sources of assistance are more important to
sustaining the value of Palestine's BATNA of continuing hostilities with
Israel than what it receives from Washington. For both reasons, the road to
worsening Palestine's BATNA runs through Europe.
The EU's contribution to the PA dwarfs that of the United States. 229 To
the extent that economic pressure matters, EU cooperation will be absolutely
critical to the U.S. effort. Moreover, European diplomacy has proved central
to maintaining the Palestinian war effort. Many European countries, notably
France, Belgium, and the Scandinavian states, have become increasingly
hostile to Israel. 230 The EU has also refused to audit the funds that it gives to
the PA, enabling it to funnel such money to terrorist groups for military
purposes. European diplomats routinely visited Yasser Arafat while he was
alive and continued to back him diplomatically even when events suggested
he lacked commitment to reaching a peace agreement.23'
In this light, it may seem unrealistic to think that the United States could
acquire European support for changing the Palestinian BATNA, but several
factors suggest otherwise. Not all European countries are hostile to Israel: the
Jewish state has received support recently from Eastern Europe, the
Netherlands, Italy, and even Germany. 232 Despite the enormous strides made
over the last two decades in the direction of European unity, Henry
Kissinger's famous quip that Europe has no telephone number2  remains true:
European policy remains constantly shifting depending upon ephemeral
average Palestinian, intellectuals form one of the most credible sectors of society." Ghassan Khatib,
Very Little Give and Take, bitterlemons.org, at http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/-
b1070703ed26.html (July 7, 2003). It thus stands to reason that this lack of self-criticism among
intellectuals should be mirrored in Palestinian society at large.
229. The EU and its individual member states provide 60% of the PA's foreign aid. Nicholas
Simon, Show Us the Money!, JERUSALEM REP., Mar. 10, 2003, at 34.
230. During the initial outbreak of violence in September 2000, French President Jacques
Chirac strongly encouraged Yasser Arafat and refused to condemn Palestinian violence. "Chirac was so
supportive of Arafat that the Palestinian leader, already reluctant to finalize an agreement, decided that
he could do better by not continuing the talks." RutuN & RUBiN, supra note 13, at 206; see also KARSH,
supra note 13, at 202. France recently threatened to block an EU move to cite Hamas as a terrorist
group, saying that it needed "more evidence." Herb Keinon, France Remains Unconvinced Hamas
Should Be Placed on Terror List, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 26, 2003, at 2; see also Netty C. Gross, How
Bad Could It Get?, JERUSALEM REP., June 3, 2002, at 14 (stating that the European Parliament voted for
sanctions against Israel although they were not adopted by the European Commission); David Horovitz,
Europe Buys the Big Lie, JERUSALEM REP., May 20, 2002, at 5.
231. See Leslie Susser, supra note 108, at 12 (the EU maintains strong support of Arafat
despite Israeli and American efforts to sideline him). On the European Commission's refusal to audit
Arafat's finances, see Igal Avidan, Time Running Out on Bid for EU Probe of PA Spending, JERUSALEM
REP., Jan. 13, 2003, at 12.
232. See, e.g., Aluf Benn, Israel Sees Signs of Thaw in EU Relations, HA'ARETZ, Apr. 7, 2003,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml; Adar Primor, Where Will the
Weather Vane Stop?, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 7, 2003, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/-
ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml.
233. For the quotation, in a particularly pertinent context, see Michael Steinberger, Interview
with Samuel Huntington, So, Are Civilisations at War?, OBSERVER (London), Oct. 21, 2001, at
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/islam/story/0,1442,577982,00.html:
The problem with Islam is the problem Henry Kissinger expressed with regard to Europe:
'If I want to call Europe, what number do I call?' If you want to call the Islamic world,
what number do you call? If there was a dominant power in the Islamic world, you could
deal with them. Now what you see is the different Islamic groups competing with each
other.
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political coalitions. This means that European support for shifting the
Palestinian BATNA can be garnered as long as it is accompanied by a serious
overall effort at peacemaking. Palestinian rejection of the non-negotiable U.S.
proposal (codified in a Security Council resolution) might provide the
necessary background for such support.
That said, the United States could certainly do more to create a united
U.S.-European front dedicated to worsening Palestine's BATNA. The Bush
administration's decision to invade Iraq alienated many European
governments, 234 but this policy decision came on the heels of a series of
earlier actions that Europe viewed as contrary to its interests. 235 Many
influential Europeans believe that the United States is bent on achieving
hegemonic power and thus see little advantage in supporting U.S.
proposals."' If the United States would compromise on one or two of the
issues that divides it from Europe, the administration could likely secure in
return commitments from Europe to end support to either disputant that
chooses not to accept the land-for-peace proposal.
The value of Palestine's BATNA of continuing its war with Israel rather
than accepting a peace agreement depends on its access to political as well as
economic support. In recent years, the PA has received critical political
backing from, among other countries, one of the closest U.S. allies in the
Middle East-Egypt. When Arafat repeatedly rejected the Barak and Clinton
peace proposals in 2000, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak gave Arafat
strong and public backing. 23In support of Palestine and in violation of the
1978 Camp David Accords, Egypt recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv
234. Not all European governments opposed the invasion. The United Kingdom, Spain, Italy,
Poland, and many Eastern European countries all strongly supported U.S. policy. See Jose Maria Aznar
et al., United We Stand, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2003, at A14 (supporting U.S. policy in Iraq) (the authors
are, respectively, the prime ministers of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland,
and Denmark. Thus, although Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's dismissal of Franco-German
opposition as the remnants of "Old Europe" was simplistic and needlessly inflammatory, it was not
wholly without support. See Outrage at "Old Europe" Remarks, BBC NEws (Jan. 23, 2003), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm; Rumsfeld Dismisses "Old Europe" Defiance on Iraq,
CBC NEWS, at http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/01/23/rumsfeld030l 23 (Jan. 23, 2003).
235. Examples include American opposition to the establishment of the International Criminal
Court, opposition to European-supported approaches to climate change such as the Kyoto Treaty,
American steel and textile subsidies, and abrogation of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. This is
not to suggest that the United States is alone to blame for the trans-Atlantic rift. For an incisive analysis
on this point, see Thomas L. Friedman, Our War with France, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, at A31 ("It's
time we Americans came to terms with something: France is not just our annoying ally. It is not just our
jealous rival. France is becoming our enemy.").
236. The truth of European suspicions is peripheral to our analysis. The point is that Europe
will be more likely to cooperate with the United States if it receives policy concessions from
Washington. The European attitude is most closely associated with former French Foreign Minister
Hubert Vedrine, who has expressed anger over what he calls U.S. "hyperpower." See generally HUBERT
VEDRINE & DOMINIQUE MoisI, FRANCE IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Philip H. Gordon trans., 2001).
See also Japan, France to Join Forces Against U.S. "Hyperpower,"' GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE,
Dec. 17, 1999, at http://www.atimes.com/global-econ/ALl8DjOl.html:
The unbridled nature of US power has rankled France more than any other nation. Once a
world power, French influence is overshadowed by Hollywood, McDonalds, the US
economy-and Washington's military muscle. Jospin, President Jacques Chirac and
Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine have in the last month repeatedly condemned U.S.
"hyperpower" and stressed the importance of a multi-polar world.
237. See RUBIN & RUBIN, supra note 13, at200.
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early in the intifada. 238 In 2001, the Egyptian government issued postage
stamps with the image of a Palestinian boy allegedly killed by the IDF.
The United States can and should ensure that Egypt supports the U.S.
land-for-peace proposal and ends its support of Palestine if Palestine rejects it.
Egypt currently receives just under $2 billion in U.S. aid each year, second
only to Israel in terms of U.S. foreign assistance.240 Moreover, Egypt enjoys
this level of assistance as a result of a deal struck by Anwar Sadat to switch
sides in the Cold War.24 1 In other words, this support is a historical artifact
irrelevant to current U.S. foreign policy concerns. The United States must
ensure that continuation of this level of aid is conditional on Egypt's
assistance in assuring the success of a U.S.-sponsored peace initiative.
Although the goal of weakening Palestine's BATNA would be aided
substantially by enlisting European and Arab assistance, the United States can
directly reduce the value of Palestine's BATNA without the support of its
allies through its political influence over Israel's political and military
responses to terrorist attacks that emanate from the Territories. First, the
United States should make it clear that if Palestine rejects its land-for-peace
proposal, Washington will refrain from using its influence to restrain Israel's
response to future terrorist attacks, 242 an influence that undoubtedly keeps
Israel's military actions more measured than they otherwise would be.
Second, the United States should make it clear that a Palestinian rejection of
its proposal will result in U.S. political support-including U.S. vetoes of
future U.N. Security Council resolutions-for feared Israeli plans to
effectively redraw the border between Israel and the West Bank unilaterally,
both by withdrawing from small parts of the West Bank while reinforcing
Israeli control of the settlements and adjacent land, and by continuing to
construct Israel's controversial, partially completed security barrier far to the
east of the Green Line.
243
C. Preventing Internal Divisions from Blocking Agreement
We believe that by crafting a specific land-for-peace proposal that serves
as many interests of both parties as possible, accompanying that proposal with
238. Egypt Recalls Ambassador from Israel, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 1, 2000, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,400871,00.html.
239. See Palestine Nat'l Info. Ctr., World Reactions to the Latest Developments in the
Palestinian Territories, http://www.pnic.gov.ps/arabic/quds/eng/reactions/2001/2001l1/e-reaction_26.-
html (Jan. 26, 2001).
240. See Jim Lobe, U.S.: Bush's Foreign Aid Request Takes on Cold War Cast, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Feb. 3, 2004, available at http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2004/IP040205.html. The
Congressional Research Service publishes a more comprehensive listing. See Mark, supra note 215, at 6.
241. See, e.g., AJAMI, supra note 228, at 194-95.
242. An analogy might be drawn to tactics used by the United States in its attempts to forge a
treaty to end the Bosnian War of the early 1990s. The United States attempted to bring the Bosnian
Serbs to the bargaining table by unleashing Bosnian Muslim and Croat military offensives, see Saadia
Touval, Coercive Mediation on the Road to Dayton, 1 INT'L NEGOTIATION 547, 557 (1996), thus
"demonstrating to the Serbs that their defiance would be severely punished." Id. at 559. At the Dayton
peace talks, the United States warned the Bosnian Muslims that if that group did not demonstrate
flexibility, "the U.S. would abandon them, that they [would] be on their own." Id. at 566.
243. Further background and discussion of the security fence, along with an argument that a
U.S.-backed peace initiative should include affirmative support for the construction of the fence but not
necessarily along the route now planned, can be found infra at Part VI.C.2.b.ii.
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offers of side payments and other forms of U.S. assistance if it is accepted,
offering that proposal on a strictly non-negotiable basis, and taking steps to
worsen the quality of both Israel's and Palestine's BATNA of continuing the
conflict, the United States can create a situation in which agreeing to the terms
of that proposal will dominate any other option available to either side. This
scenario will not guarantee that the proposed agreement is signed and
implemented, however. As Part IV discussed, two very different types of
internal divisions within one negotiating party can prevent the consummation
of an agreement that is desirable for both sides: the party can be represented
by a faithless agent, or a minority faction can have the power to block an
agreement desired by the majority.
In Israel, the ideologically driven and politically powerful settler
community, though relatively small in number, has long set the agenda within
the dominant Likud party. It has also managed to extract significant and
extremely costly benefits from the central government, even during times of
economic hardship and national political peril.245 Recently, settler opposition
led Sharon's own Likud party to reject his proposal for unilateral
disengagement from Gaza, and threatened his hold on the governing
coalition. 246 Any U.S. peace initiative needs to take steps to minimize the
likelihood that minority preferences could control Israeli policy concerning a
peace agreement to the detriment of Israel as a whole.
Internal divisions on the Palestinian side present an even greater threat to
the achievement of a mutually beneficial peace agreement. The Bush
administration's Middle East policy attempted to address both the agency and
blocking-minority problems with a single initiative: creating the office of the
Palestinian prime minister. Although this initiative failed miserably, its
ultimate goal-the replacement of Arafat as Palestinian leader-was recently
achieved by Arafat's death. However, if internal divisions within the
Palestinian nation in the form of a blocking minority are a primary roadblock
to a peace agreement, the Bush approach shows no signs of surmounting it in
the near term, and a new initiative is needed.
244. See, e.g., Yossi Alpher, Eighteen More Months At Least, bitterlemons.org, at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl290903ed37.html (Sept. 29, 2003) (noting that while Israel has
the ability to deal with its major threats, "the Jewish body politic appears to be paralyzed by fear" of,
inter alia, "angry settlers and their rabbis").
245. See The Price of the Settlements, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 26, 2003,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml (noting that the Israeli government
spends 2.5 billion shekels per year on the settlements and 40,000 shekels per settler family over and
above the normal funds spent per citizen); Moti Bassok, Decades of Tax Breaks for the Settler
Population, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 26, 2003, http://www.haaretz.corn/hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.-
jhtml. The settlers have, in fact, brilliantly used their leverage between the larger parties to extract
enormous benefits out of proportion to their numbers. In a classic article, Albert Hirschmann
demonstrated the underlying logic of this strategic behavior. See Albert 0. Hirschman, The Stability of
Neutralism: A Geometric Note, in ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLMCS 292-99 (Bruce M.
Russett ed., 1968) (showing how "Thirdonia" can extract large payments out of "Usonia" and
"Russonia").
246. See infra Part V.C.2.a.
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1. The State of the Roadblock: The Accidental Success of the
"Replace Arafat" Strategy
Early in his presidency, George W. Bush concluded that Yasser Arafat
was himself a roadblock to a negotiated peace, both because the Palestinian
leader was not willing to approve a land-for-peace agreement and because he
would never use the full power of his office to stop terrorism and thus ensure
that a Palestinian minority could not prevent an agreement.247 This belief
created hope that a Palestinian leader more committed to peace would solve
not only the agency problem but the blocking minority problem as well.
Accordingly, Bush initiated what might be called the "replace Arafat '248
strategy, according to which the President pledged that no peace plan would
move forward unless the Palestinians adopted leadership that rejected terror-
a thinly veiled swipe at the Palestinian leader himself.249 For a brief time, the
policy appeared to succeed by creating enough pressure that Arafat reluctantly
appointed the moderate Abbas as Palestinian prime minister in 2003.
With Abbas installed and pledging that a Palestinian state would be a
peaceful neighbor to Israel, 250 Bush moved quickly to reengage the United
States in the Middle East peace process by issuing the Road Map. Just months
later, however, Abbas and Arafat were no longer on speaking terms, and
Abbas soon thereafter resigned his position, claiming Arafat had undermined
his authority.
251
He was right. Although Abbas held the title of prime minister, Arafat
remained the president of the PA and retained control over most of the PA's
multilayered security apparatus through the Palestinian National Security
Council, a group of hand-picked loyalists dependent upon Arafat for salaries
and patronage. Abbas convinced the Palestinian rejectionist groups to agree
247. Ross, supra note 66, at 784 ("President Bush ... believe[d] that we had indulged Arafat
too much.').
248. The term is ours, not President Bush's.
249. Muravchick, supra note 149, at 28 ("President Bush's landmark speech of June 24, 2002,
called for 'a new and different Palestinian leadership... not compromised by terror."'); see also Steven
R. Weisman, Bush Rebukes Israel for Attack in Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2003, at Al ("Mr. Bush
decreed that no one in the administration would ever deal with Mr. Arafat.").
250. Elisabeth Bumiller, Israel and Palestinians Say They Will Take First Steps in Quest for
Mideast Peace, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 2003, at Al ("In his statement, Mr. Abbas promised 'a complete
end to violence and terrorism,' as well as the collection of illegal weapons and a stop to any
encouragement of violence by Palestinian institutions-apparently a reference to schools and the news
media."). The administration also provided diplomatic pressure. Matt Rees, Who's the No. I Palestinian
Now?, TIME, June 9, 2003, at 42; Weisman, supra note 249.
251. See Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas Resigns, CNN, (Sept. 6, 2003), at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/09/06/mideast (last visited Dec. 12, 2003) (Abbas cited "lack
of support for the government's policies; harsh and dangerous domestic incitement against the
government and the obstruction of its functions, and unjustified accusations that the government and the
prime minister had the motive of either having control over everything or nothing.").
252. Fred Barnes, Time to Hit the Road Map?, DAILY STANDARD, Apr. 24, 2003, at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer preview.asp?idArticle=2593 ("Arafat has lost only a
bit of his power. He retains a virtual veto over any steps Abbas may want to take, plus the right to fire
Abbas at any time, Which means that the chief Palestinian impediment to peace, Arafat, is still in a
position to impede."); Indyk, supra note 115, at 51 ("Arafat will do everything he can to undermine
[Abbas] in order to retain power."); Rees, supra note 250, at 42 ("Arafat is working behind the scenes-
with some success-to undermine the new Prime Minister."); Stokes, supra note 125, at 1003 ("[T]he
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to a temporary ceasefire with Israel in the summer of 2003 .253 But when that
ceasefire collapsed in mid-summer, Abbas shied away from a military
confrontation with the militants, presumably because without Arafat's support
he lacked both the military muscle and popular political backing to prevail in
such a confrontation.
254
According to the Road Map, the PA must reduce its number of security
services to three, all of which must answer only to the Interior Minister, who
in turn must answer only to the prime minister. 255 Arafat ignored this
requirement during Abbas's tenure as prime minister. After appointing
Parliament speaker Ahmed Queria, also known as Abu Ala, to replace Abbas,
Arafat continued to ignore the Road Map's clear mandate, 256 rejecting
Queria's nominee for the office of Interior Minister and maintaining firm
control of the security services. 25 7 Not long after his appointment, Queria
resigned his post and agreed to rescind his resignation only after Arafat
promised to reform the Palestinian security services and give more control to
Queria.258 Like many of Arafat's promises, however, this one remained
largely unfulfilled.259
Mortality, of course, achieved the tactical goal that U.S. policy could
not-the removal of Yasser Arafat as agent of Palestine. Although this might
move the parties one step closer to agreement, it will not necessarily
overcome even the roadblock of internal division. The "replace Arafat"
strategy was premised implicitly on two assumptions. The first was that a
Palestinian leader who supported the concept of land for peace would exert
the power of the PA to crack down on the rejectionist factions. The second
was that the PA has the power to stop terrorism and thus prevent Palestinian
rejectionists from exercising a de facto veto over a peace agreement by
law creating [the Prime Ministry] left Arafat in charge of security in the Palestinian Authority, raising
doubts about [Abbas's] ultimate authority.").
253. See generally James Bennet & Greg Myre, Israeli Forces Withdrawing from Gaza, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 30, 2003, at Al ("Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the militant Palestinian groups [sic] announced
a three-month halt to attacks.").
254. Cf. James Bennet, Accord Reported on Israeli Pullout from Gaza Areas, N.Y. TIMEs, June
28, 2003, at Al ("Mr. Abbas has argued that he needs to extract concessions from Israel ... before he
will be politically strong enough to confront Hamas ...."); Ehud Ya'ari, Riding Low, JERUSALEM REP.,
June 30, 2003, at 23 ("The moment he gave his word that he would not attempt to harm Hamas, even if
they continued with their terror attacks, Abu Mazen lost one of his main instruments of leverage over the
organization and was left as nothing more than a lobbyist for ending the spiral of violence.").
255. See U.S. Dept. of State, Press Statement, A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent
Two-State Solution to the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (Apr. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm ("All Palestinian security organizations are
consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.").
256. See Yossi Alpher, Strategy and Local Politics, bitterlemons.org, at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bll01103ed4l.html (Nov. 10, 2003) ("In Ramallah, Palestinian
leader Yasir Arafat is again fully in control, having beat back the reformers. He and his Fatah Central
Committee cronies retain a strategic approach that ultimately relies on violence ....").
257. See Isabel Kershner, Separation Anxiety, JERUSALEM REP., Sept. 6, 2004, at 22-23.
258. See, e.g., Greg Myre, Arafat Agrees with Premier on Ending Their Standoff, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 2004, at A9.
259. See Kershner, supra note 257, at 22-23 ("[O]nce more, Arafat's [star) appears to be the
strongest in the constellation. 'It seems that the president has prevailed,' says Ziad Abu Amr, a
Palestinian Legislative Council member and reform advocate from Gaza City. 'He managed to get away
with his new appointments, and reasserted his authority vis-A-vis his security services.").
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continuing to make war on Israel. The second premise remains untested
because, up until Arafat's death, the first proved false.
It is therefore critical to recognize that even if Abbas, the newly elected
president of the PA, uses all the tools at his disposal, it remains unclear
whether the PA, acting alone, can prevent Palestinian rejectionists from
routinely launching terrorist attacks against Israel and thus effectively
blocking the implementation of any land-for-peace agreement. Consequently,
a U.S. policy designed to maximize the likelihood of helping the disputants
reach a peace agreement (in addition to providing a specific, non-negotiable
set of peace agreement terms and a series of strong measures to establish or
widen the bargaining zone) must consciously include efforts designed to
disempower Palestinian rejectionists and thus prevent internal divisions within
Palestine from blocking implementation of that agreement. A U.S.-sponsored
peace initiative should also take seriously the possibility that Israeli
rejectionists can wield their influence in Sharon's Likud party to block the
implementation of a land-for-peace agreement.
2. Policy Initiative: Disempower Rejectionist Groups
No U.S. policy that hopes to forge peace in the Holy Land can succeed if
the leaders of Israel or Palestine do not have the power to commit their
internal constituencies to the terms of the deal proposed. 260 As discussed in
Part IV.C, a threat posed by a minority constituency to the adoption or
implementation of a negotiated agreement can be confronted by co-opting or
disempowering those constituencies. Carefully drafted, the terms of a specific
land-for-peace agreement could co-opt many opponents to peace, winning
their acquiescence if not their active support. For example, if the specific
territorial division permits Israel to retain some Jewish settlements located
near the Green Line and in the Jerusalem suburbs, perhaps in return for some
Israeli territory elsewhere, many settlers would no doubt support the
agreement. If the proposed terms also provide sufficient rights to Palestinian
refugees-whether in terms of very limited opportunities to immigrate to
Israel, financial compensation, citizenship in third countries, or some
combination of these-many Palestinians who support rejectionist groups
such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad might reassess their opposition to
peace.
This said, it would be unrealistic to believe that, whatever the specific
terms of a land-for-peace agreement, all of the Israelis who believe that the
land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River must be entirely Jewish
and all of the Palestinians who believe the same land must be entirely Arab
could ever be assuaged. Consequently, a U.S. peace initiative should focus on
disempowering these groups-that is, making it impossible for their
opposition to block the implementation of a land-for-peace agreement.
260. Cf. Lawrence Susskind & Eileen Babbit, Overcoming Obstacles to Effective Mediation of
International Disputes, in MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 196, at 30, 33 (noting
that a condition of mediation effectiveness is that party representatives have "authority to speak for their
members and to commit to a course of action").
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a. Detaching the Settlers
For the past thirty years, Israeli settlers and their supporters have
become a key component-perhaps the key component-in the power base of
Ariel Sharon's Likud party. 261 These Israelis provide Likud's core
constituency, and the Party reciprocates by providing enormous government
benefits to the settler movement. 262 The intifada, among other problems, has
caused Israel's worst economic crisis since the early 1950S,263 yet the
government continues to spend billions of shekels on settlement development
at the expense of education, health care, and economic development within
pre-1967 Israel. 264 The IDF spend scarce resources defending militarily
indefensible positions in the settlements, risking the lives of hundreds of
soldiers and doing little to protect the vast majority of Israel's citizens from
terrorism.
265
Sharon's plan to unilaterally abandon the settlements in Gaza enjoys
broad support among the Israeli public,26 6 and polls show that most Israelis
support the concept of dismantling most of the West Bank settlements as part
267of a peace agreement. The opposition of settlers, however, could lead to
Israeli rejection of a land-for-peace proposal. Recent events illustrate the
political power that defenders of the settlements have in Israel, despite their
minority status. When Sharon proposed withdrawal from Gaza, the
membership of his Likud party voted overwhelmingly to reject the plan,
embarrassing the prime minister and demonstrating that the settlers' political
power is much greater than suggested by the four percent of the Israeli
268population that they comprise.
Any U.S. initiative should drive a wedge between the settlers and both
their supporters inside the Green Line and the rest of the Israeli population.
U.S. efforts to reduce the quality of Israel's BATNA by threatening to
withhold economic, military, and political support should Israel reject the
proposed agreement, as explained above, might have this effect. According to
one prominent scholar of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli prime ministers
261. For a background on the settler movement and its role in the Likud, see Isabel Kershner,
Tearing Ourselves Apart, JERUSALEM REP., Nov. 18, 2002, at 12. Over the last four years, right-wing
settler movements have become more influential within the Likud party. See Leslie Susser, The
Infiltrators, JERUSALEM REP., Dec. 2, 2002, at 34.
262. See, e.g., Gerald M. Steinberg, Israel's Best Option, bitterlemons.org, at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/b1090204ed5.htmI (Feb. 9, 2004) (noting that Sharon's "long-term
core constituency" is the settler population located in "Judea, Samaria and Gaza").
263. See, e.g., Pinhas Landau, Needed: New Ideas, New People, JERUSALEM REP., Dec. 16,
2002, at 39; Leslie Susser et al., Six Key Challenges for the Next Government, JERUSALEM REP., Feb. 10,
2003, at 15-16 (noting that Israel has a 10.4% unemployment rate, two years of negative economic
growth, 7% inflation, and the West's largest rich-poor gap).
264. Cf. The Price of the Settlements, supra note 245; Bassok, supra note 245.
265. Cf. The Price of the Settlements, supra note 245 (noting that the IDF spend 4 billion
shekels each year defending the settlements).
266. See Greg Myre, Netanyahu Joins Call for Referendum on Pullout of Gaza Settlers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2004, at A5.
267. See, e.g., James Bennet, Israel Coalition Nears Collapse in Budget Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2002, at At (citing an Israeli poll finding that 78% of Israelis surveyed would favor dismantling
the settlements); Everts, supra note 205, at 673 (citing a Ha'aretz report for the proposition that "a
majority of Israelis still favour removing most settlements in the context of a peace deal").
268. Cf Avnery, supra note 45.
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dating back to David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir have justified making
concessions in negotiations with their Arab neighbors by claiming they were
"necessitated by threatening notes from American presidents." 269 In addition,
the U.S.-sponsored land-for-peace initiative should include as one element a
large economic aid package to Israel for use in dismantling the settlements on
land that would, under the proposal's terms, be part of the state of 
Palestine. 270
Withdrawing from the settlements would be tremendously expensive-the
cost of withdrawing from just the small Gaza settlements is expected to
exceed $1 billion, including relocation payments. 27 1 It would be particularly
difficult for Sharon's government to reject a U.S.-sponsored agreement if an
obvious and immediate consequence of doing so would be to turn down a
large subsidy to dismantle settlements and instead sacrifice services to Israelis
272
living within the Green Line in order to preserve the settlements.
b. Controlling the Capacity of Palestinian Rejectionist
Groups
As we asserted above, any U.S.-sponsored peace agreement should
include a specific warranty committing the PA to use all its available
resources to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorist organizations within the
273Territories. However, relying on the PA alone to control terrorism and
make a land-for-peace agreement both possible and enduring has failed thus
far, and its future prospects remain uncertain at best. To maximize the chances
of success, a U.S. peace initiative should include a multi-pronged approach to
controlling terrorism by Palestinian rejectionists, with commitments of the
Palestinian security forces only part of that approach. In addition, the United
States needs to exert direct political pressure on Arab and Muslim nations that
provide economic and military assistance for Palestinian rejectionists to
eliminate (or, more likely, reduce) that assistance, and to support Israel's
construction of a separation barrier to provide a level of defensive protection
against terrorist attacks.
274
i. External Funding of Terror
Although Arab and Islamic nations historically have provided little
assistance to the PA, 275 they have strongly supported the Palestinian
269. TOUVAL, supra note 1, at 269-70.
270. As we suggested above, a U.S.-sponsored land-for-peace agreement might permit Israel to
retain some settlement blocks that are located close to the Green Line, perhaps in return for territorial
concessions elsewhere. See supra Part VI.A.2. Any land-for-peace proposal, however, would likely call
on Israel to evacuate a large number of settlements and turn the land over to Palestine.
271. Greg Myre, Israeli Panel Approves Payout for Settlers Wo Leave Gaza Strip, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2004, at A5.
272. By one estimate, relocating all Jewish settlers into Israel would cost $6 billion. Dan
Ephron, Middle East: The Sky's the Limit, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 2002, at 44, 46.
273. See supra Part VI.B.2.a.
274. See infra Part VI.C.2.b.2.
275. See Peter Hansen, Statement to Council of Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs, League of
Arab States (Mar. 12, 2001), http://www.un.org/unrwa/news/statements/arab-mar0l.html:
Ever since 1987, this esteemed Council's resolution no. 4645 has called on Arab
countries to increase their contributions to the Agency's annual budget to the level of
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rejectionists with financial assistance for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
military technology and expertise, training facilities, and logistical help in
smuggling weapons and explosives into the Palestinian territories.276
In launching the Road Map, President Bush urged Arab and Islamic
nations to cut off all sources of financial and military support for the militant
Palestinian factions that promote terrorism. 277 Moral pressure has not been
sufficient, however, and is not likely to be. More diplomatic arm-twisting is
necessary-arm-twisting that can be attempted only by the United States, in
light of the importance that the Arab states attach to their ties with
Washington.
278
To be fair, the administration has taken some steps in this direction. The
U.S. invasion of Iraq had the side effect of reducing the ability of Palestinian
rejectionists to foment terror by eliminating one regime that had provided
economic support for Palestinian extremists. 279 In the wake of the Iraq war,
Pentagon sources hinted that the United States believes Syria assisted Saddam
Hussein 290 and tacitly threatened that Syria's Ba'athist regime, long a
supporter of Palestinian rejectionists, might suffer the same fate that befell
Saddam if its behavior did not improve.2 81 Washington also protected Israel
diplomatically when its air force raided Palestinian terrorist training camps
inside Syria in 2003,282 and dropped its opposition to tough sanctions against
Damascus. 283 Syria should know that any further sponsorship of Palestinian
7.8% of UNRWA's annual budget. In 2000, total Arab contributions to UNRWA's
budget were 1.9% only. Having the privilege and honour to be here on behalf the 3.8
million refugees we serve and the 22,000 employees we employ, I sincerely hope that
your esteemed Council will find a way to implement its 14 year old resolution which will
bring us much closer to making ends meet this year and for as long as our services are
required.
The official website of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) lists pledges from
donor states, although it does not break down actual contributions. Still, it shows that Arab states' actual
support for UNRWA is negligible, paling before EU and Scandinavian contributions, and distantly
behind that of the United States. See United Nations Relief and Works Agency, How UNRWA Is
Funded?, http://www.un.org/unrwa/fmances/index.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2004).
276. We use the somewhat inelegant phrase "Arab and Islamic nations" here primarily because
the largest regional (and perhaps global) supporter of Islamic radicalism and Palestinian extremism is
Iran, a non-Arab state.
277. Sofaer, supra note 112, at 25 ("President Bush made clear where he stands in his speech
of June 24, 2002: 'Every nation actually committed to peace must block the shipment of Iranian supplies
to [terrorist] groups and oppose regimes that promote terror, like Iraq. And Syria must choose the right
side in the war on terror by closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organizations."').
278. See generally FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FtTuRE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT
HOME AND ABROAD 151 (2003) ("[E]very country [in the Middle East] views its relations with
Washington as the most critical tie they have.").
279. See, e.g., Mohammed Daraghmeh, Iraq Boosts Suicide Payment, ASSOCIATED PREss, Apr.
3, 2002, http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/2002-04-03/usw_iraq.asp.
280. See Bob Drogin and Jeffrey Fleishman, Banned Arms Flowed Into Iraq Through Syrian
Firm, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 2003, at Al.
281. See generally Alpher, supra note 111.
282. Washington ensured that Israel would not receive U.N. sanctions for the raid and blocked
a Security Council Resolution condemning it. See Harel, supra note 111.
283. See Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, 22 U.S.C.S. § 2151
(West Supp. 2004). The Act empowers the President to impose sanctions on Syria as well as to ban the
export of weapons and weapons-ready materials to Syria. The Act offers the President six further
sanctions, including a ban on all U.S. exports to Syria except food and medicine, restrictions on Syrian
diplomats in Washington and at the United Nations to a 25-mile radius of that city and that building, and
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rejectionists would substantially worsen U.S.-Syrian relations and put the
Damascus regime at risk.
Saudi Arabia provides significant economic and moral support to
Palestinian rejectionism. Prominent elements of the Saudi royal family and
Wahhabi clerics closely tied to the regime provide crucial financial and
logistical support to Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups. 2m Saudi
television has held telethons to support families of Palestinian suicide
bombers, 285 and the network of Saudi religious institutions throughout the
world serves as an international funding conduit for Palestinian 
terrorism. 286
Although the U.S. government has long been silent on the subject of Saudi
support for Palestinian rejectionists, 287 as part of a U.S.-sponsored peace
initiative, Washington should reassess its relationship with the House of Saud.
The destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime has given the United States more
strategic leverage than it has had in the past: Washington no longer needs to
base troops in Saudi Arabia to protect the Kingdom's oil supplies, and it no
longer needs to buttress Saudi military forces to protect against Saddam's
aggression. Thus, Washington should condition ongoing military aid to
Riyadh on its cessation of funding of Palestinian rejectionist groups that
would seek to block a peace agreement or sabotage its implementation.
288
The Saudi role in Middle Eastern politics is more complex than merely
as a backer of Palestinian rejectionism. Indeed, our proposal for a U.S. non-
a ban on all Syrian-owned or operated aircraft from taking off, landing, or flying over the United States.
Id.
284. See, e.g., Simon Henderson, The Saudi Way, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at A10 (noting
that the Saudi royal family continues to ensure that money will flow to Hamas); Matthew Levitt, Wash.
Inst. for Near East Pol'y, Combating Terrorist Financing, Despite the Saudis, POLICYWATCH No. 673,
at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/policywatch/policywatch2002/673.htm (Nov. 1, 2002).
This is true not only for Palestinian terrorism but for radical Islamist terrorist groups worldwide,
including Al Qaeda. See, e.g., Glenn R. Simpson, Al Qaeda List Points to Saudi Elite, WALL ST. J., Mar.
18, 2003, at A7.
285. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY), Schumer Urges Saudis
to Fire Minister in Charge of Saudi Anti-Terrorism Efforts (July 31, 2003), at
http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press releases/PR01912.html;
Documents: Saudis Paid Bombers' Families, Fox News Channel (Apr. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendlystory/0,3566,51252,00.html.
286. See, e.g., Daniel McGrory, Militants Outside Control of Mosques Target Teenagers,
TIMES (London), Dec. 28, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, Times File; Fareed Zakaria, The Politics of
Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2001, at 22, 30:
Disoriented young men, with one foot in the old world and another in the new, now look
for a purer, simpler alternative. Fundamentalism searches for such people everywhere; it,
too, has been globalized. One can now find men in Indonesia who regard the Palestinian
cause as their own. Twenty years ago an Indonesian Muslim would barely have known
where Palestine was.
See also Interview with Vali Nasr, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of San Diego,
PBS-Frontline: Saudi Time Bomb? (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 25, 2001), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/interviews/nasr.html; Lawmakers Criticize Saudi
Arabia, CNN (May 18, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/18/-
lawmakers.terrorism/.
287. See generally ROBERT BAER, SLEEPING WITH THE DEVIL (2003).
288. The Saudis depend heavily upon American F-15s for military aviation, and finn American
measures-such as refusing to supply spare parts or withdrawing American personnel necessary for the
operation of Saudi air bases-could quickly destabilize the Royal Saudi Air Force. For a persuasive
demonstration of this proposition, see Michael Knights, Wash. Inst. for Near East Pol'y, Saudi Saber
Rattling, POLICYWATCH No. 802, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/-
policywatch2003/802.htm (Oct. 30, 2003).
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negotiable offer along the lines of the Geneva Accord and the People's Voice
initiative, together with firm threats against continuing backing of terrorism,
recognizes the complexity of contemporary Saudi politics. In a recent
analysis, Michael S. Doran has observed that the Saudi royal family is sharply
divided between westernizers, led by Crown Prince Abdullah, and
sympathizers with radical Islam, led by Abdullah's half-brother Prince
Nayef.289 By providing a non-negotiable land-for-peace offer, U.S. foreign
policy would support the westernizing factions of the Saudi royal family in
two ways. First, it would promote several of the ideas advanced by Crown
Prince Abdullah in his peace initiative of spring 2002; second, it would belie
the Islamists' assertions that the United States seeks to destroy Palestinian
nationhood and is simply a stooge of Sharon and the Israeli settlers.
290
Finally, there is Iran, the most vocal advocate of the destruction of Israel
in the Middle East today 291 and the chief patron of both Hezbullah and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 292 Iranian cooperation against Palestinian
rejectionists is impossible as long as radical mullahs, led by Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei (the nation's Supreme Leader), remain in power. The clerics in
Tehran prefer continued attempts to liquidate the Jewish state to an Israeli-
Palestinian peace agreement.
293
Islamism is deeply unpopular in Iran, suggesting that time itself might
end Iranian support of Palestinian rejectionism. Eliminating the threat to a
peace agreement posed by Palestinian rejectionists in the near term, however,
calls for a U.S. commitment to isolate the mullahs and expose their
294 295corruption as well as support reformers in every way possible. In
289. See generally Michael S. Doran, The Saudi Paradox, FoREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 35.
290. See BAER, supra note 287.
291. Former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani bluntly stated that his country desires
nuclear weapons so that it can obliterate Tel Aviv. See Middle East Media Res. Inst., Former Iranian
President Rafsanjani on Using a Nuclear Bomb Against Israel, Special Dispatch Series No. 325 (Jan. 3,
2002), http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area-sd&ID=SP32502. Iran is so
virulently anti-Israel that it refused humanitarian assistance from Israel after the devastating December
2003 earthquake in Barn, which took more than 20,000 lives. See USA Today, Tens of Thousands Said
to Be Dead in Iranian Earthquake, (Dec. 26, 2003), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-12-26-iran-earthquake2_x.htm (quoting the mayor of
Kerman as saying "[wie welcome assistance from all countries except Israel.").
292. See, e.g., Ely Karmon, Wash. Inst. for Near East Pol'y, The U.S. Indictment of Palestinian
Islamic Jihad Militants: The Iranian Connection, POLICYWATCH No. 718, at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch2003/718.htm (Mar. 3, 2003);
Middle East Media Research Inst., Khamenei's Response to Israeli-Palestinian Fighting, Special
Dispatch Series No. 365, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area-sd&ID=SP36502
(Apr. 10, 2002).
293. See, e.g., Leslie Susser, The Iranian Threat, JERUSALEM REP., Mar. 11, 2002, at 12.
294. Fareed Zakaria states:
Iranians now have a visceral disgust with clerics in power, a backlash that is more likely
to produce the separation of mosque and state than scholarly writings about an Islamic
reformation. Washington should make a major effort to publicize the mullahs' greed. It
can obtain-from Switzerland, Luxembourg, wherever-the hard evidence that will show
Iranians that their sainted leaders are as corrupt as Africa's worst tin-pot tyrants ....
Washington should also fund the satellite-television stations, many beaming out of Los
Angeles, that have become manna for information-starved Iranians. Most of their
programs are not particularly political, but news, entertainment, fashion-all harmless
windows into the modem world-are the slow killers of a closed society. Many of these
stations are struggling for lack of money. Small sums could make a big difference.
Fareed Zakaria, Time to Expose the Mullahs, NEWSwEEK, Dec. 23, 2002, at 45, 45.
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addition, as noted above, America needs to engage its European allies to work
with it in isolating Tehran. 296 The United States does not have good options
with Iran, but coordinated multilateral efforts at isolating the regime, thus far
ignored, could make life more difficult for the Palestinian rejectionists and
convince Israel that the days in which those rejectionists receive support from
Tehran are numbered.
ii. The Security Barrier
After the failure of the Camp David II peace talks, Israeli pessimism
with the peace process gave an old idea of building a separation barrier
between Palestine and Israel new political currency. 297 In 2002, Israel began
unilateral construction of a barrier between Israel and portions of the West
Bank, with plans calling for a barrier that stands as tall as fifty feet in places
and has several border crossing points. 29 The following year, the Israeli
government completed plans to extend the barrier 720 continuous kilometers
nearly all the way around the West Bank.2 9 9 It is now approximately twenty-
five percent complete. 300 Israel argues that the barrier will provide a
substantial level of protection against Palestinian terrorists. In support of this
295. A U.S. effort to encourage regime change in Tehran need not imply an Iraq-style invasion.
As recent Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin 'Ebadi has noted, in Iran there is an internal mechanism for
change based upon Parliament. Middle East Media Res. Inst., Shirin 'Ebadi, Iranian Nobel Peace Prize
Laureate, Special Dispatch Series No. ' 325. http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?-
Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP59603 (Oct. 24, 2003).
296. As of now, the Bush administration appears to be moving in precisely the opposite
direction, softening its position on Tehran in response to election-year imperatives and not engaging its
European allies on this issue.
The Bush administration, which has abandoned Afghanistan to warlordism and seems
resigned to tribalism and fragmentation in Iraq, has now opted to discard 'regime change'
in Iran. One can almost hear the election speeches of US President George W. Bush. The
administration's capitulation to the right-wing mullahs at the moment of the reversal of
American fortunes in the Middle East will be spun as Iranian capitulation in the face of
Washington's show of force in Iraq. This is no surprise. The US has put spreading
democracy in the Middle East on the backburner, especially this election year.
Ahmad Sadri, Daily Star, Indifference and Iran's Reformists, Feb. 6, 2004, available at
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition-ID=ID&articleID=223&categ-id=5.
297. A few portions of a security fence had been built by the Rabin government in the early
1990s. See, e.g., WASSERSTEIN, supra note 6, at 147 (calling this construction "haphazard and
uncoordinated"), but the project lay dormant during the latter part of the decade. Shimon Peres, Rabin's
successor, believed that economic integration was the key to peace, and so rejected separation strategies
such as the fence. Peres's successor, Benjamin Netanyahu, rejected the fence because of his political ties
to West Bank settlers. See Makovsky, supra note 183, at 53.
298. See Ze'ev Schiff, Something's Afoot Along the Fence, HA'ARETZ, Dec. 12, 2003,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/arch/ArchSearchEngArt.jhtml.
299. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
2004 I.C.J. No. 131 (July 9), para. 80, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/-
idocket/imwp/imwp advisoryopinion/imwpadvisoryopinion_20040709.htm [hereinafter Legal
Consequences]. It is impossible to present a precise account of exactly where, how long, and how high
the fence will be when completed because the Israeli government's plans for it appear to change rapidly.
See, e.g., WASSERSTEIN, supra note 6, at 149 (fence will be 215 miles long with five checkpoints);
Makovsky, supra note 183, at 59 (under the Ministry of Defence plans, there will be "five enclaves west
of the fence, which would be connected to the West Bank by underpasses or checkpoints."); Schiff,
supra note 298 (fence will be between 500 and 750 kilometers long, with precise numbers of
checkpoints to be decided).
300. Greg Myre, Israelis To Extend Barrier Deeper Into the West Bank, N.Y. TiMEs, June 15,
2004, at All.
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claim, the Israeli government credited a fence that separates the Gaza Strip
from Israel with being largely responsible for the fact that only one suicide
bombing has originated from Gaza during the second intifada.3°t It also argues
that Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel launched from the West Bank have
already been reduced substantially in the areas adjacent to the portions of the
barrier that currently exist.
302
The plan to build the security barrier has been a lightening rod for
international criticism. Last summer, by a vote of fourteen to one, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory ruling that the barrier
violates international law by impeding the movement of West Bank
Palestinians and potentially altering the demographic balance of the region.
303
Shortly after, the U.N. General Assembly voted to demand that Israel
dismantle the barrier. 304 An earlier U.S. veto prevented the U.N. Security
Council from adopting a Resolution along the same lines, but even the United
States has expressed concerns about the construction of the barrier deep inside
301. At the end of 2003, the number was zero:
[S]ince early 2001, not a single successful Palestinian suicide bomber has infiltrated
Israel from Gaza, and mortar shells fired from within the territory have failed to kill any
Israelis. Given that Gaza has been surrounded by a fence since 1994, this fact has had a
heavy impact on arguments for a barrier around the West Bank: many Israelis see it as
proof that a fence can stop terrorism.
Makovsky, supra note 183, at 55. In March 2004, two Hamas suicide bombers were able to
sneak out of the Gaza Strip and blow up a section of the port of Ashdod. Sharon Cancels Peace
Talks, CBS News (Mar. 15, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/16/-
world/main606574.shtml.
302. This is certainly the view of pro-Israel analysts, even when suicide bombers have
managed to get through.
The bombing in Tel Aviv Sunday showed distress among the terrorist
organizations. It is further proof that Israel is winning the war on Palestinian terror and
that the security barrier has a central role in this .... The 180 kilometers of the planned
780-kilometer fence has been completed and is under full patrol by the IDF. This has
substantially stabilized the terror.
The Palestinians are deterred by the fence and there have been very few attempts
to try and infiltrate it. There is no longer the situation where a suicide bomber gets into a
car in Tulkarm and half an hour later blows himself up in Netanya, as had happened three
times in the past two years.
According to security establishment statistics, in the past 11 months since the
fence was declared operational, just three suicide bombers succeeded .... This was a 90
percent drop from the 73 suicide attacks in the 34 months before the barrier was built.
Arieh O'Sullivan, Blips in the Stats, JERUSALEM POST, July 12, 2004, at 1. Many Palestinians agree. See
Joshua Hammer, A Change of Direction, MSNBC (Aug. 30, 2004), available at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5784338/site/newsweek ("The few active guerrillas in the West Bank admit
that attacking Israeli targets has become a near-insurmountable challenge. 'The [724-kilometer security]
wall has made it almost impossible for us to conduct operations,' says Zacaria Zubeideh, the leader of
the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the Jenin refugee camp."). The successful Hamas attack on August 31,
2004 in Beersheba, southern Israel, was blamed on the absence of the fence in the southern sector. See
Dan Ephron, 16 Killed in Suicide Bombings in Israel, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 2004, at Al ("Several
Israeli officials said delays in erecting a disputed separation barrier in the West Bank... allowed the
bombers to cross from their home in the southern West Bank town of Hebron to Beersheba.").
303. Legal Consequences, supra note 299, para. 134.
304. Warren Hoge, Remove Wall, Israel Is Told by the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at
A10. The vote was 150 in favor, 6 against (including the United States), with 10 abstentions. Id.
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the West Bank,"' going so far as to cancel loan guarantees to Israel equal to
the costs of barrier construction.
306
Although objections have been raised to the mere existence of a barrier
that essentially fences in West Bank Palestinians, international opposition has
been focused primarily on its location.3 °7 Parts of the completed and planned
portions of the barrier are located on the Green Line, but much of the barrier is
located much further east, cutting through large swaths of Palestinian
territory. 308 Critics of the barrier, which, according to a U.N. Secretary
General's Report, will place 16.6 percent of the West Bank and 320,000
Jewish settlers on the Israeli side,30 charge that its construction is an Israeli
attempt to de facto annex portions of the Territories, and that its existence will
further entrench the settlements lying inside the fence and make a negotiated
peace even more difficult to achieve. 310 The Israeli government contends that
the fence has no political purpose and will not prejudice the content of a future
Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and that its location is dictated solely by
military and security necessity. 311 Whatever the actual motivation for the
barrier's route, it is clear that its location is causing, and will continue to
cause, substantial hardship to as many as 237,000 West Bank Palestinians
who will find themselves physically separated from West Bank population
centers and as many as 160,000 more who will find themselves in
communities almost completely encircled by the barrier.3 12
Just prior to the issuance of the ICJ opinion, Israel's Supreme Court
heard a challenge raised by a number of Palestinian villages on the West Bank
to the location of specific portions of the barrier located near Jerusalem.
Ruling for the villages in seven challenges out of eight, the Court held that the
challenged portions of the fence were illegal and ordered the government to
305. See, e.g., Myre, supra note 300 (noting that the Bush administration "does not object to
the barrier in principle" but has expressed concerns about its location beyond the Green Line).
306. See Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Rescinds Part of Loan Guarantees to Israel, N.Y TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2003, at A12.
307. In its advisory ruling on the wall, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) specifically noted
that it was not "called upon to examine the legal consequences arising from the construction of those
parts of the wall" on Israeli territory. Legal Consequences, supra note 299, para. 67.
308. In point of fact, there are, as of this writing, two major plans for the fence. One plan is
properly referred to by David Makovsky as the "encirclement fence," for it would leave Palestinians
with only 53% of the West Bank, stranding more than 270,000 Palestinians and 147 Palestinian villages
on the Israeli side of the fence. See Makovsky, supra note 183, at 51 & 60-61. It would also cut
Palestinian land into several noncontiguous cantons, with no real border with any state except Israel. Id.
at 60-61. Another plan would be much more circumscribed: Palestinians would have 85.5% of the land,
and only 10,000 Palestinians and 32 villages would be stranded on the Israeli side. Id.; see also Schiff,
supra note 298 (noting that the Ministry of Defence plan has begun to dominate Israeli government
planning). The fence envisioned under the Geneva Accord goes further, leaving 100% of Palestinians on
the Palestinian side and not confiscating any Palestinian land. See Makovsky, supra note 183, at 61.
309. Legal Consequences, supra note 299, para. 84.
310. See, e.g., Isabel Kershner, Zoned Out, JERUSALEM REP., Jan. 26, 2004, at 24, 25 ("The
Ramallah-based PLO Negotiations Affairs Department speaks of Israeli 'de facto annexation' of the
land between the wall and the Green Line, and of an Israeli attempt to 'cleanse' these areas of their
Palestinian population."). The PLO led a successful effort to get the U.N. General Assembly to condemn
the fence and send the issue to the ICJ in The Hague. Ina Friedman, Fencing in The Hague, JERUSALEM
REP., Jan. 12, 2004, at 24.
311. Legal Consequences, supra note 299, para. 116; H.C. 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village
Council v. Gov't of Israel, para. 28, available at http://62.90.71.124/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html (June
30, 2004) [hereinafter Beit Sourik Village Council].
312. Legal Consequences, supra note 299, para. 84.
2005]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
relocate or remove them.3 13 Unlike the ICJ, which concluded that the harm to
Palestinians caused by the barrier "cannot be justified by milita7 exigencies
or by the requirements of national security or public order," the Israeli
Supreme Court held that both international and Israeli law require that
marginal security benefits be proportional to the marginal hardship that the
location of the barrier creates for Palestinians.315 The Court accepted the
government's argument that the barrier was sited on flat, high ground and at a
distance from Israeli population centers for security-related purposes, 316 but it
determined that the hardship created clearly outweighed the strategic benefits,
at least in some instances. In its analysis of eight different portions of the
barrier, the Court found in seven instances that that the military could site the
barrier in an alternative location that would substantially reduce hardship to
Palestinian villages while imposing at most a small security disadvantage for
Israel.317
The Israeli Supreme Court's careful analysis leaves little doubt that a
defensive barrier can be constructed on Israeli territory and still contribute
substantially to Israeli security from terrorists, even if Israeli territory does not
always provide the optimal location for the barrier as judged from a military
perspective. In light of this finding, U.S. financial and political support for the
construction of a security barrier along the final Israeli-Palestinian border
should be an element of a U.S.-sponsored peace proposal. If the Israeli
government believes that portions of the proposed border would be
strategically unsuitable for the barrier, it could (after agreeing to the non-
negotiable agreement terms) attempt to renegotiate portions of the border with
Palestine. If Palestine believes that a security barrier across portions of the
new border would be undesirable for economic, social, or political reasons, it
could attempt to renegotiate the location of the border or provide security
sufficient to convince Israel to abandon the barrier altogether. In either case,
the barrier would not be inconsistent with international law (because it would
be built entirely on Israeli territory) or present an impediment to negotiating a
peace agreement (because its construction and location would be part of a
peace agreement).
It would be naive to believe that any physical barrier could ever
eliminate the terrorist threat to Israel posed by Palestinian rejectionists. This
reality is underscored by rockets frequently launched by Palestinians in Gaza
at Israeli towns across the Gaza fence3 1 8 that usually do not cause any harm
but occasionally result in fatalities.319 Some Palestinian radicals opposed to
313. Beit Sourik Village Council, supra note 311, para. 86.
314. Legal Consequences, supra note 299, para. 137.
315. Beit Sourik Village Council, supra note 311, paras. 36-39.
316. Id. para. 29.
317. Id. paras. 61, 67, 76, 80.
318. See Greg Myre, Israeli Pullback in Gaza Met with Palestinian Rockets, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
6, 2004, at A3 ("Palestinians have fired more than 300 Qassam rockets from Gaza in the past few
years."). For a thorough account of the background of the Hamas "Qassam Guys," and the effects that
the missile launches are having on ordinary Palestinians, see Isabel Kershner, Qassam City, JERUSALEM
REP., Sept. 20, 2004, at 24-26.
319. Greg Myre, Sharon Said To Agree To Pull Back Troops, N.Y. TtMEs, Oct. 15, 2004, at
A10 (reporting that two Israeli children in Sederot were killed by rockets); see also Joseph Berger,
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peace will no doubt go to substantial effort to find ways through, around, or
over the barrier. Notwithstanding this reality, a substantial and well-patrolled
security barrier certainly would reduce the severity of that threat, thus
mitigating the ability of rejectionists to prevent Palestine from providing Israel
with the peace that would rightfully be due to Israel as part of a land-for-peace
bargain. Thus, U.S. support for the barrier's construction as part of a peace
agreement would increase the desirability of such an agreement from Israel's
perspective compared to its BATNA of continued hostilities.
VII. CONCLUSION
A conflict that can be alternately described as national, ethnic, or
religious, that has existed in its present form for thirty-eight years and has
centuries-old roots, and that has repeatedly defied resolution by Nobel Peace
laureates and leaders from every comer of the globe, quite obviously lacks
any easy solutions. Our treatment of the problem is not meant to imply that we
believe we have all of the answers. To even be attempted in full, our proposal
would require that the United States adopt a foreign policy that would
engender significant opposition domestically, make threats and commitments
that would be difficult to carry out, and depend on the support and cooperation
of other nations with which Washington cooperates sometimes, rarely, or
never, as the case may be. To make these efforts succeed, our proposal would
require that U.S. policymakers understand the Middle East well enough to
craft a specific agreement that falls within the parties' bargaining zone, while
taking steps to make certain that Middle Eastern leaders do not doubt U.S.
resolve. In addition, our proposal requires that Israelis and Palestinians react
to the U.S.-sponsored initiative with cold rationality and a desire to serve their
long-term best interests rather than with hot, short-sighted emotion. The
obvious difficulty of implementing such a policy might explain why no U.S.
government has attempted to do what we propose.
The repeated failure of Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate an enduring
peace agreement, however, suggests the need for new analytical prisms
through which to view the Middle East conflict. We believe that our
framework, informed by negotiation theory, presents a fresh way to
conceptualize the impediments to peace in sufficient detail to generate policy
proposals but not in so much minutiae that paralysis results.
Our framework also leads logically to policy prescriptions for the United
States that do not fit neatly into the usual political debates on the subject.
Neoconservatives (often closely aligned with the Bush administration) have
argued that to struggle for Middle East peace requires the United States to use
all military, political and economic means at its disposal to pressure
recalcitrant Arab and Muslim regimes to make peace and overthrow those that
will not.320 Liberals, in contrast, insist that Middle East peace requires the
Militants Force Palestinian Family into an Agonizing Choice, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2004, at A4
(reporting that an Israeli child and an Israeli adult were killed in Sederot).
320. See generally DAVID FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: How To WIN THE WAR
ON TERROR (2004). Frum served as President George W. Bush's principal speechwriter during the first
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United States to become directly involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
and work more closely both with multilateral institutions such as the United
Nations and with its European allies. 321 Our framework suggests that a
strategy most likely to help break the impasse would include elements of both
of these approaches plus a number of other features as well.
Most importantly, our analysis suggests that any U.S.-sponsored Middle
East initiative can maximize its likelihood of success by consciously
addressing the full range of potential roadblocks to peace. The Bush
administration's determination that Yasser Arafat was the primary
impediment to peace resulted in four years of single-minded focus in
Washington on eliminating his influence. Pursuing a policy so narrow was and
continues to be a high-risk approach. Even if Arafat's ultimate successors are
faithful agents of the Palestinian people, the absence of a bargaining zone,
blocking minorities on one or both sides, and strategic hard bargaining will
still threaten to derail attempts to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the
basis of land for peace. Arafat's death has given many Israelis, Palestinians,
Americans, and other interested parties a renewed sense of optimism that an
Israeli-Palestinian peace might be possible. A reinvigorated U.S. policy must
be comprehensive-that is, consciously designed to circumvent each of the
potential roadblocks.
two years of the Bush administration; Perle formerly served on the Defense Intelligence Advisory Board
and is a leading thinker in the neoconservative camp.
321. A representative statement can be found in Harold Hongju Koh, On American
Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479, 1490-91 (2003).
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